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World's  Classics 


XLIII 
THE  PRINCE 

BY 

NICCOL6  MACHIAVELLI 


THE     PRINCE 


BY 


NICCOL6    MACHIAVELLI 


TRANSLATED  INTO  ENGLISH  BY 

LUIGI  RICCI 


HUMPHREY    MILFORD 

OXFORD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

LONDON    EDINBURGH    GLASGOW 

NEW  YORK  TORONTO  MELBOURNE  CAPETOWN 

BOMBAY    CALCUTTA  AND  MADRAS 


NICCOLO  MACHIAVELLI 

Born,  Florence         „  May  3,  1469 

Died,  Florence June  22,  1527 

The  present  translation  of  Machiavelli's  *  Prince '  was 
first  published  in  'The  World's  Classics'  in  1903,  and 
reprinted  in  1909  and  1921. 


(OCT  I  6  ^943 


Printed  in  England  by  the  Garden  City  Press,  Letchworth. 


PREFACE 

*> 

OF  all  Machiavelli's  works  The  Prince  is  undoubtedly 
the  greatest  ;  aiid  a  new  English  edition  of  it  is 
likely  to  he  welcome  to  all  those  who  have  not  the 
advantage  of  reading  it  in  the  classical  Italian 
original. 

For  a  true  appreciation  of  Machiavelli,  impossible 
in  a  brief  Preface,  I  must  refer  the  English  reader 
to  Macaulay's  Essay  on  the  Italian  historian  and 
statesman.  In  it  he  will  see  how  our  Author's  ideas 
and  work  were  wrongfully  and  wilfully  misinter- 
preted by  the  very  men  who,  while  profiting  by  his 
wisdom,  have  with  great  ingratitude  criticised  the 
statesman  and  defamed  his  name,  as  that  of  the 
inventor  of  the  worst  political  system  ever  imagined. 
Yet,  as  his  whole  life  was  an  indefatigable  and  un- 
remitting endeavour  to  secure  for  his  native  Florence 
a  good  and  popular  government,  and  as  he  lost  his 
great  office  of  Secretary  to  the  Florentine  Republic 
on  account  of  his  avowed  liberal  opinions,  it  is  not 
only  unjust  but  ridiculous  to  accuse  him  of  helping 
tyrants  to  enslave  the  people.  What  he  did  was  to 
show  in  the  most  deliberate  and  in  the  plainest  way 
the  arts  by  which  free  peoples  were  made  slaves  ; 
and,  had  his  words  of  advice  been  always  heeded, 
no  tyrant  in  Italy  or  elsewhere  could  have  been 
successful  in  his  policy.  That  he  was  not  listened 
to,  and  his  advice  scorned  and  spurned,  was  not 
Machiavelli's  fault. 


vi  NICCOLO  MACHIAVELL1 

Those  who  still  share  the  opinion  of  his  interested 
detractors  should  read  his  private  correspondence 
with  the  leaders  of  liberal  ideas  in  Italy — many  of 
his  letters  being  still  left  unpublished  in  the  MS. 
Collection  of  Giuliano  Ricci  in  the  National  Library, 
in  the  Riccardiana  Library  (No.  2467),  in  the 
Government  Archives  (Strozzi,  Nos.  133  and  1028) 
of  Florence,  in  the  Barberini  Library,  and  in  the 
Collezione  Gonnelli  of  the  Palatine  Library  in 
Rome. 

LUIGT  RICCI 

22  ALBKMARLE  STREET, 
LONDON,  W. 


CONTENTS 


NICCOLO    MACHIAVELL1    TO    LORENZO     THE    MAGNIFICENT 
CHAP.  PAGE 

1.  The  various  kinds  of  Government  and  the 

ways  by  which  they  are  established       .         3 

2.  Of  Hereditary  Monarchies        ...         4 

3.  Of  Mixed  Monarchies      ....         5 

4  Why  the  Kingdom  of  Darius,  occupied  by 
Alexander,  did  not  rebel  against  the 
successors  of  the  latter  after  his  death  .  14 

5.  The  way  to  govern  Cities  or  Dominions 

that,  previous  to  being  occupied,  lived 
under  their  own  Laws  ....       18 

6.  Of  New  Dominions  which  have  been  ac- 

quired by  one's  own  Arms  and  Powers .       20 

7.  Of  New  Dominions  acquired  by  the  Power 

of  others  or  by  Fortune        ...       24 

8.  Of  those  who  have  attained  the  position  of 

Prince  by  villainy         ....       32 

9.  Of  the  Civic  Principality .    '  .37 

10.  How  the  strength  of  all  States  should  be 

measured     ......       41 

11.  Of  Ecclesiastical  Principalities          .         ,       44 

12.  The  different   kinds   of  Militia  and  Mer- 

cenary Soldiers  47 

vii 


viii  NICCOLO  MACHIAVELLI 

CHAP.  PAGE 

13.  Of  Auxiliary,  Mixed,  and  Native  Troops         53 

14.  AVTiat  the  duties  of  a   Prince  are  with 

regard  to  the  Militia    ....       67 

15.  Of  the  things  for  which  Men,  and  especi- 

ally Princes,  are  praised  or  blamed      .       60 

16.  Of  Liberality  and  Niggardliness        .         .       62 

17.  Of  Cruelty  and  Clemency,  and  whether  it 

is  better  to  be  loved  or  feared       .         .       65 

18.  In  what  way  Princes  must  keep  faith        .       69 

19.  That  we  must  avoid  being  despised  and 

hated 72 

20.  Whether    Fortresses    and    other    things 

which  Princes  often  make  are  useful  or 
injurious 83 

21.  How  a  Prince  must  act  in  order  to  gain 

reputation 88 

22.  Of  the  Secretaries  of  Princes    ...       92 

23.  How  Flatterers  must  be  shunned     .         .       94 

24.  Why  the  Princes  of  Italy  have  lost  their 

States 97 

25.  How   much   Fortune   can   do  in  human 

affairs,  and  how  it  may  be  opposed       .       99 

26.  Exhortation   to  liberate   Italy  from  the 

Barbarians  ....  103 


NICCOLO  MACHIAVELLI 

TO 

LORENZO  THE  MAGNIFICENT 

SON   OF   PIERO   DI   MEDICI 

IT  is  customary  for  those  who  wish  to  gain  the 
favour  of  a  prince  to  endeavour  to  do  so  by  offer- 
ing him  gifts  of  those  things  which  they  hold 
most  precious,  or  in  which  they  know  him  to  take 
especial  delight.  In  this  way  princes  are  often 
presented  with  horses,  arms,  cloth  of  gold,  gems, 
and  such-like  ornaments  worthy  of  their  grandeur. 
In  my  desire,  however,  to  offer  to  Your  Highness 
some  humble  testimony  of  my  devotion,  I  have 
been  unable  to  find  among  my  possessions  anything 
which  I  hold  so  dear  or  esteem  so  highly  as  that 
knowledge  of  the  deeds  of  great  men  which  I  have 
acquired  through  a  long  experience  of  modern 
events  and  a  constant  study  of  the  past. 

The  results  of  my  long  observations  and  reflec- 
tions are  recorded  in  the  little  volume  which  I  now 
offer  to  Your  Highness :  and  although  I  deem  this 
work  unworthy  of  Your  Highness's  notice,  yet  my 
confidence  in  your  humanity  assures  me  that  you 
will  accept  it,  knowing  that  it  is  not  in  my  power 


2  NICCOI/)  MACHIAVELL1 

to  offer  you  a  greater  gift  than  that  of  enabling 
you  to  understand  in  the  shortest  possible  time  all 
those  things  which  I  have  learnt  through  danger 
and  suffering  in  the  course  of  many  years.  I  have 
not  sought  to  adorn  my  work  with  long  phrases  or 
high-sounding  words  or  any  of  those  allurements 
and  ornaments  with  which  many  writers  seek  to 
embellish  their  books,  as  I  desire  no  honour  for  my 
work  but  such  as  its  truth  and  the  gravity  of  its 
subject  may  justly  deserve.  Nor  will  it,  I  trust, 
be  deemed  presumptuous  on  the  part  of  a  man  of 
humble  and  obscure  condition  to  attempt  to  discuss 
and  criticise  the  government  of  princes ;  for  in 
the  same  way  that  landscape  painters  station  them- 
selves in  the  valleys  in  order  to  draw  mountains  or 
elevated  ground,  and  ascend  an  eminence  in  order 
to  get  a  good  view  of  the  plains,  so  it  is  necessary 
to  be  a  prince  to  be  able  to  know  thoroughly  the 
nature  of  a  people,  and  to  know  the  nature  of 
princes  one  must  be  one  of  the  populace. 

May  I  trust,  therefore,  that  Your  Highness  will 
accept  this  little  gift  in  the  spirit  in  which  it  is 
offered  ;  and  if  Your  Highness  will  deign  to  peruse 
it,  you  will  recognise  in  it  my  ardent  desire  that 
you  may  attain  to  that  grandeur  which  fortune  and 
your  own  merits  presage  for  you. 

And  should  Your  Highness  gaze  down  from  the 
summit  of  that  eminence  towards  this  humble  spot, 
you  will  recognise  the  great  and  unmerited  suffer- 
ings inflicted  on  me  by  a  cruel  fate. 


THE  PRINCE 


CHAPTER  I 

THE    VARIOUS    KINDS    OP    GOVERNMENT    AND   THE 
WAYS    BY    WHIC1I    THEY   ARE    ESTABLISHED 

ALL  states  and  dominions  which  hold  or  have 
held  sway  over  mankind  are  either  republics  or 
monarchies.  Monarchies  are  either  hereditary 
ones,  in  which  the  rulers  have  been  for  many  years 
of  the  same  family,  or  else  they  are  those  of  recent 
foundation.  The  newly  founded  ones  are  either 
entirely  new,  as  was  Milan  to  Francesco  Sforza,  or 
else  they  are,  as  it  were,  new  members  grafted  on 
to  the  hereditary  possessions  of  the  prince  that 
annexes  them,  as  is  the  kingdom  of  Naples  to  the 
King  of  Spain.  The  dominions  thus  acquired  have 
either  been  previously  accustomed  to  the  rule  of 
another  prince,  or  else  have  been  free  states,  and 
they  are  annexed  either  by  force  of  arms  of  the 
prince,  or  of  others,  or  else  fall  to  him  by  good 
fortune  or  merit. 


CHAPTER  II 

OF    HEREDITARY    MONARCHIES 

I  WILL  not  here  speak  of  republics,  having  already 
treated  of  them  fully  in  another  place.  I  will  deal 
only  with  monarchies,  and  will  show  how  the 
various  kinds  described  above  can  be  governed  and 
maintained.  In  the  first  place,  in  hereditary  states 
accustomed  to  the  reigning  family  the  difficulty  of 
maintaining  them  is  far  less  than  in  new  monarchies  ; 
for  it  is  sufficient  not  to  exceed  the  ancestral  usages, 
and  to  accommodate  one's  self  to  accidental  circum- 
stances ;  in  this  way  such  a  prince,  if  of  ordinary 
ability,  will  always  be  able  to  maintain  his  position, 
unless  some  very  exceptional  and  excessive  force 
deprives  him  of  it ;  and  even  if  he  be  thus  deprived 
of  it,  on  the  slightest  misfortune  happening  to  the 
new  occupier,  he  will  be  able  to  regain  it. 

We  have  in  Italy  the  example  of  the  Duke  of 
Ferrara,  who  was  able  to  withstand  the  assaults  of 
the  Venetians  in  the  year  '84,  and  of  Pope  Julius 
in  the  year  '10,  for  no  other  reason  than  because 
of  the  antiquity  of  his  family  in  that  dominion.  In 
as  much  as  the  legitimate  prince  has  less  cause  and 
less  necessity  to  give  offence,  it  is  only  natural  that 
he  should  be  more  loved  ;  and,  if  no  extraordi- 
nary vices  make  him  hated,  it  is  only  reasonable  for 
his  subjects  to  be  naturally  attached  to  him,  the 
memories  and  causes  of  innovations  being  forgotten 
in  the  long  period  over  which  his  rule  has  existed  ; 
whereas  one  change  always  leaves  the  way  prepared 
for  the  introduction  of  another. 


CHAPTER  III 

OF    MIXED    MONARCHIES 

Bur  it  is  in  the  new  monarchy  that  difficulties 
really  exist.  Firstly,  if  it  is  not  entirely  new,  but 
a  member  as  it  were  of  a  mixed  state,  its  disorders 
spring  at  first  from  a  natural  difficulty  which  exists 
in  all  new  dominions,  because  men  change  masters 
willingly,  hoping  to  better  themselves ;  and  this 
belief  makes  them  take  arms  against  their  rulers, 
in  which  they  are  deceived,  as  experience  shows 
them  that  they  have  gone  from  bad  to  worse.  This 
is  the  result  of  another  very  natural  cause,  which  is 
the  necessary  harm  inflicted  on  those  over  whom 
the  prince  obtains  dominion,  both  by  his  soldiers  and 
by  an  infinite  number  of  other  injuries  unavoidably 
caused  by  his  occupation. 

Thus  you  find  enemies  in  all  those  whom  you 
have  injured  by  occupying  that  dominion,  and  you 
cannot  maintain  the  friendship  of  those  who  have 
helped  you  to  obtain  this  possession,  as  you  will  not 
be  able  to  fulfil  their  expectations,  nor  can  you  use 
strong  measures  with  them,  being  under  an  obliga- 
tion to  them  ;  for  which  reason,  however  strong 
your  armies  may  be,  you  will  always  need  the 
favour  of  the  inhabitants  to  take  possession  of  a 
province.  It  was  from  these  causes  that  Louis  XII. 
of  France,  though  able  to  occupy  Milan  without 
trouble,  immediately  lost  it,  and  the  forces  of 


6  NICCOL6  MACHIAVELL1 

Ludovico  alone  were  sufficient  to  take  it  from  him 
the  first  time,  for  the  inhabitants  who  had  willingly- 
opened  their  gates  to  him,  finding  themselves 
deluded  in  the  hopes  they  had  cherished  and  not 
obtaining  those  benefits  that  they  had  anticipated, 
could  not  bear  the  vexatious  rule  of  their  new  prince. 
It  is  indeed  true  that,  after  reconquering  the 
rebel  territories  they  are  not  so  easily  lost  again, 
for  the  ruler  is  now,  by  the  fact  of  the  rebellion, 
less  averse  to  secure  his  position  by  punishing 
offenders,  investigating  any  suspicious  circumstances, 
and  strengthening  himself  in  weak  places.  So  that 
although  the  mere  appearance  of  such  a  person 
as  Duke  Ludovico  on  the  frontier  was  sufficient  to 
cause  France  to  lose  Milan  the  first  time,  to  make 
her  lose  her  grip  of  it  the  second  time  was  only 
possible  when  all  the  world  was  against  her,  and 
after  her  enemies  had  been  defeated  and  driven  out 
of  Italy ;  which  was  the  result  of  the  causes  above 
mentioned.  Nevertheless  it  was  taken  from  her 
both  the  first  and  the  second  time.  The  general 
causes  of  the  first  loss  have  been  already  discussed  ; 
it  remains  now  to  be  seen  what  were  the  causes  of 
the  second  loss  and  by  what  means  France  could 
have  avoided  it,  or  what  measures  might  have  been 
taken  by  another  ruler  in  that  position  which  were 
not  taken  by  the  King  of  France.  Be  it  observed, 
therefore,  that  those  states  which  on  annexation  are 
united  to  a  previously  existing  state  may  or  may 
not  be  of  the  same  nationality  and  language.  If 
they  are,  it  is  very  easy  to  hold  them,  especially  if 
they  are  not  accustomed  to  freedom  ;  and  to  possess 
them  securely  it  suffices  that  the  family  of  the 
princes  which  formerly  governed  them  be  extinct. 
For  the  rest,  their  old  condition  not  being  disturbed, 
and  there  being  no  dissimilarity  of  customs,  the 
people  settle  down  quietly  under  their  new  rulers, 
as  is  seen  in  the  case  of  Burgundy,  Brittany, 
Gascony,  and  Normandy,  which  have  been  so  long 


THE  PRINCE  7 

united  to  France  ;  and  although  there  may  be  some 
slight  differences  of  language,  the  customs  of  the 
people  are  nevertheless  similar,  and  they  can  get 
along  well  together,  and  whoever  obtains  possession 
of  them  and  wishes  to  retain  them  must  bear  in 
mind  two  things  :  the  one,  that  the  blood  of  their 
old  rulers  is  extinct ;  the  other,  to  make  no  altera- 
tion either  in  their  laws  or  in  their  taxes ;  in  this 
way  they  will  in  a  very  short  space  of  time  become 
united  with  their  old  possessions  and  form  one 
state.  But  when  dominions  are  acquired  in  a 
province  differing  in  language,  laws,  and  customs, 
the  difficulties  to  be  overcome  are  great,  and  it 
requires  good  fortune  as  well  as  great  industry  to 
retain  them  ;  one  of  the  best  and  most  certain 
means  of  doing  so  would  be  for  the  new  ruler  to 
take  up  his  residence  in  them.  This  would  render 
their  possession  more  secure  and  durable,  it  is  what 
the  Turk  has  done  in  Greece ;  in  spite  of  all  the 
other  measures  taken  by  him  to  hold  that  state,  it 
would  not  have  been  possible  to  retain  it  had  he 
not  gone  to  live  there.  Being  on  the  spot,  dis- 
orders can  be  seen  as  they  arise  and  can  quickly 
be  remedied,  but  living  at  a  distance,  they  are  only 
heard  of  when  they  get  beyond  remedy.  Besides 
which,  the  province  is  not  despoiled  by  your  officials, 
the  subjects  are  pleased  with  the  easy  accessibility 
of  their  prince  ;  and  wishing  to  be  loyal  they  have 
more  reason  to  love  him,  and  should  they  be  other- 
wise they  will  have  greater  cause  to  fear  him. 

Any  external  Power  who  wishes  to  assail  that 
state  will  be  less  disposed  to  do  so  ;  so  that  as  long 
as  he  resides  there  he  will  be  very  hard  to  dis- 
possess. The  other  and  better  remedy  is  to  plant 
colonies  in  one  or  two  of  those  places  which  form 
as  it  were  the  keys  of  the  land,  for  it  is  necessary 
either  to  do  this  or  to  maintain  a  large  force  of 
armed  men.  The  colonies  will  cost  the  prince 
little ;  with  little  or  no  expense  on  his  part,  he 


8  NICCOLt)  MACH1AVELL1 

can  send  and  maintain  them  ;  he  only  injures 
those  whose  lands  and  houses  are  taken  to  give  to 
the  new  inhabitants,  and  these  form  but  a  small 
proportion  of  the  state,  and  those  who  are  injured, 
remaining  poor  and  scattered,  can  never  do  any  harm 
to  him,  and  all  the  others  are,  on  the  one  hand,  not 
injured  and  therefore  easily  pacified ;  and,  on  the 
other,  are  fearful  of  offending  lest  they  should  be 
treated  like  those  who  have  been  dispossessed  of 
their  property.  To  conclude,  these  colonies  cost 
nothing,  are  more  faithful,  and  give  less  offence ; 
and  the  injured  parties  being  poor  and  scattered 
are  unable  to  do  mischief,  as  I  have  shown.  For 
it  must  be  noted,  that  men  must  either  be  caressed 
or  else  annihilated  ;  they  will  revenge  themselves 
for  small  injuries,  but  cannot  do  so  for  great  ones ; 
the  injury  therefore  that  we  do  to  a  man  must  be 
such  that  we  need  not  fear  his  vengeance.  But  by 
maintaining  a  garrison  instead  of  colonists,  one  will 
spend  much  more,  and  consume  in  guarding  it  all 
the  revenues  of  that  state,  so  that  the  acquisition 
will  result  in  a  loss,  besides  giving  much  greater 
offence,  since  it  injures  every  one  in  that  state  with 
the  quartering  of  the  army  on  it ;  which  being  an 
inconvenience  felt  by  all,  every  one  becomes  an 
enemy,  and  these  are  enemies  which  can  do  mischief, 
as,  though  beaten,  they  remain  in  their  own  homes. 
In  every  way,  therefore,  a  garrison  is  as  useless  as 
colonies  are  useful.  Further,  the  ruler  of  a  foreign 
province  as  described,  should  make  himself  the 
leader  and  defender  of  his  less  powerful  neighbours, 
and  endeavour  to  weaken  the  stronger  ones,  and 
take  care  that  his  possessions  are  not  entered  by 
some  foreigner  not  less  powerful  than  himself,  who 
will  always  intervene  at  the  request  of  those  who 
are  discontented  either  through  ambition  or  fear, 
as  was  seen  when  the  ^Etoli  invited  the  Romans  into 
Greece  ;  and  in  whatever  province  they  entered,  it 
was  always  at  the  request  of  the  inhabitants.  And 


THE   PRINCE  9 

the  rule  is  that  when  a  powerful  foreigner  enters  a 
province,  all  the  less  powerful  inhabitants  become 
his  adherents,  jnoved  by  the  envy  they  bear  to 
those  ruling  over  them ;  so  much  so  that  with 
regard  to  these  minor  potentates  he  has  no  trouble 
whatever  in  winning  them  over,  for  they  willingly 
join  forces  with  the  state  that  he  has  acquired. 
He  has  merely  to  be  careful  that  they  do  not 
assume  too  much  power  and  authority,  and  he  can 
easily  with  his  own  forces  and  their  favour  put 
down  those  that  are  powerful  and  remain  in  every- 
thing the  arbiter  of  that  province.  And  he  who 
does  not  govern  well  in  this  way  will  soon  lose 
what  he  has  acquired,  and  while  he  holds  it  will 
meet  with  infinite  difficulty  and  trouble. 

The  Romans  in  the  provinces  they  took,  always 
followed  this  policy ;  they  established  colonies, 
flattered  the  less  powerful  without  increasing  their 
strength,  put  down  the  most  powerful  and  did  not 
allow  foreign  rulers  to  obtain  influence  in  them. 
I  will  let  the  single  province  of  Greece  suffice  as 
an  example.  They  made  friends  with  the  Achaei 
and  the  ^Etoli,  the  kingdom  of  Macedonia  was 
cast  down,  and  Antiochus  driven  out,  nor  did  they 
allow  the  merits  of  the  Achaei  or  the  ^Etoli  to 
gain  them  any  increase  of  territory,  nor  did  the 
persuasions  of  Philip  induce  them  to  befriend  him 
without  lowering  him,  nor  could  the  power  of 
Antiochus  make  them  consent  to  allow  him  to  hold 
any  state  in  that  province. 

For  the  Romans  did  in  this  case  what  all  wise 
princes  should  do,  who  look  not  only  at  present 
dangers  but  also  at  future  ones  and  diligently  guard 
against  them  ;  for  being  foreseen  they  can  easily  be 
remedied,  but  if  one  waits  till  they  are  at  hand,  the 
medicine  is  no  longer  in  time  as  the  malady  has 
become  incurable  ;  it  happening  with  this  as  with 
those  hectic  fevers  spoken  of  by  doctors,  which  at 
their  beginning  are  easy  to  cure  but  difficult  to- 


10  NICCOLO  MACHIAVELLI 

recognise,  but  in  course  of  time  when  they  have 
not  at  first  been  recognised  and  treated,  become 
easy  to  recognise  and  difficult  to  cure.  Thus  it 
happens  in  matters  of  state ;  for  knowing  afar  off 
(which  it  is  only  given  to  a  prudent  man  to  do)  the 
evils  that  are  brewing,  they  are  easily  cured.  But 
when,  for  want  of  such  knowledge,  they  are  allowed 
to  grow  so  that  every  one  can  recognise  them,  there 
is  no  longer  any  remedy  to  be  found.  However, 
the  Romans,  observing  these  disorders  while  yet 
remote,  were  always  able  to  find  a  remedy,  and 
never  allowed  them  to  proceed  in  order  to  avoid  a 
war  ;  for  they  knew  that  war  was  not  to  be  avoided, 
and  could  be  deferred  only  to  the  advantage  of  the 
other  side;  they  therefore  declared  war  against 
Philip  and  Antiochus  in  Greece,  so  as  not  to  have  to 
fight  them  in  Italy,  though  they  might  at  the  time 
have  avoided  either  ;  this  they  did  not  choose  to  do, 
never  caring  to  do  that  which  is  now  every  day  to 
be  heard  in  the  mouths  of  our  wise  men,  to  enjoy 
the  benefits  of  time,  but  preferring  those  of  their 
own  virtue  and  prudence,  for  time  brings  with  it  all 
things,  and  may  produce  indifferently  either  good 
or  evil.  But  let  us  return  to  France  and  examine 
whether  she  did  any  of  these  things ;  and  I  will 
speak  not  of  Charles,  but  of  Louis  as  the  one  whose 
proceedings  can  be  better  seen,  as  he  held  posses- 
sion in  Italy  for  a  longer  time ;  you  will  then  see 
that  he  did  the  opposite  of  all  those  things  which 
must  be  done  to  keep  possession  of  a  foreign  state. 
King  Louis  was  called  into  Italy  by  the  ambition 
of  the  Venetians,  who  wished  by  his  coming  to  gam 
half  of  Lombardy.  I  will  not  blame  the  king  for 
coming  nor  for  the  part  he  took,  because  wishing  to 
plant  his  foot  in  Italy,  and  not  having  friends  in 
the  country,  on  the  contrary  the  conduct  of  King 
Charles  having  caused  all  doors  to  be  closed  to  him, 
he  was  forced  to  accept  what  friendships  he  could 
find,  and  his  schemes  would  have  quickly  been 


THE  PRINCE  11 

successful  if  he  had  made  no  mistakes  m  his  other 
proceedings. 

The  king  then  having  acquired  Lombardy  re- 
gained immediately  the  reputation  lost  by  Charles. 
Genoa  yielded,  the  Florentines  became  his  friends, 
the  Marquis  of  Mantua,  the  Dukes  of  Ferrara  and 
Bentivogli,  the  Lady  of  Furli,  the  Lords  of  Faenza, 
Pesaro,  Rimini,  Camerino,  and  Piombino,  the 
inhabitants  of  Lucca,  of  Pisa,  and  of  Sienna,  all 
approached  him  with  offers  of  friendship.  The 
Venetians  might  then  have  seen  the  effects  of  their 
temerity,  how  to  gain  a  few  lands  in  Lombardy 
they  had  made  the  king  ruler  over  two-thirds  of 
Italy.  Consider  how  little  difficulty  the  king 
would  have  had  in  maintaining  his  reputation  in 
Italy  if  he  had  observed  the  rules  above  given,  and 
kept  a  firm  and  sure  hold  over  all  those  friends  of 
his,  who  being  many  in  number,  and  weak,  and 
fearful  one  of  the  Church,  another  of  the  Venetians, 
were  always  obliged  to  hold  fast  to  him,  and  by 
whose  aid  he  could  easily  make  sure  of  any  who 
were  still  great.  But  he  was  hardly  in  Milan 
before  he  did  exactly  the  opposite,  by  giving  aid  to 
Pope  Alexander  to  occupy  the  Romagna.  Nor 
did  he  perceive  that,  in  taking  this  course,  he 
weakened  himself,  by  casting  off  his  friends  and 
those  who  had  placed  themselves  at  his  disposal, 
and  strengthened  the  Church  by  adding  to  the 
spiritual  power,  which  gives  it  such  authority, 
further  temporal  powers.  And  having  made  the 
first  mistake,  he  was  obliged  to  follow  it  up,  whilst, 
to  put  a  stop  to  the  ambition  of  Alexander  and  pre- 
vent him  becoming  ruler  of  Tuscany,  he  was  forced 
to  come  to  Italy.  And  not  content  with  having 
increased  the  power  of  the  Church  and  lost  his 
friends,  he  now  desiring  the  kingdom  of  Naples, 
divided  it  with  the  king  of  Spain  ;  and  where  he 
alone  was  the  arbiter  of  Italy,  he  now  brought  in  a 
companion,  so  that  the  ambitious  of  that  province 


12  NICCOLO  MACH1AVELLI 

who  were  dissatisfied  with  him  might  have  some  one 
else  to  appeal  to ;  and  where  he  might  have  left 
in  that  kingdom  a  king  tributary  to  him,  he  dis- 
possessed him  in  order  to  bring  in  another  who  was 
capable  of  driving  him  out.  The  desire  to  acquire 
possessions  is  a  very  natural  and  ordinary  thing,  and 
when  those  men  do  it  who  can  do  so  successfully, 
they  are  always  praised  and  not  blamed,  but  when 
they  cannot  and  yet  want  to  do  so  at  all  costs,  they 
make  a  mistake  deserving  of  great  blame.  If 
France,  therefore,  with  her  own  forces  could  have 
taken  Naples,  she  ought  to  have  done  so ;  if  she 
could  not  she  ought  not  to  have  divided  it.  And 
if  the  partition  of  Lombardy  with  the  Venetians  is 
to  be  excused,  as  having  been  the  means  of  allow- 
ing the  French  king  to  set  foot  in  Italy,  this  other 
partition  deserves  blame,  not  having  the  excuse  of 
necessity.  Louis  had  thus  made  these  five  mistakes  : 
he  had  crushed  the  smaller  Powers,  increased  the 
power  in  Italy  of  one  ruler,  brought  into  the  land 
a  very  powerful  foreigner,  and  he  had  not  come  to 
live  there  himself,  nor  had  he  established  any 
colonies.  Still  these  mistakes  might,  if  he  had 
lived,  not  have  injured  him,  had  he  not  made  the 
sixth,  that  of  taking  the  state  from  the  Venetians  ; 
for,  if  he  had  not  strengthened  the  Church  and 
brought  the  Spaniards  into  Italy,  it  would  have 
been  right  and  necessary  to  humble  them  ;  having 
once  taken  those  measures,  he  ought  never  to  have 
consented  to  their  ruin ;  because,  had  the  Venetians 
been  strong,  it  would  have  kept  the  others  from 
making  attempts  on  Lombardy,  partly  because  the 
Venetians  would  not  have  consented  to  any  measures 
by  which  they  did  not  get  it  for  themselves,  and 
partly  because  the  others  would  not  have  wanted  to 
take  it  from  France  to  give  it  to  Venice,  and  would 
not  have  had  the  courage  to  attack  both. 

If  any  one  urges  that  King  Louis  yielded  the 
Romagna  to  Alexander  and  the  kingdom  to  Spain 


THE  PRINCE  13 

in  order  to  avoid  war,  I  reply,  with  the  reasons 
already  given,  that  one  ought  never  to  allow  a  dis- 
order to  take  place  in  order  to  avoid  war,  for  war  is 
not  thereby  avoided,  but  only  deferred  to  your  dis- 
advantage. And  if  others  allege  the  promise  given 
by  the  king  to  the  pope  to  undertake  that  enter- 
prise for  him,  in  return  for  the  dissolution  of  his 
marriage  and  for  the  cardinalship  of  Rohan,  I  reply 
with  what  I  shall  say  later  on  about  the  faith  of 
princes  and  how  it  is  to  be  observed.  Thus  King 
Louis  lost  Lombardy  through  not  observing  any  of 
those  conditions  which  have  been  observed  by  others 
who  have  taken  provinces  and  wished  to  retain 
them.  Nor  is  this  any  miracle,  but  very  reasonable 
and  natural.  I  spoke  of  this  matter  with  Cardinal 
Rohan  at  Nantes  when  Valentine,  as  Cesare  Borgia, 
son  of  Pope  Alexander,  was  commonly  called,  was 
occupying  the  Romagna,  for  on  Cardinal  Rohan 
saying  to  me  that  the  Italians  did  not  understand 
war,  I  replied  that  the  French  did  not  understand 
politics,  for  if  they  did  they  would  never  allow  the 
Church  to  become  so  great.  And  experience  shows 
us  that  the  greatness  in  Italy  of  the  Church  and 
also  of  Spain  have  been  caused  by  France,  and  her 
ruin  has  proceeded  from  them.  From  which  may  be 
drawn  a  general  rule,  which  never  or  very  rarely 
fails,  that  whoever  is  the  cause  of  another  becoming 
powerful,  is  ruined  himself  ;  for  that  power  is  pro- 
duced by  him  either  through  craft  or  force  ;  and 
both  of  these  are  suspected  jby  the  one  that  has 
become  powerful. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  KINGDOM  OP  DARIUS,  OCCUPIED  BY  ALEX- 
ANDER, DID  NOT  REBEL  AGAINST  THE  SUCCESSORS 
OF  THE  LATTER  AFTER  HIS  DEATH. 

CONSIDERING  the  difficulties  there  are  in  holding 
a  newly  acquired  state,  some  may  wonder  how  it 
came  to  pass  that  Alexander  the  Great  became 
master  of  Asia  in  a  few  years,  and  had  hardly 
occupied  it  when  he  died,  from  which  it  might  be 
supposed  that  the  whole  state  would  have  rebelled. 
However,  his  successors  maintained  themselves  in 
possession,  and  had  no  further  difficulty  in  doing 
so  than  those  which  arose  among  themselves  from 
their  own  ambitions. 

I  reply  that  the  kingdoms  known  to  history  have 
been  governed  in  two  ways  :  either  by  a  prince  and 
his  servants,  who,  as  ministers  by  his  grace  and 
permission,  assist  in  governing  the  realm  ;  or  by  a 
prince  and  by  barons,  who  hold  their  positions  not 
by  favour  of  the  ruler  but  by  antiquity  of  blood. 
Such  barons  have  states  and  subjects  of  their  own, 
who  recognise  them  as  their  lords,  and  are  naturally 
attached  to  them.  In  those  states  which  are  governed 
by  a  prince  and  his  servants,  the  prince  possesses 
more  authority,  because  there  is  no  one  in  the  state 
regarded  as  a  superior  besides  himself,  and  if  others 
are  obeyed  it  is  merely  as  ministers  and  officials  of 
the  prince,  and  no  one  regards  them  with  any 
14 


THE  PRINCE  15 

special  affection.  Examples  of  these  two  kinds  of 
government  in  our  own  time  are  the  Turk  and  the 
King  of  France.  All  the  Turkish  monarchy  is 
governed  by  one  ruler,  the  others  are  his  servants, 
and  dividing  his  kingdom  into  "  sangiacates/'  he 
sends  to  them  various  administrators,  and  changes 
or  recalls  them  at  his  pleasure.  But  the  King  of 
France  is  surrounded  by  a  large  number  of  ancient 
nobles,  recognised  as  such  by  their  subjects,  and 
loved  by  them  ;  they  have  their  prerogatives,  which 
the  king  cannot  deprive  them  of  without  danger  to 
himself.  Whoever  now  considers  these  two  states 
will  see  that  it  would  be  difficult  to  acquire  the 
state  of  the  Turk;  but  having  conquered  it,  it 
would  be  very  easy  to  hold  it. 

The  causes  of  the  difficulty  of  occupying  the 
Turkish  kingdom  are,  that  the  invader  could  not 
be  invited  by  princes  of  that  kingdom,  nor  hope  to 
facilitate  his  enterprise  by  the  rebellion  of  those 
around  him,  as  will  be  evident  from  reasons  given 
above.  Because,  being  all  slaves,  and  bound,  it 
will  be  more  difficult  to  corrupt  them,  and  even  if 
they  were  corrupted,  little  effect  could  be  hoped 
for,  as  they  would  not  be  able  to  carry  the  people 
with  them  for  the  reasons  mentioned.  Therefore, 
whoever  assaults  the  Turk  must  be  prepared  to 
meet  his  united  forces,  and  must  rely  more  on  his 
own  strength  than  on  the  disorders  of  others ;  but 
having  once  conquered  him,  and  beaten  him  in 
battle  so  that  he  can  no  longer  raise  armies,  nothing 
else  is  to  be  feared  except  the  family  of  the  prince, 
and  if  this  is  extinguished,  there  is  no  longer  any 
one  to  be  feared,  the  others  having  no  credit  with 
the  people ;  and  as  the  victor  before  the  victory 
could  place  no  hope  in  them,  so  he  need  not 
fear  them  afterwards.  The  contrary  is  the  case  in 
kingdoms  governed  like  that  of  France,  because  it  is 
easy  to  enter  them  by  winning  over  some  baron  of 
the  kingdom,  there  being  always  some  malcontents, 


16  NICCOLO  MACHIAVELLI 

and  those  desiring  innovations.  These  can,  for  the 
reasons  stated,  open  the  way  to  you  and  facilitate 
victory  ;  but  afterwards,  if  you  wish  to  keep  posses- 
sion, infinite  difficulties  arise,  both  from  those  who 
have  aided  you  and  from  those  you  have  oppressed. 
Nor  is  it  sufficient  to  extinguish  the  family  of  the 
prince,  for  there  remain  those  nobles  who  will  make 
themselves  the  head  of  new  changes,  and  being 
neither  able  to  content  them  nor  exterminate 
them,  you  will  Jose  the  state  whenever  an  occasion 
arises.  Now  if  you  will  consider  what  was  the 
nature  of  the  government  of  Darius  you  will  fma 
it  similar  to  the  kingdom  of  the  Turk,  and  tnere- 
fore  Alexander  had  first  to  completely  overthrow  it 
and  seize  the  country,  after  which  victory,  Darius 
being  dead,  the  state  remained  secure  to  Alexander, 
for  the  reasons  discussed  above.  And  his  successors, 
had  they  remained  united,  might  have  enjoyed  it 
in  peace,  nor  did  any  tumults  arise  in  the  kingdom 
except  those  fomented  by  themselves.  But  it  is 
impossible  to  possess  with  such  ease  countries  con- 
stituted like  France. 

Hence  arose  the  frequent  rebellions  of  Spain, 
France,  and  Greece  against  the  Romans,  owing  to 
the  numerous  principalities  which  existed  in  those 
states  ;  for,  as  long  as  the  memory  of  these  lasted, 
the  Romans  were  always  uncertain  of  their  pos- 
sessions ;  but  when  the  memory  of  these  princi- 
palities had  been  extinguished  they  became,  with 
the  power  and  duration  of  the  empire,  secure  pos- 
sessions. 

And  afterwards  the  latter  could,  when  fighting 
among  themselves,  draw  each  one  with  him  a  portion 
of  these  provinces,  according  to  the  authority  he 
had  established  there,  and  these  provinces,  when 
the  family  of  their  ancient  princes  was  extinct, 
recognised  no  other  rulers  but  the  Romans.  Con- 
sidering these  things,  therefore,  let  no  one  be  sur- 
prised at  the  facility  with  which  Alexander  could  hold 


THE  PRINCE  17 

Asia,  and  at  the  difficulties  that  others  have  had  in 
holding  acquired  possessions,  like  Pyrrhus  and  many 
others ;  as  this  was  not  caused  hy  the  greater  or 
smaller  ability  of  the  conqueror,  but  depended  on 
the  dissimilarity  of  the  conditions. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  WAY  TO  GOVERN  CITIES  OB  DOMINIONS  THAT, 
PREVIOUS  TO  BEING  OCCUPIED,  LIVED  UNDER 
THEIR  OWN  LAWS. 

WHEN  those  states  which  have  heen  acquired  are 
accustomed  to  live  at  liberty  under  their  own  laws, 
there  are  three  ways  of  holding  them.  The  first  is 
to  ruin  them  ;  the  second  is  to  go  and  live  there  in 
person ;  the  third  is  to  allow  them  to  live  under 
their  own  laws,  taking  tribute  of  them,  and  creating 
there  within  the  country  a  state  composed  of  a  few 
who  will  keep  it  friendly  to  you.  Because  this 
state,  being  created  by  the  prince,  knows  that  it 
cannot  exist  without  his  friendship  and  protection, 
and  will  do  all  it  can  to  keep  them,  and  a  city  used 
to  liberty  can  be  more  easily  held  by  means  of  its 
citizens  than  in  any  other  way,  if  you  wish  to 
preserve  it.  There  is  the  example  of  the  Spartans 
and  the  Romans.  The  Spartans  held  Athens  and 
Thebes  by  creating  within  them  a  state  of  a  few 
people  ;  nevertheless  they  lost  them.  The  Romans, 
in  order  to  hold  Capua,  Carthage,  and  Numantia, 
destroyed  them,  but  did  not  lose  them.  They 
wanted  to  hold  Greece  in  almost  the  same  way  as 
the  Spartans  held  it,  leaving  it  free  and  under  its 
own  laws,  but  they  did  not  succeed  ;  so  that  they 
were  compelled  to  destroy  many  cities  in  that 
province  in  order  to  keep  it,  because  in  truth  there 
18 


THE  PRINCE  19 

is  no  sure  method  of  holding  them  except  by  ruin- 
ing them.  And  whoever  becomes  the  ruler  of  a 
free  city  and  does  not  destroy  it,  can  expect  to  be 
destroyed  by  it,  for  it  can  always  find  a  motive  for 
rebellion  in  the  name  of  liberty  and  of  its  ancient 
usages,  which  are  forgotten  neither  by  lapse  of 
time  nor  by  benefits  received,  and  whatever  one 
does  or  provides,  so  long  as  the  inhabitants  are 
not  separated  or  dispersed,  they  do  not  forget  that 
name  and  those  usages,  but  appeal  to  them  at  once 
in  every  emergency,  as  did  Pisa  after  being  so 
many  years  held  in  servitude  by  the  Florentines. 
But  when  cities  or  provinces  have  been  accustomed 
to  live  under  a  prince,  and  the  family  of  that  prince 
is  extinguished,  being  on  the  one  hand  used  to 
obey,  ami  on  the  other  not  having  their  old  prince, 
they  cannot  unite  in  choosing  one  from  among 
themselves,  and  they  do  not  know  how  to  live  in 
freedom,  so  that  they  are  slower  to  take  arms,  and 
a  prince  can  win  them  over  with  greater  facility 
and  establish  himself  securely.  But  in  republics 
there  is  greater  life,  greater  hatred,  and  more 
desire  for  vengeance ;  they  do  not  and  cannot  cast 
aside  the  memory  of  their  ancient  liberty,  so  that 
the  surest  way  is  either  to  destroy  them  or  reside 
in  them. 


CHAPTER  VI 


OF   NEW    DOMINIONS    WHICH    HAVE    BEEN    ACQUIRED 
BY    ONE'S    OWN    ARMS    AND    POWERS 

LET  no  one  marvel  if  in  speaking  of  new  dominions 
both  as  to  prince  and  state,  I  bring-  forward  very 
exalted  instances,  for  as  men  walk  almost  always 
in  the  paths  trodden  by  others,  proceeding  in  their 
actions  by  imitation,  and  not  being  always  able  to 
follow  others  exactly,  nor  attain  to  the  excellence 
of  those  they  imitate,  a  prudent  man  should  always 
follow  in  the  path  trodden  by  great  men  and 
imitate  those  who  are  most  excellent,  so  that  if  he 
does  not  attain  to  their  greatness,  at  any  rate  he 
will  get  some  tinge  of  it.  He  will  do  like  prudent 
archers,  who  when  the  place  they  wish  to  hit  is  too 
far  off,  knowing  how  far  their  bow  will  carry,  aim 
at  a  spot  much  higher  than  the  one  they  wish  to 
hit,  not  in  order  to  reach  this  height  with  their 
arrow,  but  by  help  of  this  high  aim  to  hit  the  spot 
they  wish  to.  I  say  then  that  in  new  dominions, 
where  there  is  a  new  prince,  it  is  more  or  less  easy  to 
hold  them  according  to  the  greater  or  lesser  ability 
of  him  who  acquires  them.  And  as  the  fact  of  a 
private  individual  becoming  a  prince  presupposes 
either  great  ability  or  good  fortune,  it  would  appear 
that  either  of  these  things  would  mitigate  in  part 
many  difficulties.  Nevertheless  those  who  have  been 
wanting  as  regards  good  fortune  have  maintained 
20 


THE   PRINCE  21 

themselves  best.  The  matter  is  also  facilitated  by 
the  prince  being  obliged  to  reside  personally  in  his 
territory,  having  no  others.  But  to  come  to  those 
who  have  become  princes  through  their  own  merits 
and  not  by  fortune,  I  regard  as  the  greatest, 


Cyrus.  Romulus,  Tbqseus.  and  such  like.  And 
although  one  should  not  speak  of  Moses,  he  having 
merely  carried  out  what  was  ordered  him  by  God, 
still  he  deserves  admiration,  if  only  for  that  grace 
which  made  him  worthy  to  speak  with  God.  Cut 
regarding  Cyrus  and  others  who  have  acquired  or 
founded  kingdoms,  they  will  all  be  found  worthy 
of  admiration  ;  and  if  their  particular  actions  and 
methods  are  examined  they  will  not  appear  very 
different  from  those  of  Moses,  although  he  had  so 
great  a  Master.  And  in  examining  their  life  and 
deeds  it  will  be  seen  that  they  owed  nothing  to 
fortune  but  the  opportunity  which  gave  them  matter 
to  be  shaped  into  the  form  that  they  thought  fit  ; 
and  without  that  opportunity  their  powers  would 
have  been  wasted,  and  without  their  powers  the 
opportunity  would  have  come  in  vain.  It  was  thus 
necessary  that  Moses  should  find  the  people  of  Israel 
slaves  in  Egypt  and  oppressed  by  the  Egyptians,  so 
that  they  were  disposed  to  follow  him  in  order  to 
escape  from  their  servitude.  It  was  necessary  that 
Romulus  should  be  unable  to  remain  in  Alba,  and 
should  have  been  exposed  at  his  birth,  in  order 
that  he  might  become  King  of  Rome  and  founder 
of  that  nation.  It  was  necessary  that  Cyrus  should 
find  the  Persians  discontented  with  the  empire  of 
the  Medes,  and  the  Medes  weak  and  effeminate 
through  long  peace.  Theseus  could  not  have 
showed  his  abilities  if  he  had  not  found  the 
Athenians  dispersed. 

These  opportunities,  therefore,  gave  these  men 
their  chance,  and  their  own  great  qualities  enabled 
them  to  profit  by  them,  so  as  to  ennoble  their 
country  and  augment  its  fortunes.  Those  who  by 


22  NICCOLO  MACHIAVELLI 

heroic  means  such  as  these  hecome  princes,  ohtain 
their  dominions  with  difficulty  but  retain  them 
easily,  and  the  difficulties  which  they  have  in  ac- 
quiring their  dominions  arise  in  part  from  the  new 
rules  and  regulations  that  they  have  to  introduce 
in  order  to  establish  their  position  securely.  It 
must  be  considered  that  there  is  nothing  more 
difficult  to  carry  out,  nor  more  doubtful  of  success, 
nor  more  dangerous  to  handle,  than  to  initiate  a 
new  order  of  things.  For  the  reformer  has  enemies 
in  all  those  who  profit  by  the  old  order,  and  only 
lukewarm  defenders  in  all  those  who  would  profit 
by  the  new  order,  this  lukewarmness  arising  partly 
from  fear  of  their  adversaries,  who  have  the  laws  in 
their  favour  ;  and  partly  from  the  incredulity  of 
mankind,  who  do  not  truly  believe  in  anything 
new  until  they  have  had  actual  experience  of  it. 
Thus  it  arises  that  on  every  opportunity  for  attack- 
ing the  reformer,  his  opponents  do  so  with  the  zeal 
of  partisans,  the  others  only  defend  him  half- 
heartedly, so  that  between  them  he  runs  great 
danger.  '  It  is  necessary,  however,  in  order  to 
investigate  thoroughly  this  question,  to  examine 
whether  these  innovators  are  independent,  or 
whether  they  depend  upon  others,  that  is  to  say, 
whether  in  order  to  carry  out  their  designs  they 
have  to  entreat  or  are  able  to  force.  In  the  first 
case  they  invariably  succeed  ill,  and  accomplish 
nothing ;  but  when  they  can  depend  on  their  own 
strength  and  are  able  to  use  force,  they  rarely  fail. 
Thus  it  comes  about  that  all  armed  prophets  have 
conquered  and  unarmed  ones  failed ;  for  besides 
what  has  been  already  said,  the  character  of  people 
varies,  and  it  is  easy  to  persuade  them  of  a  thing, 
but  difficult  to  keep  them  in  that  persuasion.  And 
so  it  is  necessary  to  order  things  so  that  when  they 
no  longer  believe,  they  can  be  made  to  believe  by 
force.  Moses,  Cyrus,  Theseus,  and  Romulus  would 
not  have  been  able  to  make  their  institutions 


THE  PRINCE  23 

observed  for  so  long  had  they  been  disarmed,  as 
happened  in  our  own  time  to  Fra  Girolamo 
Savonarola,  who  failed  entirely  in  his  new  rules 
when  the  multitude  began  to  disbelieve  in  him, 
and  he  had  no  means  of  holding  fast  those  who 
had  believed  nor  of  compelling  the  unbelievers  to 
believe.  Therefore  such  men  as  these  have  great 
difficulty  in  making  their  way,  and  all  their  dangers 
are  met  on  the  road  and  must  be  overcome  by  their 
own  abilities ;  but  when  once  they  have  overcome 
them  and  have  begun  to  be  held  in  veneration, 
and  have  suppressed  those  who  envied  them,  they 
remain  powerful  and  secure,  honoured  and  happy. 
To  the  high  examples  given  I  will  add  a  lesser  one, 
which,  however,  is  to  be  compared  in  some  measure 
with  them  and  will  serve  as  an  instance  of  all  such 
cases,  that  of  Jerone  of  Syracuse,  who  from  a 
private  individual  became  Prince  of  Siracusa,  with- 
out other  aid  from  fortune  beyond  the  opportunity  ; 
for  the  Siracusans  being  oppressed  elected  him  as 
their  captain,  from  which  by  merit  he  was  made 
prince ;  while  still  in  private  life  his  virtues  were 
such  that  it  was  written  of  him,  that  he  lacked 
nothing  to  reign  but  the  kingdom.  He  abolished 
the  old  militia,  raised  a  new  one,  abandoned  his 
old  friendships  and  formed  new  ones;  and  as  he 
had  thus  friends  and  soldiers  of  his  own,  he  was 
able  on  this  foundation  to  build  securely,  so  that 
while  he  had  great  trouble  in  acquiring  his  position 
he  had  little  in  maintaining  it. 


CHAPTER  VII 

OF    NEW   DOMINIONS   ACQUIRED    BY    THE   POWER    OF 
OTHERS   OR    BY    FORTUNE 

THOSE  who  rise  from  private  citizens  to  be  princes 
merely  by  fortune  have  little  trouble  in  rising-  but 
very  much  in  maintaining  their  position.  They 
meet  with  no  difficulties  on  the  way  as  they  fly 
over  them,  but  all  their  difficulties  arise  when 
they  are  established.  Such  are  they  who  are 
granted  a  state  either  for  money,  or  by  favour  of 
him  who  grants  it,  as  happened  to  many  in  Greece, 
in  the  cities  of  Ionia  and  of  the  Hellespont,  who 
were  created  princes  by  Darius  in  order  to  hold 
these  places  for  his  security  and  glory  ;  such  were 
also  those  emperors  who  from  private  citizens 
became  emperors  by  bribing  the  army.  Such  as 
these  depend  absolutely  on  the  good  will  and 
fortune  of  those  who  have  raised  them,  both  of 
which  are  extremely  inconstant  and  unstable. 
They  neither  know  how  to,  nor  are  in  a  position  to 
maintain  their  rank,  for  unless  he  be  a  man  of 
great  genius  it  is  not  likely  that  one  who  has  always 
lived  in  a  private  position  should  know  how  to 
command,  and  they  are  unable  to  command  because 
they  possess  no  forces  which  will  be  friendly  and 
faithful  to  them.  Moreover,  states  quickly  founded, 
like  all  other  things  which  are  born  and  grow 
rapidly,  cannot  have  deep  roots,  so  that  the  first 
24 


THE  PRINCE  25 

storm  destroys  them,  unless,  as  already  said,  the 
man  who  thus  becomes  a  prince  is  of  such  great] 
genius  as  to  be  able  to  take  immediate  steps  for| 
maintaining  what  fortune  has  thrown  into  his  lap,! 
and  lay  afterwards  those  foundations  which  others| 
make  before  becoming  princes.  With  regard  ta 
these  two  methods  of  becoming  a  prince, — by  ability 
or  by  good  fortune,  I  will  here  adduce  two  examples 
which  have  taken  place  within  our  memory,  those 
of  Francesco  Sforza  and  Cesare  Borgia. 

Francesco,  by  appropriate  means  and  through  great 
abilities,  from  citizen  became  Duke  of  Milan,  and 
what  he  had  attained  after  a  thousand  difficulties  he 
maintained  with  little  trouble.  On  the  other  hand, 
Cesare  Borgia,  commonly  called  Duke  Valentine, 
acquired  the  state  through  the  fortune  of  his  father 
and  by  the  same  means  lost  it,  and  that  although 
every  measure  was  adopted  by  him  and  everything 
done  that  a  prudent  and  capable  man  could  do  to 
establish  himself  firmly  in  that  state  that  the  arms 
and  the  favours  of  others  had  given  him.  For,  as 
we  have  said,  he  who  does  not  lay  his  foundations 
beforehand  may  by  great  abilities  do  so  afterwards, 
although  with  great  trouble  to  the  architect  and 
danger  to  the  building.  If,  then,  one  considers  the 
progress  made  by  the  duke,  it  will  be  seen  how 
firm  were  the  foundations  he  had  laid  to  his  future 
power,  which  I  do  not  think  it  superfluous  to 
examine,  as  I  know  of  no  better  precepts  for  a  new 
prince  to  follow  than  the  example  of  his  actions  ; 
and  if  his  measures  were  not  successful,  it  was 
through  no  fault  of  his  own  but  only  by  the  most 
extraordinary  malignity  of  fortune.  In  wishing  to 
aggrandise  the  duke  his  son,  Alexander  VI.  had  to 
meet  very  great  difficulties  both  present  and  future. 
In  the  first  place,  he  saw  no  way  of  making  him 
ruler  of  any  state  that  was  not  a  possession  of  the 
Church.  And  in  attempting  to  take  that  of  the 
Church,  he  knew  that  the  Duke  of  Milan  and  the 


26  NICCOLO  MACHIAVELLI 

Venetians  would  not  consent,  because  Faenza  and 
Rimini  were  already  under  the  protection  of  the 
Venetians.  He  saw,  moreover,  that  the  arms  of 
Italy,  especially  of  those  who  might  have  served 
him,  were  in  the  hands  of  those  who  would  fear  the 
greatness  of  the  pope,  and  therefore  he  could  not 
depend  upon  them,  being  all  under  the  Orsinis  and 
Colonnas  and  their  adherents.  It  was,  therefore, 
necessary  to  disturb  the  existing  condition  and 
bring  about  disorders  in  the  states  of  Italy  in  order 
to  obtain  secure  mastery  over  a  part  of  them  ;  this 
was  easy,  for  he  found  the  Venetians,  who,  actuated 
by  other  motives,  had  invited  the  French  into  Italy, 
which  he  not  only  did  not  oppose,  but  facilitated 
by  dissolving  the  marriage  of  King  Louis.  The 
king  came  thus  into  Italy  with  the  aid  of  the 
Venetians  and  the  consent  of  Alexander,  and  had 
hardly  arrived  at  Milan  before  the  pope  obtained 
troops  from  him  for  his  enterprise  in  the  Romagna, 
which  he  carried  out  by  means  of  the  reputation  of 
the  king.  The  duke  having  thus  obtained  the 
Romagna  and  defeated  the  Colonnas,  was  hindered 
in  maintaining  it  and  proceeding  further  by  two 
things  :  the  one,  his  forces,  of  which  he  doubted 
the  fidelity  ;  the  other  the  will  of  France,  that  is  to 
say,  he  feared  lest  the  arms  of  the  Orsini  of  which 
he  had  availed  himself  should  fail  him,  and  not  only 
hinder  him  in  obtaining  more  but  take  from  him 
what  he  had  already  conquered,  and  he  also 
feared  that  the  king  might  do  the  same.  He  had 
evidence  of  this  as  regards  the  Orsini  when,  after 
taking  Faenza,  he  assaulted  Bologna  and  observed 
their  backwardness  in  the  assault.  And  as  regards 
the  king,  he  perceived  his  designs  when,  after 
taking  the  dukedom  of  Urbino,  he  attacked 
Tuscany,  and  the  king  made  him  desist  from  that 
enterprise  ;  whereupon  the  duke  decided  to  depend 
no  longer  on  the  fortunes  and  arms  of  others. 
The  first  thing  he  did  was  to  weaken  the  parties  of 


THE  PRINCE  27 

the  Orsinis  and  Colonnas  in  Rome  by  gaining  all 
their  adherents  who  were  gentlemen  and  making 
them  followers  of  himself,  by  granting  them  large 
pensions,  and  appointing  them  to  commands  and 
offices  according  to  their  rank,  so  that  their  attach- 
ment to  their  parties  was  extinguished  in  a  few 
months,  and  entirely  concentrated  on  the  duke. 
After  this  he  awaited  an  opportunity  for  crushing 
the  Orsinis,  having  dispersed  the  adherents  of  the 
Colonna  family,  and  when  the  opportunity  arrived 
he  made  good  use  of  it,  for  the  Orsini  seeing  at 
length  that  the  greatness  of  the  duke  and  of  the 
Church  meant  their  own  ruin,  convoked  a  diet  at 
Magione  in  the  Perugino.  Hence  sprang  the 
rebellion  of  Urbino  and  the  tumults  in  Romagna 
and  infinite  dangers  to  the  duke,  who  overcame 
them  all  with  the  help  of  the  French  ;  and  having 
regained  his  reputation,  neither  trusting  France  nor 
other  foreign  forces  in  order  not  to  have  to  oppose 
them,  he  had  recourse  to  stratagem.  He  dissembled 
his  aims  so  well  that  the  Orsini,  through  the  media- 
tion of  Signor  Pavolo,  made  their  peace  with  him, 
which  the  duke  spared  no  efforts  to  make  secure, 
presenting  them  with  robes,  money,  and  horses,  so 
that  in  their  simplicity  they  were  induced  to  come 
to  Sinigaglia  and  fell  into  his  hands.  Having  thus 
suppressed  these  leaders  and  made  their  partisans 
his  friends,  the  duke  had  laid  a  very  good  founda- 
tion to  his  power,  having  all  the  Romagna  with  the 
duchy  of  Urbino,  and  having  gained  the  favour  of 
the  inhabitants,  who  began  to  feel  the  benefit  of  his 
rule.  And  as  this  part  is  worthy  of  note  and  of 
imitation  by  others,  I  will  not  omit  mention  of  it. 
When  he  took  the  Romagna,  it  had  previously 
been  governed  by  weak  rulers,-  who  had  rather 
despoiled  their  subjects  than  governed  them,  and 
given  them  more  cause  for  disunion  than  for  union, 
so  that  the  province  was  a  prey  to  robbery,  assaults, 
and  every  kind  of  disorder.  He,  therefore,  judged 


28  NICCOLO  MACHIAVELLI 

it  necessary  to  give  them  a  good  government  in 
order  to  make  them  peaceful  and  obedient  to  his 
rule.  For  this  purpose  he  appointed  Messer 
Remiro  d'  Oreo,  a  cruel  and  able  man,  to  whom  he 
gave  the  fullest  authority.  This  man,  in  a  short 
time,  was  highly  successful  in  rendering  the  country 
orderly  and  united,  whereupon  the  duke,  not 
deeming  such  excessive  authority  expedient,  lest 
it  should  become  hateful,  appointed  a  civil  court 
of  justice  in  the  middle  of  the  province  under  an 
excellent  president,  to  which  each  city  appointed 
its  own  advocate.  And  as  he  knew  that  the  harsh- 
ness of  the  past  had  engendered  some  amount  of 
hatred,  in  order  to  purge  the  minds  of  the  people 
and  to  win  them  over  completely,  he  resolved  to 
show  that  if  any  cruelty  had  taken  place  it  was  not 
by  his  orders,  but  through  the  harsh  disposition  of 
his  minister.  And  taking  him  on  some  pretext, 
he  had  him  placed  one  morning  in  the  public 
square  at  Cesena,  cut  in  half,  with  a  piece  of  wood 
and  blood-stained  knife  by  his  side.  The  ferocity 
of  this  spectacle  caused  the  people  both  satisfaction 
and  amazement.  But  to  return  to  where  we  left  off. 
The  duke  being  now  powerful  and  partly  secured 
against  present  perils,  being  armed  himself,  and 
having  in  a  great  measure  put  down  those  neigh- 
bouring forces  which  might  injure  him,  had  now  to 
get  the  respect  of  France,  if  he  wished  to  proceed 
with  his  acquisitions,  for  he  knew  that  the  king, 
who  had  lately  discovered  his  error,  would  not  give 
him  any  help.  He  began  therefore  to  seek  fresh 
alliances  and  to  vacillate  with  France  in  the 
expedition  that  the  French  made  towards  the 
kingdom  of  Naples  against  the  Spaniards,  who  were 
besieging  Gaeta.  His  intention  was  to  assure 
himself  of  them,  which  he  would  soon  have  suc- 
ceeded in  doing  if  Alexander  had  lived.  These 
were  the  measures  taken  by  him  with  regard  to  the 
present.  As  to  the  future,  he  feared  that  a  new 


THE  PRINCE  29 

successor  to  the  Church  might  not  be  friendly 
to  him  and  might  seek  to  deprive  him  of  what 
Alexander  had  given  him,  and  he  sought  to  provide 
against  this  in  four  ways.  Firstly,  by  destroying 
all  who  were  of  the  blood  of  those  ruling  families 
which  he  had  despoiled,  in  order  to  deprive  the  pope 
of  any  opportunity.  Secondly,  by  gaining  the 
friendship  of  the  Roman  nobles,  so  that  he  might 
through  them  hold  as  it  were  the  pope  in  check. 
Thirdly,  by  obtaining  as  great  a  hold  on  the  College 
as  he  could.  Fourthly,  by  acquiring  such  power 
before  the  pope  died  as  to  be  able  to  resist  alone 
the  first  onslaught.  Of  these  four  things  he  had  at 
the  death  of  Alexander  accomplished  three,  and  the 
fourth  he  had  almost  accomplished. 

For  of  the  dispossessed  rulers  he  killed  as  many 
as  he  could  lay  hands  on,  and  very  few  escaped;  he 
had  gained  to  his  party  the  Roman  nobles  ;  and  he 
had  a  great  share  in  the  College.  As  to  new 
possessions,  he  designed  to  become  lord  of  Tuscany, 
and  already  possessed  Perugia  and  Piombino,  and 
had  assumed  the  protectorate  over  Pisa ;  and  as  he 
had  no  longer  to  fear  the  French  (for  the  French 
had  been  deprived  of  the  kingdom  of  Naples  by  the 
Spaniards  in  such  a  way  that  both  parties  were 
obliged  to  buy  his  friendship)  he  seized  Pisa.  After 
this,  Lucca  and  Siena  at  once  yielded,  partly 
through  envy  of  the  Florentines  and  partly  through 
fear  ;  the  Florentines  had  no  resources,  so  that,  had 
he  succeeded  as  he  had  done  before,  in  the  very  year 
that  Alexander  died  he  would  have  gained  such 
strength  and  renown  as  to  be  able  to  maintain  him- 
self without  depending  on  the  fortunes  or  strength 
of  others,  but  solely  by  his  own  power  and  ability. 
But  Alexander  died  five  years  after  he  had  first 
drawn  his  sword.  He  left  him  with  the  state  of 
Romagna  only  firmly  established,  and  all  the 
other  schemes  in  mid-air,  between  two  very  power- 
ful and  hostile  armies,  and  suffering  from  a  fatal 


30  NICCOLO  MACHIAVELLI 

illness.  But  the  valour  and  ability  of  the  duke 
were  such,  and  he  knew  so  well  how  to  win  over 
men  or  vanquish  them,  and  so  strong  were  the 
foundations  that  he  had  laid  in  this  short  time,  that 
if  he  had  not  had  those  two  armies  upon  him,  or  else 
had  been  in  good  health,  he  would  have  survived 
every  difficulty.  And  that  his  foundations  were  good 
is  seen  from  the  fact  that  the  Romagna  waited  for  him 
more  than  a  month  ;  in  Rome,  although  half  dead, 
he  remained  secure,  and  although  the  Baglioni, 
Vitelli,  and  Orsini  entered  Rome  they  found  no 
followers  against  him.  He  was  able,  if  not  to  make 
pope  whom  he  wished,  at  any  rate  to  prevent  a  pope 
being  created  whom  he  did  not  wish.  But  if  at  the 
death  of  Alexander  he  had  been  well  everything 
would  have  been  easy.  And  he  told  me  on  the  day 
that  Pope  Julius  II.  was  created,  that  he  had  thought 
of  evei  ything  which  might  happen  on  the  death  of 
his  father,  and  provided  against  everything,  except 
that  he  had  never  thought  that  at  his  father's  death 
he  would  be  dying  himself.  Reviewing  thus  all  the 
actions  of  the  duke,  I  find  nothing  to  blame,  on  the 
contrary,  I  feel  bound,  as  I  have  done,  to  hold  him 
up  as  an  example  to  be  imitated  by  all  who  by 
fortune  and  with  the  arms  of  others  have  risen  to 
power.  For  with  his  great  courage  and  high  ambition 
he  could  not  have  acted  otherwise,  and  his  designs 
were  only  frustrated  by  the  short  life  of  Alexander 
and  his  own  illness. 

Whoever,  therefore,  deems  it  necessary  in  his  new 
principality  to  secure  himself  against  enemies,  to 
gain  friends,  to  conquer  by  force  or  fraud,  to  make 
himself  beloved  and  feared  by  the  people,  followed 
and  reverenced  by  the  soldiers,  to  destroy  those 
who  can  and  may  injure  him,  introduce  innovations 
into  old  customs,  to  be  severe  and  kind,  magnani- 
mous and  liberal,  suppress  the  old  militia,  create  a 
new  one,  maintain  the  friendship  of  kings  and 
princes  in  such  a  way  that  they  are  glad  to  benefit 


THE  PRINCE  31 

him  and  fear  to  injure  him,  such  a  one  can  find  no 
better  example  than  the  actions  of  this  man.  The 
only  thing  he  can  be  accused  of  is  that  in*  the 
creation  of  Julius  II.  he  made  a  bad  choice  ;  for,  as 
has  been  said,  not  being  able  to  choose  his  own  pope, 
he  could  still  prevent  any  one  being  made  pope, 
and  he  ought  never  to  have  permitted  any  of  those 
cardinals  to  be  raised  to  the  papacy  whom  he  had 
injured,  or  who  when  pope  would  stand  in  fear  of 
him.  For  men  commit  injuries  either  through  fear 
or  through  hate. 

Those  whom  he  had  injured  were,  among  others, 
San  Pietro  ad  Vincula,  Colonna,  San  Giorgio,  and 
Ascanio.  All  the  others,  if  assumed  to  the  ponti- 
ficate, would  have  had  to  fear  him  except  Rohan 
and  the  Spaniards ;  the  latter  through  their  re- 
lationship and  obligations  to  him,  the  former 
from  his  great  power,  being  related  to  the  King  of 
France.  For  these  reasons  the  duke  ought  above 
all  things  to  have  created  a  Spaniard  pope  ;  and  if 
unable  to,  then  he  should  have  consented  to  Rohan 
being  appointed  and  not  San  Pietro  ad  Vincula. 
And  whoever  thinks  that  in  high  personages  new 
benefits  cause  old  offences  to  be  forgotten,  makes  a 
great  mistake.  The  duke,  therefore,  erred  in  this 
choice,  and  it  was  the  cause  of  his  ultimate  ruin. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

OF   THOSE    WHO    HAVE    ATTAINED   THE   POSITION    OP 
PRINCE    BY    VILLAINY 

BUT  as  there  are  still  two  ways  of  becoming  prince 
which  cannot  be  attributed  entirely  either  to  fortune 
or  to  ability,  they  must  not  be  passed  over,  although 
one  of  them  could  be  more  fully  discussed  if  we 
were  treating  of  republics.  These  are  when  one 
becomes  prince  by  some  nefarious  or  villainous 
means,  or  when  a  private  citizen  becomes  the  prince 
of  his  country  through  the  favour  of  his  fellow- 
citizens.  And  in  speaking  of  the  former  means, 
I  will  give  two  examples,  one  ancient,  the  other 
modern,  without  entering  further  into  the  merits 
of  this  method,  as  I  judge  them  to  be  sufficient  for 
any  one  obliged  to  imitate  them.  Agathocles  the 
Sicilian  rose  not  only  from  private  life  but  from 
the  lowest  and  most  abject  position  to  be  King  of 
Syracuse.  The  son  of  a  potter,  he  led  a  life  of  the 
utmost  wickedness  through  all  the  stages  of  his 
fortune.  Nevertheless,  his  wickedness  was  accom- 
panied by  such  vigour  of  mind  and  body  that,  having 
joined  the  militia,  he  rose  through  all  its  grades  to 
be  praetor  of  Syracuse.  Having  been  appointed  to 
this  position,  and  having  decided  to  become  prince, 
and  to  hold  with  violence  and  without  the  support 
of  others  that  which  had  been  granted  him  ;  and 
having  imparted  his  design  to  Hamilcar  the  Car- 
32 


THE  PRINCE  33 

thaginian,  who  with  his  armies  was  fighting  in 
Sicily,  he  called  together  one  morning  the  people 
and  senate  of  Syracuse,  as  if  he  had  to  deliberate 
on  matters  of  importance  to  the  republic,  and  at  a 
given  signal  had  all  the  senators  and  the  richest 
men  of  the  people  killed  by  his  soldiers  ;  after  their 
death  he  occupied  and  held  rule  over  the  city 
without  any  civil  disorders.  And  although  he  was 
twice  beaten  by  the  Carthaginians  and  ultimately 
besieged,  he  was  able  not  only  to  defend  the  city, 
but  leaving  a  portion  of  his  forces  for  its  defence, 
with  the  remainder  he  invaded  Africa,  and  in  a 
short  time  liberated  Syracuse  from  the  siege  and 
Drought  the  Carthaginians  to  great  extremities,  so 
that  they  were  obliged  to  come  to  terms  with  him, 
and  remain  contented  with  the  possession  of  Africa, 
leaving  Sicily  to  Agathocles.  Whoever  considers, 
therefore,  the  actions  and  qualities  of  this  man, 
will  see  few  if  any  things  which  can  be  attributed 
to  fortune ;  for,  as  above  stated,  it  was  not  by  the 
favour  of  any  person,  but  through  the  grades  of 
the  militia,  which  he  had  gained  with  a  thousand 
hardships  and  perils,  that  he  arrived  at  the  position 
of  prince,  which  he  afterwards  maintained  by  so 
many  courageous  and  perilous  expedients.  It  can- 
not be  called  a  virtue  to  kill  one's  fellow-citizens, 
betray  one's  friends,  be  without  faith,  without  pity, 
and  without  religion,  by  which  methods  one  may 
indeed  gain  an  empire,  but  not  glory.  For  if  the 
virtuesofAgathoclesinbraviugandovercomingperils, 
and  his  greatness  of  soul  in  supporting  and  sur- 
mounting obstacles  be  considered,  one  sees  no  reason 
for  holding  him  inferior  to  any  of  the  most  renowned 
captains.  Nevertheless  his  barbarous  cruelty  and 
inhumanity,  together  with  his  countless  atrocities, 
do  not  permit  of  his  being  named  among  the  most 
famous  men.  We  cannot  attribute  to  fortune  or 
merit  that  which  he  achieved  without  either.  In 
our  own  times,  during  the  reign  of  Alexander  VI., 

D 


34  NICCOLO  MACHIAVELL1 

Oliverotto  du  Fermo  had  been  left  a  young  boy 
under  the  care  of  his  maternal  uncle,  Giovanni 
Fogliani,  who  brought  him  up,  and  sent  him  in 
early  youth  to  fight  under  Paolo  Vitelli,  in  order 
that  he  might,  under  that  discipline,  obtain  a 
good  military  position.  On  the  death  of  Paolo  he 
fought  under  his  brother  Vitellozzo,  and  in  a  very 
short  time,  being  of  great  intelligence,  and  active  in 
mind  and  body,  he  became  one  of  the  leaders  of 
his  troops.  But  deeming  it  servile  to  be  under 
others,  he  resolved,  with  the  help  of  some  citizens 
of  Fermo,  who  preferred  servitude  to  the  liberty  of 
their  country,  and  with  the  favour  of  the  Vitellis, 
to  occupy  Fermo;  he  therefore  wrote  to  Giovanni 
Fogliaui,  how,  having  been  for  many  years  away 
from  home,  he  wished  to  come  to  see  him  and  his 
city,  and  in  some  measure  to  revisit  his  estates. 
And  as  he  had  only  laboured  to  gain  honour,  in 
order  that  his  fellow-citizens  might  see  that  he 
had  not  spent  his  time  in  vain,  he  wished  to  come 
honourably  accompanied  by  one  hundred  horsemen, 
his  friends  and  followers,  and  prayed  him  that  he 
would  be  pleased  to  order  that  he  should  be 
received  with  honour  by  the  citizens  of  Fermo,  by 
which  he  would  honour  not  only  him,  Oliverotto, 
but  also  himself,  as  he  had  been  his  pupil. 
Giovanni  did  not  fail  in  any  duty  towards  his 
nephew  ;  he  caused  him  to* be  honourably  received 
by  the  people  of  Fermo,  and  lodged  him  in  his 
own  houses.  After  waiting  some  days  to  arrange 
all  that  was  necessary  to  his  villainous  projects, 
Oliverotto  invited  Giovanni  Fogliani  and  all  the 
principal  men  of  Fermo  to  a  grand  banquet.  After 
the  dinner  and  the  entertainments  usual  at  such 
feasts,  Oliverotto  artfully  introduced  certain  im- 
portant matters  of  discussion,  speaking  of  the 
greatness  of  Pope  Alexander,  and  of  his  sou  Cesare, 
and  of  their  enterprises.  To  which  discourses 
Giovanni  and  others  having  replied,  he  all  at  once 


THE   PRINCE  35 

rose,  saying  that  these  matters  should  be  spoken  of 
in  a  more  secret  place,  and  withdrew  into  a  room 
where  Giovanni  and  the  other  citizens  followed  him. 
They  were  no  sooner  seated  than  soldiers  rushed 
out  of  hiding-places  and  killed  Giovanni  and  all  the 
others.  After  which  massacre  Oliverotto  mounted 
his  horse,  rode  through  the  town  and  besieged  the 
chief  magistrate  in  his  palace,  so  that  through  fear 
they  were  obliged  to  obey  him  and  form  a  govern- 
ment, of  which  he  made  himself  prince.  And  all 
those  being  dead  who,  if  discontented,  could  injure 
him,  he  fortified  himself  with  new  orders,  civil  and 
military,  in  such  a  way  that  within  the  year  that 
he  held  the  principality  he  was  not  only  safe  him- 
self in  the  city  of  Fermo,  but  had  become  formid- 
able to  all  his  neighbours.  And  his  overthrow 
would  have  been  difficult,  like  that  of  Agathocles,  if 
he  had  not  allowed  himself  to  be  deceived  by  Cesare 
Borgia,  when  he  besieged  the  Orsinis  and  Vitellis 
at  Sinigaglia,  as  already  related,  where  he  also  was 
taken,  one  year  after  the  parricide  he  had  committed, 
and  strangled,  together  with  Vitellozzo,  who  had 
been  his  teacher  in  ability  and  atrocity.  Some  may 
wonder  how  it  came  about  that  Agathocles,  and  others 
like  him,  could,  after  infinite  treachery  and  cruelty, 
live  secure  for  many  years  in  their  country  and 
defend  themselves  from  external  enemies  without 
being  conspired  against  by  their  subjects  ;  although 
many  others  have,  through  their  cruelty,  been 
unable  to  maintain  their  position  in  times  of  peace, 
not  to  speak  of  the  uncertain  times  of  war. 

I  believe  this  arises  from  the  cruelties  being  used 
well  or  badly.  Well  used  may  be  called  those  (if  it 
is  permissible  to  use  the  word  well  of  evil)  which  are 
committed  once  for  the  need  of  securing  one's  self, 
and  which  afterwards  are  not  persisted  in,  but  are 
exchanged  for  measures  as  useful  to  the  subjects  as 
possible.  Cruelties  ill  used  are  those  which ,  although 
at  first  few,  increase  rather  than  diminish  with 


36  NICCOL6  MACHIAVELL1 

time.  Those  who  follow  the  former  method  may 
remedy  in  some  measure  their  condition,  both  with 
God  and  man  ;  as  did  Agathocles.  As  to  the  others, 
it  is  impossible  for  them  to  maintain  themselves. 
Whence  it  is  to  be  noted,  that  in  taking  a  state 
the  conqueror  must  arrange  to  commit  all  his 
cruelties  at  once,  so  as  not  to  have  to  recur  to  them 
every  day,  and  so  as  to  be  able,  by  not  making  fresh 
changes,  to  reassure  people  and  win  them  over  by 
benefiting  them.  Whoever  acts  otherwise,  either 
through  timidity  or  bad  counsels,  is  always  obliged 
to  stand  with  knife  in  hand,  and  can  never  depend 
on  his  subjects,  because  they,  through  continually 
fresh  injuries,  are  unable  to  depend  upon  him. 
For  injuries  should  be  done  all  together,  so  that 
being  less  tasted,  they  will  give  less  offence. 
Benefits  should  be  granted  little  by  little,  so  that 
they  may  be  better  enjoyed.  And  above  all,  a  prince 
must  live  with  his  subjects  in  such  a  way  that  no 
accident  should  make  him  change  it,  for  good  or 
fevil ;  for  necessity  arising  in  adverse  times,  you  are 
;not  in  time  with  severity,  and  the  good  that  you 
,do  does  not  profit  you,  as  it  is  judged  to  be  forced, 
land  you  will  derive  no  benefit  whatever  from  it. 


CHAPTER  IX 

OF    THE    CIVIC    PRINCIPALITY 

BUT  we  now  come  to  the  case  where  a  citizen 
becomes  prince  not  through  crime  or  intolerable 
violence,  but  by  the  favour  of  his  fellow-citizens, 
which  may  be  called  a  civic  principality.  To 
arrive  at  this  position  depends  not  entirely  oa 
worth  or  entirely  on  fortune,  but  rather  on  cunning' 
assisted  by  fortune.  One  attains  it  by  help  of 
popular  favour  or  by  the  favour  of  the  aristocracy. 
For  in  every  city  these  two  opposite  parties  are  to- 
be  found,  arising  from  the  desire  of  the  populace  ta 
avoid  the  oppression  of  the  great,  and  the  desire  of 
the  great  to  command  and  oppress  the  people. 
And  from  these  two  opposing  interests  arises  in  the- 
city  one  of  three  effects :  either  absolute  govern- 
ment, liberty,  or  license.  The  former  is  created 
either  by  the  populace  or  the  nobility  depending 
on  the  relative  opportunities  of  the  two  parties  ;  for 
when  the  nobility  see  that  they  are  unable  to  resist 
the  people  they  unite  in  creating  one  of  their 
number  prince,  so  as  to  be  able  to  carry  out  their 
own  designs  under  the  shadow  of  his  authority. 
The  populace,  on  the  other  hand,  when  unable  to 
resist  the  nobility,  endeavour  to  create  a  prince  in 
order  to  be  protected  by  his  authority.  He  who 
becomes  prince  by  help  of  the  nobility  has  greater 
difficulty  in  maintaining  his  power  than  he  who  is 
37 


38  NICCOLO  MACHIAVELLI 

raised  by  the  populace,  for  he  is  surrounded  by 
those  who  think  themselves  his  equals,  and  is  thus 
unable  to  direct  or  command  as  he  pleases.  But 
one  who  is  raised  to  the  leadership  by  popular 
favour  finds  himself  alone,  and  has  no  one  or  very 
few  who  are  not  ready  to  obey  him.  Besides 
which,  it  is  impossible  to  satisfy  the  nobility  by 
fair  dealing  and  without  inflicting  injury  on  others, 
whereas  it  is  very  easy  to  satisfy  the  mass  of  the 
people  in  this  way.  For  the  aim  of  the  people  is 
more  honest  than  that  of  the  nobility,  the  latter 
desiring  to  oppress,  and  the  former  merely  to  avoid 
oppression.  It  must  also  be  added  that  the  prince 
can  never  insure  himself  against  a  hostile  populace 
on  account  of  their  number,  but  he  can  against  the 
hostility  of  the  great,  as  they  are  but  few.  The 
worst  that  a  prince  has  to  expect  from  a  hostile 
people  is  to  be  abandoned,  but  from  hostile  nobles 
ne  has  to  fear  not  only  abandonment  but  their 
active  opposition,  and  as  they  are  more  far-seeing 
and  more  cunning,  they  are  always  in  time  to  save 
themselves  and  take  sides  with  the  one  who  they 
expect  will  conquer.  The  prince  is,  moreover, 
obliged  to  live  always  with  the  same  people,  but  he 
can  easily  do  without  the  same  nobility,  being  able 
to  make  and  unmake  them  at  any  time,  and  increase 
their  position  or  deprive  them  of  it  as  he  pleases. 
And  to  throw  further  light  on  this  part,  I  would 
say,  that  the  nobles  are  to  be  considered  in  two 
different  manners ;  that  is,  they  are  either  to  be  ruled 
so  as  to  make  them  entirely  depend  on  your  fortunes, 
or  else  not.  Those  that  are  thus  bound  to  you  and 
are  not  rapacious,  must  be  honoured  and  loved ; 
those  who  are  not  bound  must  be  considered  in 
two  ways,  they  either  do  this  through  pusillanimity 
and  natural  want  of  courage,  and  in  this  case  you 
ought  to  make  use  of  them,  and  especially  such  as 
are  of  good  counsel,  so  that  they  may  honour  you 
in  prosperity  and  in  adversity  you  have  not  to  fear 


THE  PRINCE  39 

them.  But  when  they  are  not  bound  to  you  of  set 
purpose  and  for  ambitious  ends,  it  is  a  sign  that 
they  think  more  of  themselves  than  of  you  ;  and 
from  such  men  the  prince  must  guard  himself  and 
look  upon  them  as  secret  enemies,  who  will  help  to 
ruin  him  when  in  adversity.  One,  however,  who 
becomes  prince  by  favour  of  the  populace,  must 
maintain  its  friendship,  which  he  will  lind  easy,  the 
people  asking  nothing  but  not  to  be  oppressed. 
But  one  who  against  the  people's  wishes  becomes 
prince  by  favour  of  the  nobles,  should  above  all 
endeavour  to  gain  the  favour  of  the  people ;  this 
will  be  easy  to  him  if  he  protects  them.  And  as 
men,  who  receive  good  from  those  they  expected 
evil  from,  feel  under  a  greater  obligation  to  their 
benefactor,  so  the  subject  populace  will  become 
even  better  disposed  towards  him  than  if  he  had 
become  prince  through  their  favour.  The  prince 
can  win  their  favour  in  many  ways,  which  vary 
according  to  circumstances,  for  which  no  certain 
rule  can  be  given,  and  will  therefore  be  passed  over. 
I  will  only  say,  in  conclusion,  that  it  is  necessary 
for  a  prince  to  possess  the  friendship  of  the  people  ; 
otherwise  he  has  no  resource  in  times  of  adversity. 
Nabis,  prince  of  the  Spartans,  sustained  a  siege 
by  the  whole  of  Greece  and  a  victorious  Roman 
army,  and  defended  against  them  his  country  and 
maintained  his  own  position.  It  sufficed  when  the 
danger  arose  for  him  to  make  sure  of  a  few,  which 
would  not  have  been  enough  if  the  populace  had 
been  hostile  to  him.  And  let  no  one  oppose  my 
opinion  in  this  by  quoting  the  trite  proverb,  ' '  He 
who  builds  on  the  people,  builds  on  mud  "  ;  because 
that  is  true  when  a  private  citizen  relies  upon  the 
people  and  persuades  himself  that  they  will  liberate 
him  if  he  is  oppressed  by  enemies  or  by  the  magis- 
trates ;  in  this  case  he  might  often  find  himself 
deceived,  as  happened  in  Rome  to  the  Gracchi  and 
in  Florence  to  Messer  Georgio  Scali. 


40  N1CCOLO  MACHIAVELLI 

But  when  it  is  a  prince  who  founds  himself  on 
this  basis,,  one  who  can  command  and  is  a  man  of 
courage,  and  does  not  get  frightened  in  adversity, 
and  does  not  neglect  other  preparations,  and  one 
who  by  his  own  courage  and  measures  animates 
the  mass  of  the  people,  he  will  not  find  himself 
deceived  by  them,  and  he  will  find  that  he  has  laid 
his  foundations  well.  Usually  these  principalities 
are  in  danger  when  the  prince  from  the  position  oi 
a  civil  ruler  changes  to  an  absolute  one,  for  these 
princes  either  command  themselves  or  by  means 
of  magistrates.  In  the  latter  case  their  position 
is  weaker  and  more  dangerous,  for  they  are  at 
the  mercy  of  those  citizens  who  are  appointed 
magistrates,  who  can,  especially  in  times  of 
adversity,  with  great  facility  deprive  them  of  their 
position,  either  by  acting  against  them  or  by  not 
obeying  them.  The  prince  is  not  in  time,  in  such 
dangers,  to  assume  absolute  authority,  for  the 
citizens  and  subjects  who  are  accustomed  to  take 
their  orders  from  the  magistrates  are  not  ready  in 
these  emergencies  to  obey  his,  and  he  will  always 
in  doubtful  times  lack  men  whom  he  can  rely  on. 
Such  a  prince  cannot  base  himself  on  what  he  sees 
in  quiet  times,  when  the  citizens  have  need  of  the 
state ;  for  then  every  one  is  full  of  promises  and 
each  one  is  ready  to  die  for  him  when  death  is  far 
off ;  but  in  adversity,  when  the  state  has  need  of 
citizens,  then  he  will  find  but  few.  And  this 
experience  is  the  more  dangerous,  in  that  it  can 
only  be  had  once.  Therefore  a  wise  prince  will 
seek  means  by  which  his  subjects  will  always  and  in 
every  possible  condition  of  things  have  need  of  his 
government,  and  then  they  will  always  be  faithful 
to  him. 


CHAPTER  X 


HOW    THE   STRENGTH    OP   ALL   STATES    SHOULD 
BE   MEASURED 

IN  examining  the  character  of  these  principalities 
it  is  necessary  to  consider  another  point,  namely, 
whether  the  prince  has  such  a  position  as  to  be 
able  in  case  of  need  to  maintain  himself  alone,  or 
whether  he  has  always  need  of  the  protection  of 
others.  The  better  to  explain  this  I  would  say, 
that  I  consider  those  capable  of  maintaining  them- 
selves alone  who  can,  through  abundance  of  men  or 
money,  put  together  a  sufficient  army,  and  hold 
the  field  against  any  one  who  assails  them  ;  and  I 
consider  to  have  need  of  others,  those  who  cannot 
take  the  field  against  their  enemies,  but  are  obliged 
to  take  refuge  within  their  walls  and  stand  on  the 
defensive.  We  have  already  discussed  the  former 
case  and  will  speak  in  future  of  it  as  occasion  arises. 
In  the  second  case  there  is  nothing  to  be  said 
except  to  encourage  such  a  prince  to  provision  and 
fortify  his  own  town,  and  not  to  trouble  about  the 
country.  And  whoever  has  strongly  fortified  his 
town  and,  as  regards  the  government  of  his  sub- 
jects, has  proceeded  as  we  have  already  described 
and  will  further  relate,  will  be  attacked  with  great 
reluctance,  for  men  are  always  averse  to  enterprises 
in  which  they  foresee  difficulties,  and  it  can  never 
appear  easy  to  attack  one  who  has  his  town  well 
41 


42  N1CCOLO  MACHIAVELL1 

guarded  and  is  not  hated  by  the  people.  The 
cities  of  Germany  are  extremely  liberal,  have  little 
surrounding  country,  and  obey  the  emperor  when 
they  choose,  and  they  do  not  fear  him  or  any  other 
potentate  that  they  have  about  them.  They  are 
fortified  in  such  a  manner  that  every  one  thinks 
that  to  reduce  them  would  be  tedious  and  difficult, 
for  they  all  have  the  necessary  moats  and  bastions, 
sufficient  artillery,  and  always  keep  in  the  public 
storehouses  food  and  drink  and  fuel  for  one  year. 
Beyond  which,  to  keep  the  lower  classes  satisfied, 
and  without  loss  to  the  public,  they  have  always 
enough  means  to  give  them  work  for  one  year  in 
these  employments  which  form  the  nerve  and  life 
of  the  town,  and  in  the  industries  by  which  the 
lower  classes  live  ;  military  exercises  are  still  held 
in  reputation,  and  many  regulations  are  in  force 
for  maintaining  them.  'A  prince,  therefore,  who 
possesses  a  strong  city  and  does  not  make  himself 
hated,  cannot  be  assaulted  ;  and  if  he  were  to  be 
so,  the  assailant  would  be  obliged  to  retire  shame- 
fully ;  for  so  many  things  change,  that  it  is  almost 
impossible  for  any  one  to  hold  the  field  for  a  year 
with  his  armies  idle.  And  to  those  who  urge  that 
the  people,  having  their  possessions  outside  and 
seeing  them  burnt,  will  not  have  patience,  and 
the  long  siege  and  self-interest  will  make  them 
forget  their  prince,  I  reply  that  a  powerful  and 
courageous  prince  will  always  overcome  those 
difficulties  by  now  raising  the  hopes  of  his  subjects 
that  the  evils  will  not  last  long,  now  impressing 
them  with  fear  of  the  enemy's  cruelty,  now  by 
dextrously  assuring  himself  of  those  who  appear 
too  bold.  Besides  which,  the  enemy  would  naturally 
burn  and  ruin  the  country  on  first  arriving  and  in 
the  time  when  men's  minds  are  still  hot  and  eager 
to  defend  themselves,  and  therefore  the  prince  has 
still  less  to  fear,  for  after  some  days,  when  people 
have  cooled  down,  the  damage  is  done,  the  evil  has 


THE  PRINCE  43 

been  suffered,  and  there  is  no  remedy,  so  that  they 
are  the  more  ready  to  unite  with  their  prince,  as  it 
appears  that  he  is  under  an  obligation  to  them, 
their  houses  having  been  burnt  and  their  possessions 
ruined  in  his  defence. 

It  is  the  nature  of  men  to  be  us  much  bound  by 
the  benefits  that  they  confer  as  by  those  they  receive. 
From  which  it  follows  that,  everything  considered, 
a  prudent  prince  will  not  find  it  difficult  to  uphold 
the  courage  of  his  subjects  both  at  the  commence- 
ment and  during  a  state  of  siege,  if  he  possesses 
provisions  and  means  to  defend  himself. 


CHAPTER  XI 

OP   ECCLESIASTICAL    PRINCIPALITIES 

IT  now  remains  to  us  only  to  speak  of  ecclesiastical 
principalities,  with  regard  to  which  the  difficulties 
lie  wholly  before  they  are  possessed.  They  are 
acquired  either  by  ability  or  by  fortune;  but  are 
maintained  without  either,  for  they  are  sustained 
by  the  ancient  religious  customs,  which  are  so 
powerful  and  of  such  quality,  that  they  keep  their 
princes  in  power  in  whatever  manner  they  proceed 
and  live.  These  alone  have  a  state  without  defend- 
ing it,  have  subjects  without  governing  them,  and 
the  states,  not  being  defended,  are  not  taken  from 
them  ;  the  subjects  not  being  governed  do  not 
disturb  themselves,  and  neither  think  of  nor  are 
capable  of  alienating  themselves  from  them.  Only 
these  principalities,  therefore,  are  secure  and  happy. 
But  as  they  are  upheld  by  higher  causes,  which  the 
human  mind  cannot  attain  to,  I  will  abstain  from 
speaking  of  them  ;  for  being  exalted  and  maintained 
by  God,  it  would  be  the  work  of  a  presumptuous 
and  foolish  man  to  discuss  them. 

However,  I  might  be  asked  how  it  has  come  about 
that  the  Church  has  reached  such  great  temporal 
power,  when,  previous  to  Alexander  VI. ,  the  Italian 
potentates,  —  and  not  merely  the  really  powerful 
ones,  but  every  lord  or  baron,  however  insignificant, 
held  it  in  slight  esteem  as  regards  temporal  power  ; 
44 


THE  PRINCE  45 

whereas  now  it  is  dreaded  by  a  king  of  France, 
whom  it  has  been  able  to  drive  out  of  Italy,  and 
has  also  been  able  to  ruin  the  Venetians.  There- 
fore, although  this  is  well  known,  I  do  not  think 
it  superfluous  to  call  it  to  mind.  Before  Charles, 
King  of  France,  came  into  Italy,  this  country  was 
under  the  rule  of  the  pope,  the  Venetians,  the 
King  of  Naples,  the  Duke  of  Milan,  and  the 
Florentines.  These  potentates  had  to  have  two 
chief  cares :  one,  that  no  foreigner  should  enter 
Italy  by  force  of  arms,  the  other  that  none  of  the 
existing  governments  should  extend  its  dominions. 
Those  chiefly  to  be  watched  were  the  pope  and  the 
Venetians.  To  keep  back  the  Venetians  required 
the  ruin  of  all  the  others,  as  in  the  defence  of 
Ferrara,  and  to  keep  down  the  pope  they  made 
use  of  the  Roman  barons.  These  were  divided  into 
two  factions,  the  Orsinis  and  the  Colonnas,  and  as 
there  was  constant  quarrelling  between  them,  and 
they  were  constantly  under  arms,  before  the  eyes 
of  the  pope,  they  kept  the  papacy  weak  and  infirm. 
And  although  there  arose  now  and  then  a  resolute 
pope  like  Sextus,  yet  his  fortune  or  ability  was 
never  able  to  liberate  him  from  these  evils.  The 
shortness  of  their  life  was  the  reason  of  this,  for  in 
the  course  of  ten  years  which,  as  a  general  rule,  a 
pope  lived,  he  had  great  difficulty  in  suppressing 
even  one  of  the  factions,  and  if,  for  example,  a 
pope  had  almost  put  down  the  Colonnas,  a  new 
pope  would  succeed  who  was  hostile  to  the  Orsinis, 
which  caused  the  Colonnas  to  spring  up  again,  and 
he  was  not  in  time  to  suppress  them.  This  caused 
the  temporal  power  of  the  pope  to  be  of  little 
esteem  in  Italy. 

Then  arose  Alexander  VI.  who,  of  all  the  pontiffs 
who  have  ever  reigned,  best  showed  how  a  pope 
might  prevail  both  by  money  and  by  force.  With 
Duke  Valentine  as  his  instrument,  and  on  the 
occasion  of  the  French  invasion,  he  did  all  that  I 


46  NICCOLO  MACHIAVELL1 

have  previously  described  in  speaking  of  the  actions 
of  the  duke.  And  although  his  object  was  to 
aggrandise  not  the  Church  but  the  duke,  what  he 
did  resulted  in  the  aggrandisement  of  the  Church, 
which  after  the  death  of  the  duke  became  the 
heir  of  his  labours.  Then  came  Pope  Julius,  who 
found  the  Church  powerful,  possessing  all  Romagna, 
all  the  Roman  barons  suppressed,  and  the  factions 
destroyed  by  the  severity  of  Alexander,  He  also 
found  the  way  open  for  accumulating  wealth  in 
ways  never  used  before  the  time  of  Alexander. 
These  measures  were  not  only  followed  by  Julius, 
but  increased  ;  he  resolved  to  gain  Bologna,  put 
down  the  Venetians  and  drive  the  French  from 
Italy,  in  all  which  enterprises  he  was  successful. 
He  merits  the  greater  praise,  as  he  did  everything 
to  increase  the  power  of  the  Church  and  not  of 
any  private  person.  He  also  kept  the  Orsini  and 
Colonna  parties  in  the  conditions  in  which  he 
found  them,  and  although  there  were  some  leaders 
among  them  who  might  have  made  changes,  there 
were  two  things  that  kept  them  steady  :  one,  the 
greatness  of  the  Church,  which  they  dreaded  ;  the 
other,  the  fact  that  they  had  no  cardinals,  who  are 
the  origin  of  the  tumults  among  them.  For  these 
parties  are  never  at  rest  when  they  have  cardinals. 
for  these  stir  up  the  parties  both  within  Rome  and 
outside,  and  the  barons  are  forced  to  defend  them. 
Thus  from  the  ambitions  of  prelates  arise  the  dis- 
cords and  tumults  among  the  barons.  His  holiness, 
Pope  Leo  X. ,  therefore,  has  found  the  pontificate  in 
a  very  powerful  condition,  from  which  it  is  hoped, 
that  as  those  popes  made  it  great  by  force  of 
armies,  so  he  through  his  goodness  and  infinite 
other  virtues  will  make  it  both  great  and  venerated. 


CHAPTER   Xll 

THE   DIFFERENT    KINDS    OF    MILITIA   AND 
MERCENARY  SOLDIERS 

HAVING  now  discussed  fully  the  qualities  of 
these  principalities  of  which  I  proposed  to  treat, 
and  partially  considered  the  causes  of  their  pro- 
sperity or  failure,  and  having  also  showed  the 
methods  hy  which  many  have  sought  to  obtain 
such  states,  it  now  remains  for  me  to  treat  generally 
of  the  methods  of  attack  and  defence  that  can  be 
used  in  each  of  them.  We  have  said  already  how 
necessary  it  is  for  a  prince  to  have  his  foundations 
good,  otherwise  he  is  certain  to  be  ruined.  The 
chief  foundations  of  all  states,  whether  new,  old, 
or  mixed,  are  good  laws  and  good  arms.  And 
as  there  cannot  be  good  laws  where  there  are  not 
good  arms,  and  where  there  are  good  arms  there 
should  be  good  laws,  I  will  not  now  discuss  the 
laws,  but  will  speak  of  the  arms.  I  say,  therefore, 
that  the  arms  by  which  a  prince  defends  his  posses- 
sions are  either  his  own,  or  else  mercenaries,  or 
auxiliaries,  or  mixed.  The  mercenaries  and  auxil- 
iaries are  useless  and  dangerous,  and  if  any  one 
keeps  his  state  based  on  the  arms  of  mercenaries, 
he  will  never  stand  firm  or  sure,  as  they  are  dis- 
united, ambitious,  without  discipline,  faithless,  bold 
amongst  friends,  cowardly  amongst  enemies,  they 
have  no  fear  of  God,  and  keep  no  faith  with  men. 

47 


48  NICCOL6   MACHIAVELLI 

Ruin  is  only  deferred  as  long  as  the  assault  is  post- 
poned ;  in  peace  you  are  despoiled  by  them,  and  in 
war  by  the  enemy.  The  cause  of  this  is  that  they 
have  no  love  or  other  motive  to  keep  them  in  the 
field  beyond  a  trifling  wage,  which  is  not  enough  to 
make  them  ready  to  die  for  you.  They  are  quite 
willing  to  be  your  soldiers  so  long  as  you  do  not 
make  war,  but  when  war  comes,  it  is  either  fly  or 
be  off.  I  ought  to  have  little  trouble  in  proving 
this,  since  the  ruin  of  Italy  is  now  caused  by 
nothing  else  but  through  her  having  relied  for 
many  years  on  mercenary  arms.  These  were  some- 
what improved  in  a  few  cases,  and  appeared  courage- 
ous among  themselves,  but  when  the  foreigner 
came  they  showed  their  worthlessness.  Thus  it 
came  about  that  King  Charles  of  France  was  allowed 
to  take  Italy  without  the  slightest  trouble,  and  those 
who  said  that  it  was  owing  to  our  sins,  spoke  the 
truth,  but  it  was  not  the  sins  that  they  believed 
but  those  that  I  have  related.  And  as  it  was  the 
sins  of  princes,  they  too  have  suffered  the  punish- 
ment I  will  explain  more  fully  the  defects  of 
these  arms.  Mercenary  captains  are  either  very 
capable  men  or  not ;  if  they  are,  you  cannot  rely 
upon  them,  for  they  will  always  aspire  to  their  own 
greatness,  either  by  oppressing  you,  their  master, 
or  by  oppressing  others  against  your  intentions ; 
but  if  the  captain  is  not  an  able  man,  he  will 
generally  ruin  you.  And  if  it  is  replied  to  this, 
that  whoever  has  armed  forces  will  do  the  same, 
whether  these  are  mercenary  or  not,  1  would  reply 
that  as  armies  are  to  be  used  either  by  a  prince  or 
by  a  republic,  the  prince  must  go  in  person  to  take 
the  position  of  captain,  and  the  republic  must  send 
its  own  citizens.  If  the  one  sent  turns  out  incom- 
petent, it  must  change  him  ;  and  if  capable,  keep 
him  by  law  from  going  beyond  the  proper  limits. 
And  it  is  seen  by  experience  that  only  princes  and 
armed  republics  make  very  great  progress,  whereas 


THE  PRINCE  49 

mercenary  forces  do  nothing  but  damage,  and  also 
an  armed  republic  submits  less  easily  to  the  rule  of 
one  of  its  citizens  than  a  republic  armed  by  foreign 
forces.  Rome  and  Sparta  were  for  many  centuries 
well  armed  and  free.  The  Swiss  are  well  armed 
and  enjoy  great  freedom.  As  an  example  of  mer- 
cenary armies  in  antiquity  there  are  the  Cartha- 
ginians, who  were  oppressed  by  their  mercenary 
soldiers,  after  the  termination  of  the  first  war 
with  the  Romans,  even  while  they  still  had  their 
own  citizens  as  captains.  Philip  of  Macedon  was 
made  captain  of  their  forces  by  the  Thebans  after 
the  death  of  Epaminondas,  and  after  gaining  the 
victory  he  deprived  them  of  liberty.  The  Milanese, 
on  the  death  of  Duke  Philip,  hired  Francesco 
Sforza  against  the  Venetians,  who  having  overcome 
the  enemy  at  Caravaggio,  allied  himself  with  them 
to  oppress  the  Milanese  his  employers.  The  father 
of  this  Sforza,  being  a  soldier  in  the  service  of  the 
Queen  Giovanna  of  Naples,  left  her  suddenly  un- 
armed, by  which  she  was  compelled,  in  order  not 
to  lose  the  kingdom,  to  throw  herself  into  the 
arms  of  the  King  of  Aragon.  And  if  the  Venetians 
and  Florentines  have  in  times  past  increased  their 
dominions  by  means  of  such  forces,  and  their 
captains  have  not  made  themselves  princes  but 
have  defended  them,  I  reply  that  the  Florentines 
in  this  case  have  been  favoured  by  chance,  for  of 
the  capable  leaders  whom  they  might  have  feared, 
some  did  not  conquer,  some  met  with  opposition, 
and  others  directed  their  ambition  elsewhere.  The 
one  who  did  not  conquer  was  Sir  John  Hawkwood, 
whose  fidelity  could  not  be  known  as  he  was  not 
victorious,  but  every  one  will  admit  that,  had  he  con- 
quered, the  Florentines  would  have  been  athismercy. 
Sforza  had  always  the  Bracceschi  against  him,  they 
being  constantly  at  enmity.  Francesco  directed 
his  ambition  towards  Lombardy  ;  Braccio  against 
the  Church  and  the  kingdom  of  Naples.  But  let 


60  NICCOL6   MACHIAVELL1 

us  look  at  what  followed  a  short  time  ago.  The 
Florentines  appointed  Paolo  Vitelli  their  captain, 
a  man  of  great  prudence,  who  had  risen  from  a 
private  station  to  the  highest  reputation.  If  he 
had  taken  Pisa  no  one  can  deny  that  it  was  highly 
important  for  the  Florentines  to  retain  his  friend- 
ship, because  had  he  become  the  soldier  of  their 
enemies  they  would  have  had  no  means  of  opposing 
him  ;  and  in  order  to  retain  him  they  would  have 
been  obliged  to  obey  him.  As  to  the  Venetians,  if 
one  considers  the  progress  they  made,  it  will  be 
seen  that  they  acted  surely  and  gloriously  so  long 
as  they  made  war  with  their  own  forces;  that  it 
was  before  they  commenced  their  enterprises  on 
land  that  they  fought  courageously  with  their  own 
gentlemen  and  armed  populace,  but  when  they 
began  to  fight  on  laud  they  abandoned  this  virtue, 
and  began  to  follow  the  Italian  custom.  And  at 
the  commencement  of  their  land  conquests  they 
had  not  much  to  fear  from  their  captains,  their 
land  possessions  not  being  very  large,  and  their 
reputation  being  great,  but  as  their  possessions 
increased,  as  they  did  under  Carmagnola,  they  had 
an  example  of  their  mistake.  For  seeing  that  he  was 
very  powerful,  after  he  had  defeated  the  Duke  of 
Milan,  and  knowing,  on  the  other  hand,  that  he  was 
not  enterprising  in  warfare,  they  considered  that 
they  would  not  make  any  more  conquests  with  him, 
and  they  neither  would  nor  could  dismiss  him,  for 
fear  of  losing  what  they  had  already  gained.  They 
were  therefore  obliged,  in  order  to  make  sure 
of  him,  to  have  him  killed.  They  then  had  for 
captains  Bartolommeo  da  Bergamo,  Roberto  da  San 
Severino,  Count  di  Pitigliano,  and  such  like,  from 
whom  they  had  to  fear  loss  instead  of  gain,  as 
happened  subsequently  at  Vaila,  where  in  one  day 
they  lost  what  they  had  laboriously  gained  in  eight 
hundred  years  ;  for  with  these  forces,  only  slow 
and  trifling  acquisitions  are  made,  but  sudden 


THE   PRINCE  51 

and  miraculous  losses.  And  as  I  have  cited  these 
examples  from  Italy,  which  has  now  for  many  years 
been  governed  by  mercenary  forces,  I  will  now  deal 
more  largely  with  them,  so  that  having  seen  their 
origin  and  progress,  they  can  be  better  remedied. 
You  must  understand  that  in  these  latter  times,  as 
soon  as  the  empire  began  to  be  repudiated  in  Italy 
and  the  pope  to  gain  greater  reputation  in  temporal 
matters,  Italy  was  divided  into  many  states ;  many 
of  the  principal  cities  took  up  arms  against  their 
nobles,  who,  favoured  by  the  emperor,  had  held  them 
in  subjection,  and  the  Church  encouraged  this  in 
order  to  increase  its  temporal  power.  In  many 
other  cities  one  of  the  inhabitants  became  prince. 
Thus  Italy  having  fallen  almost  entirely  into  the 
hands  of  the  Church  and  a  few  republics,  and  the 
priests  and  other  citizens  not  being  accustomed  to 
bear  arms,  they  began  to  hire  foreigners  as  soldiers. 
The  first  to  bring  reputation  for  this  kind  of 
militia  was  Alberigo  da  Como,  a  native  of  Romagna. 
The  discipline  of  this  man  produced,  among  others, 
Braccio  and  Sforza,  who  were  in  their  day  the 
arbiters  of  Italy.  After  these  came  all  those 
others  who  up  to  the  present  day  have  commanded 
the  armies  of  Italy,  and  the  result  of  their  prowess 
has  been  that  Italy  has  been  overrun  by  Charles, 
preyed  on  by  Louis,  tyrannised  over  by  Ferrando, 
and  insulted  by  the  Swiss.  The  system  adopted  by 
them  was,  in  the  first  place,  to  increase  their  own 
reputation  by  discrediting  the  infantry.  They  did 
this  because,  as  they  had  no  country  and  lived  on 
their  earnings,  a  few  foot  soldiers  did  not  augment 
their  reputation,  and  they  could  not  maintain  a  large 
number  and  therefore  they  restricted  themselves 
almost  entirely  to  cavalry,  by  which  with  a  smaller 
number  they  were  well  paid  and  honoured.  They 
reduced  things  to  such  a  state  that  in  an  army 
of  20,000  soldiers  there  were  not  2000  foot. 
They  had  also  used  every  means  to  spare  them- 


52  NICCOLO  MACHIAVELL1 

selves  and  the  soldiers  any  hardship  or  fear  by  not 
killing  each  other  in  their  encounters,  but  taking 
prisoners  without  a  blow.  They  made  no  attacks 
on  fortifications  by  night ;  and  those  in  the  fortifica- 
tions did  not  attack  the  tents  at  night,  they  made 
no  stockades  on  ditches  round  their  camps,  and  did 
not  take  the  field  in  winter.  All  these  things  were 
permitted  by  their  military  rules,  and  adopted,  as 
we  have  said,  to  avoid  trouble  and  danger,  so  that 
they  have  reduced  Italy  to  slavery  and  degradation. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

OF    AUXILIARY,    MIXED,    AND    NATIVE   TROOPS 

AUXILIARY  forces,  which  are  the  other  kind  of 
useless  forces,  are  when  one  calls  on  a  potentate  to 
come  and  aid  one  with  his  troops,  as  was  done  in 
recent  times  by  Julius,  who  seeing  the  wretched 
failure  of  his  mercenary  forces,  in  his  Ferrara 
enterprise,  had  recourse  to  auxiliaries,  and  arranged 
with  Ferrando,  King  of  Spain,  that  he  should  help 
him  with  his  armies.  These  forces  may  be  good  in 
themselves,  but  they  are  always  dangerous  for  those 
who  borrow  them,  for  if  they  lose  you  are  defeated, 
and  if  they  conquer  you  remain  their  prisoner. 
And  although  ancient  history  is  full  of  examples  of 
this,  I  will  not  depart  from  the  example  of  Pope 
Julius  II.,  which  is  still  fresh.  Nothing  could 
be  less  prudent  than  the  course  lie  adopted  ;  for, 
wishing  to  take  Ferrara,  he  put  himself  entirely 
into  the  power  of  a  foreigner.  But  by  good  fortune 
there  arose  a  third  cause  which  prevented  him 
reaping  the  effects  of  his  bad  choice ;  for  when 
his  auxiliaries  were  beaten  at  Ravenna,  the  Swiss 
rose  up  and  drove  back  the  victors,  against  all 
expectation  of  himself  or  others,  so  that  he  was  not 
taken  prisoner  by  the  enemy  which  had  fled,  nor 
by  his  own  auxiliaries,  having  conquered  by  other 
arms  than  theirs.  The  Florentines,  being  totally 
disarmed,  hired  10,000  Frenchmen  to  attack  Pisa, 
53 


54  NICCOLO   MACHIAVELLI 

by  which  measure  they  ran  greater  risk  than  at  any 
period  of  their  struggles.  The  emperor  of  Con- 
stantinople, to  oppose  his  neighbours,  put  10,000 
Turks  into  Greece,  who  after  the  war  would  not  go 
away  again,  which  was  the  beginning  of  the  servi- 
tude of  Greece  to  the  infidels.  Any  one,  therefore, 
who  wishes  not  to  conquer,  would  do  well  to  use 
these  forces,  which  are  much  more  dangerous  than 
mercenaries,  as  with  them  ruin  is  complete,  for  they 
are  all  united,  and  owe  obedience  to  others,  whereas 
with  mercenaries,  when  they  have  conquered,  it 
requires  more  time  and  a  good  opportunity  for  them 
to  injure  you,  as  they  do  not  form  a  single  body  and 
have  been  engaged  and  paid  by  you,  therefore  a 
third  party  that  you  have  made  leader  cannot  at 
once  acquire  enough  authority  to  be  able  to  injure 
you.  In  a  word,  the  greatest  dangers  with  mercen- 
aries lies  in  their  cowardice  and  reluctance  to  fight, 
but  with  auxiliaries  the  danger  lies  in  their  courage. 
A  wise  prince,  therefore,  always  avoids  these  forces 
and  has  recourse  to  his  own,  and  would  prefer 
rather  to  lose  with  his  own  men  than  conquer  with 
the  forces  of  others,  not  deeming  it  a  true  victory 
which  is  gained  by  foreign  arms.  I  never  hesitate 
to  cite  the  example  of  Cesare  Borgia  and  his  actions. 
This  duke  entered  Romagna  with  auxiliary  troops, 
leading  forces  composed  entirely  of  French  soldiers, 
and  with  these  he  took  Imola  and  Forli  ;  but  as 
they  seemed  unsafe,  he  had  recourse  to  mercenaries, 
and  hired  the  Orsini  and  Vitelli ;  afterwards  finding 
these  uncertain  to  handle,  unfaithful  and  dangerous, 
he  suppressed  them,  and  relied  upon  his  own  men. 
And  the  difference  between  these  forces  can  be 
easily  seen  if  one  considers  the  difference  between 
the  reputation  of  the  duke  when  he  had  only  the 
French,  when  he  had  the  Orsini  and  Vitelli,  and 
when  he  had  to  rely  on  himself  and  his  own 
soldiers.  His  reputation  will  be  found  to  have 
constantly  increased,  and  he  was  never  so  highly 


THE   PRINCE  55 

esteemed  as  when  every  one  saw  that  he  was  the 
sole  master  of  his  forces. 

I  do  not  wish  to  go  away  from  re<  ent  Italian 
instances,  but  I  cannot  omit  Hiero  of  Syracuse, 
whom  I  have  already  mentioned.  This  man  being1, 
as  I  said,  made  head  of  the  army  by  the  Syracusaris, 
immediately  recognised  the  uselessness  of  that 
mercenary  militia  which  was  composed  like  our 
Italian  mercenary  troops,  and  as  he  thought  it 
unsafe  either  to  retain  them  or  dismiss  them,  he 
had  them  cut  in  pieces  and  thenceforward  made  war 
with  his  own  arms  and  not  those  of  others.  I  would 
also  call  to  mind  a  figure  out  of  the  Old  Testament 
which  well  illustrates  this  point.  When  David 
offered  to  Saul  to  go  and  fight  with  the  Philistine 
champion  Goliath,  Saul,  to  encourage  him,  armed 
him  with  his  own  arms,  which  when  David  had 
tried  on  he  refused  saying,  that  with  them  he  could 
not  fight  so  well ;  he  preferred,  therefore,  to  face  the 
enemy  with  his  own  sling  and  knife.  In  short,  the 
arms  of  others  either  fail  away  from  you,  or  orer- 
burden  you, or  else  impede  you.  Charles VI II.,  father 
of  King  Louis  XI.,  having  through  good  fortune  and 
bravery  liberated  France  from  the  English,  recog- 
nised this  necessity  of  being  armed  with  his  cwu 
forces,  and  established  in  his  kingdom  a  system  of 
men-at-arms  and  infantry.  Afterwards  King  Louis 
his  son  abolished  the  infantry  and  began  to  hire 
Swiss,  which  mistake  being  followed  byothers  is,  as 
may  now  be  seen,  a  cause  of  danger  to  that  kingdom. 
For  by  giving  such  reputation  to  the  Swiss,  France 
has  disheartened  all  her  own  troops,  the  infantry 
having  been  abolished  and  the  men-at-arms  being 
obliged  to  foreigners  for  assistance ;  for  being 
accustomed  to  fight  with  Swiss  troops,  they  think 
they  cannot  conquer  without  them.  Whence  it 
comes  that  the  French  are  insufficiently  strong  to 
oppose  the  Swiss,  and  without  the  aid  of  the  Swiss 
they  will  not  venture  against  others.  The  armies 


56  NICCOLO  MACHIAVELLI 

of  the  French  are  thus  of  a  mixed  kind,  partly 
mercenary  and  partly  her  own ;  taken  together 
they  are  much  better  than  troops  entirely  composed 
of  mercenaries  or  auxiliaries,  but  much  inferior  to 
national  forces. 


CHAPTER   XIV 

WHAT   THE   DUTIES    OF   A    PRINCE    ARE    WITH    REGARD 
TO    THE    MILITIA 

A  PRINCE  should  therefore  have  no  other  aim  or 
thought,  nor  take  up  any  other  thing  for  his  study, 
but  war  and  its  order  and  discipline,  for  that  is  the 
only  art  that  is  necessary  to  one  who  commands, 
and  it  is  of  such  virtue  that  it  not  only  maintains 
those  who  are  born  princes,  but  often  enables  men 
of  private  fortune  to  attain  to  that  rank.  And  one 
sees,  on  the  other  hand,  that  when  princes  think 
more  of  luxury  than  of  arms,  they  lose  their  state. 
The  chief  cause  which  makes  any  one  lose  it,  is  the 
contempt  of  this  art,  and  the  way  to  acquire  it  is 
to  be  well  versed  in  the  same.  Francesco  Sforza, 
through  being  well  armed,  became,  from  a  private 
position,  Duke  of  Milan  ;  his  sons,  through  wishing 
to  avoid  the  fatigue  and  hardship  of  war,  from 
dukes  became  private  persons.  For  among  other 
evils  caused  by  being  disarmed,  it  renders  you  con- 
temptible ;  which  is  one  of  those  disgraceful  things 
which  a  prince  must  guard  against,  as  will  be  ex- 
plained later.  Because  there  is  no  comparison 
whatever  between  an  armed  man  and  a  disarmed 
one  ;  it  is  not  reasonable  to  suppose  that  one  who 
is  armed  will  obey  willingly  one  who  is  unarmed  ; 
or  that  any  unarmed  man  will  remain  safe  among 
armed  servants.  For  one  being  disdainful  and  the 
57 


<58  NICCOLO  MACHIAVELL1 

other  suspicious,  it  is  not  possible  for  them  to  act 
well  together.  And  yet  a  prince  who  is  ignorant 
of  military  matters,  besides  the  other  misfortunes 
already  mentioned,  cannot  be  esteemed  by  his 
soldiers,  nor  have  confidence  in  them.  He  ought, 
therefore,  never  to  let  his  thoughts  stray  from 
the  exercise  of  war;  and  in  peace  he  ought  to 
practise  it  more  than  in  war,  which  he  can  do  in 
two  ways  :  both  by  action  and  by  study.  As  to 
action,  he  must,  besides  keeping  his  men  well 
•disciplined  and  exercised,  engage  continually  in 
hunting,  and  thus  accustom  his  body  to  hardships  ; 
^.nd  on  the  other  hand  learn  the  nature  of  the  land, 
how  the  mountains  rise,  how  the  valleys  are  dis- 
posed, where  the  plains  lie,  and  understand  the 
nature  of  the  rivers  and  swamps,  and  to  this  he 
should  devote  great  attention.  This  knowledge  is 
useful  in  two  ways.  In  the  first  place,  one  learns  to 
know  one's  country,  and  can  the  better  see  how  to 
defend  it.  Then  by  means  of  the  knowledge  and 
experience  gained  in  one  locality,  one  can  easily 
understand  any  other  that  it  may  be  necessary  to 
venture  on,  for  the  hills  and  valleys,  plains  and 
rivers  of  Tuscany,  for  instance,  have  a  certain 
resemblance  to  those  of  other  provinces,  so  that 
from  a  knowledge  of  the  country  in  one  province 
-one  can  easily  arrive  at  a  knowledge  of  others. 
And  that  prince  who  is  lacking  in  this  skill  is 
wanting  in  the  first  essentials  of  a  leader ;  for  it  is 
this  which  teaches  how  to  find  the  enemy,  take  up 
quarters,  lead  armies,  arrange  marches  and  occupy 
positions  with  advantage.  Philopoemen,  prince  of 
the  Achaei,  among  other  praises  bestowed  on  him 
by  writers,  is  lauded  because  in  times  of  peace  he 
thought  of  nothing  but  the  methods  of  warfare, 
-and  when  he  was  in  the  country  with  his  friends, 
he  often  stopped  and  asked  them  :  If  the  enemy 
were  on  that  hill  and  we  found  ourselves  here  with 
our  army,  which  of  us  would  have  the  advantage  ? 


THE  PRINCE  59 

How  could  we  safely  approach  him  maintaining  our 
order?  If  we  wished  to  retire,  what  ought  we  to 
do?  If  they  retired,  how  should  we  follow  them? 
And  he  put  before  them  as  they  went  along  all  the 
cases  that  might  happen  to  an  army,  heard  their 
opinion,  gave  his  own,  fortifying  it  by  argument ; 
so  that  through  these  continued  cogitations  there 
could  never  happen  any  incident  when  leading  his 
armies  for  which  he  was  not  prepared.  But  as  to 
exercise  for  the  mind,  the  prince  ought  to  read 
history  and  study  the  actions  of  eminent  men,  see 
how  they  acted  in  warfare,  examine  the  causes  of 
their  victories  and  losses  in  order  to  imitate  the 
former  and  avoid  the  latter,  and  above  all,  do  as 
some  eminent  men  have  done  in  the  past,  who  have 
imitated  some  one,  who  has  been  much  praised  and 
glorified,  and  have  always  kept  their  deeds  and 
actions  before  them,  as  they  say  Alexander  the 
Great  imitated  Achilles,  Caesar  Alexander,  and 
Scipio  Cyrus.  And  whoever  reads  the  life  of  Cyrus 
written  by  Xenophon,  will  perceive  in  the  life  of 
Scipio  how  gloriously  he  imitated  him,  and  how,  in 
chastity,  affability,  humanity,  and  liberality  Scipio 
conformed  to  those  qualities  of  Cyrus  described  by 
Xenophon. 

A  wise  prince  should  follow  similar  methods  and 
never  remain  idle  in  peaceful  times,  but  by  industry 
make  such  good  use  of  the  time  as  may  serve  him 
in  adversity,  so  that  when  fortune  changes  she 
may  find  him  prepared  to  resist  her  blows. 


CHAPTER  XV 

OF    THE    THINGS    FOB   WHICH    MEN,    AND    ESPECIALLY 
PRINCES,    ARE    PRAISED    OR    BLAMED 

IT  remains  now  to  be  seen  what  are  the  methods 
and  rules  for  a  prince  as  regards  his  subjects  and 
friends.  And  as  I  know  that  many  have  written 
of  this,  I  fear  that  my  writing  about  it  may  be 
deemed  presumptuous,  differing  as  I  do,  especi- 
ally in  this  matter,  from  the  opinions  of  others. 
But  my  intention  being  to  write  something  of 
use  to  those  who  understand  it,  it  appears  to  me 
more  proper  to  go  to  the  real  truth  of  the  matter 
than  to  its  imagination  ;  and  many  have  imagined 
republics  and  principalities  which  have  never  been 
seen  or  known  to  exist  in  reality  ;  for  how  we  live 
is  so  far  removed  from  how  we  ought  to  live,  that 
he  who  abandons  what  is  done  for  what  ought  to 
be  done,  will  rather  learn  to  bring  about  his  own 
ruin  than  his  preservation.  A  man  who  wishes  to 
make  a  profession  of  goodness  in  everything  must 
necessarily  come  to  grief  among  so  many  who  are 
not  good.  Therefore  it  is  necessary  for  a  prince, 
who  wishes  to  maintain  himself,  to  learn  how  not 
to  be  good,  and  to  use  it  and  not  use  it  according 
to  the  necessity  of  the  case.  Leaving  on  one  side 
then  those  things  which  concern  only  an  imaginary 
prince,  and  speaking  of  those  that  are  real,  I  state 
that  all  men,  when  spoken  of,  and  especially 
60 


THE  PRINCE  61 

princes,  who  are  placed  at  a  greater  height,  are 
noted  for  some  of  those  qualities  which  bring  them 
either  praise  or  blame.  Thus  one  is  considered 
liberal,  another  miserly ;  one  a  free  giver,  another 
rapacious ;  one  cruel,  another  merciful ;  one  a 
breaker  of  his  word,  another  faithful ;  one  effeminate 
and  pusillanimous,  another  fierce  and  high-spirited  ; 
one  humane,  another  proud  ;  one  lascivious,  another 
chaste ;  one  frank,  another  astute ;  one  hard, 
another  easy  ;  one  serious,  another  frivolous ;  one 
religious,  another  incredulous,  and  so  on.  I  know 
that  every  one  will  admit  that  it  would  be  highly 
praiseworthy  in  a  prince  to  possess  all  the  above- 
named  qualities  that  are  reputed  good,  but  as  they 
cannot  all  be  possessed  or  observed,  human  condi- 
tions not  permitting  of  it,  it  is  necessary  that  he 
should  be  prudent  enough  to  avoid  the  disgrace  of 
those  vices  which  would  lose  him  the  state,  and 
guard  himself  against  those  which  will  not  lose  it 
him,  if  possible,  but  if  not  able  to,  he  can  indulge 
them  with  less  scruple.  And  yet  he  must  not  mind 
incurring  the  disgrace  of  those  vices,  without  which 
it  would  be  difficult  to  save  the  state,  for  if  one 
considers  well,  it  will  be  found  that  some  things 
which  seem  virtues  would,  if  followed,  lead  to  one's 
ruin,  and  some  others  which  appear  vices  result, 
if  followed,  in  one's  greater  security  and  wellbeing. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

OF   LIBERALITY   AND    NIGGARDLINESS 

BEGINNING  now  with  the  first  qualities  above 
named,  I  say  that  it  would  be  well  to  be  considered 
liberal  ;  nevertheless  liberality  used  in  such  a  way 
that  you  are  not  feared  will  injure  you,  because  if 
used  virtuously  and  in  the  proper  way,  it  will  not  be 
known,  and  you  will  not  incur  the  disgrace  of  the 
contrary  vice.  But  one  who  wishes  to  obtain  the 
reputation  of  liberality  among  men,  must  not  omit 
every  kind  of  sumptuous  display,  and  to  such  an 
extent  that  a  prince  of  this  character  will  consume 
by  such  means  all  his  resources,  and  will  be  at  last 
compelled,  if  he  wishes  to  maintain  his  name  for 
liberality,  to  impose  heavy  charges  on  his  people, 
become  an  extortioner,  and  do  everything  possible 
to  obtain  money.  This  will  make  his  subjects  begin 
to  hate  him,  and  he  will  be  little  esteemed  being 
poor,  so  that  having  by  this  liberality  injured  many 
and  benefited  but  few,  he  will  feel  the  first  little 
disturbance  and  be  endangered  by  every  accident. 
If  he  recognises:  this  and  wishes  to  change  his 
system,  he  incurs  at  once  the  charge  of  niggardli- 
ness ;  a  prince,  therefore,  not  being  able  to 
exercise  this  virtue  of  liberality  without  risk  if  it 
is  known,  must  not,  if  he  is  prudent,  object  to  be 
called  miserly.  In  course  of  time  he  will  be 
thought  more  liberal,  when  it  is  seen  that  by  his 
62 


THE  PRINCE  63 

parsimony  his  revenue  is  sufficient,  that  he  can  de- 
fend himself  against  those  who  make  war  on  himr 
and  undertake  enterprises  without  burdening  his- 
people,  so  that  he  is  really  liberal  to  all  those  from 
whom  he  does  not  take,  who  are  infinite  in  number, 
and  niggardly  to  all  to  whom  he  does  not  give,  who 
are  few. 

In  our  times  we  have  seen  nothing  great  done 
except  by  those  who  have  been  esteemed  niggardly  ; 
the  others  have  all  been  ruined.  Pope  Julius  II., 
although  he  had  made  use  of  a  reputation  for  liber- 
ality in  order  to  attain  the  papacy,  did  not  seek  to 
retain  it  afterwards,  so  that  he  might  be  able  to 
make  war  on  the  King  of  France,  and  he  carried 
on  so  many  wars  without  imposing  an  extraordinary 
tax,  because  his  extra  expenses  were  covered  by  the 
parsimony  he  had  so  long  practised.  The  present 
King  of  Spain,  if  he  had  been  thought  liberal,  would 
not  have  engaged  in  and  won  so  many  enterprises. 
For  these  reasons  a  prince  must  care  little  for  the 
reputation  of  being  a  miser,  if  he  wishes  to  avoid 
robbing  his  subjects,  if  he  wishes  to  be  able  to  defend 
himself,  to  not  become  poor  and  contemptible,  and 
not  to  be  forced  to  become  rapacious  ;  this  vice  of 
niggardliness  is  one  of  those  vices  which  enable  him 
to  reign.  If  it  is  said  that  Caesar  attained  the  empire 
through  liberality,  and  that  many  others  have 
reached  the  highest  positions  through  being  liberal 
or  being  thought  so,  I  would  reply  that  you  are 
either  a  prince  already  or  else  on  the  way  to  become 
one.  In  the  first  case,  this  liberality  is  harmful  ; 
in  the  second,  it  is  certainly  necessary  to  be  con- 
sidered liberal,  and  Cajsar  was  one  of  those  who 
wished  to  attain  the  mastery  over  Rome,  but  if 
after  attaining  it  he  had  lived  and  had  not 
moderated  his  expenses,  he  would  have  destroyed 
that  empire.  And  should  any  one  reply  that  there 
have  been  many  princes,  who  have  done  great  things 
with  their  armies,  who  have  been  thought  extremely 


64  N1CCOLO  MACHIAVELLI 

liberal,  I  would  answer  by  saying  that  the  prince 
may  either  spend  his  own  wealth  and  that  of  his 
subjects  or  the  wealth  of  others.  In  the  first  case 
he  must  be  sparing,  but  in  the  second  he  must  not 
neglect  to  be  very  liberal.  This  liberality  is  very 
necessary  to  a  prince  who  marches  with  his  armies, 
and  lives  by  plunder,  sacking  and  extorting,  and  is 
dealing  with  the  wealth  of  others,  for  without  it  he 
would  not  be  followed  by  his  soldiers.  And  you 
may  be  very  generous  indeed  with  what  is  not  the 
property  of  yourself  or  your  subjects,  as  were  Cyrus, 
CsBsar,  and  Alexander ;  for  spending  the  wealth 
of  others  will  not  diminish  your  reputation,  but 
increase  it,  only  spending  your  own  resources  will 
injure  you.  There  is  nothing  which  destroys  itself 
so  much  as  liberality,  for  by  using  it  you  lose  the 
power  of  using  it,  and  become  either  poor  and  des- 
picable, or,  to  escape  poverty,  rapacious  and  hated. 
And  of  all  things  that  a  prince  must  guard  against, 
the  most  important  are  being  despicable  or  hated, 
and  liberality  will  lead  you  to  one  or  other  of  these 
conditions.  It  is,  therefore,  wiser  to  have  the  name 
of  a  miser,  which  produces  disgrace  without  hatred, 
than  to  incur  of  necessity  the  name  of  being 
rapacious,  which  produces  both  disgrace  and  hatred. 


CHAPTER  XV11 

OF    CRUELTY    AND    CLEMENCY,    AND    WHETHER    IT    18 
BETTER   TO    BE    LOVED    OR   FEARED 

PROCEEDING  to  the  other  qualities  before  named,  I 
say  that  every  prince  must  desire  to  be  considered 
merciful  and  not  cruel.  He  must,  however,  take 
care  not  to  misuse  this  mercifulness.  Cesare  Borgia 
was  considered  cruel,  but  his  cruelty  had  settled 
the  Romagna,  united  it,  and  brought  it  peace  and 
confidence.  If  this  is  considered  a  benefit,  it  will 
be  seen  that  he  was  really  much  more  merciful 
than  the  Florentine  people,  who,  to  avoid  the  name 
of  cruelty,  allowed  Pistoia  to  be  destroyed.  A 
prince,  therefore,  must  not  mind  incurring  the 
charge  of  cruelty  for  the  purpose  of  keeping  his 
subjects  united  and  confident ;  for,  with  a  very  few 
examples,  he  will  be  more  merciful  than  those 
who,  from  excess  of  tenderness,  allow  disorders  to 
arise,  from  whence  spring  murders  and  rapine  ;  for 
these  as  a  rule  injure  the  whole  community,  while 
the  executions  carried  out  by  the  prince  injure  only 
one  individual.  And  of  all  princes,  it  is  impossible 
for  a  new  prince  to  escape  the  name  of  cruel, 
new  states  being  always  full  of  dangers.  Where- 
fore Virgil  makes  Dido  excuse  the  inhumanity  of 
her  rule  by  its  being  new,  where  she  says : 

Res  dura,  et  regni  novitas  me  talia  cogunt 
Moliri,  et  late  fines  custode  tueri. 
F 


66  NICCOLO  MACHIAVELLI 

Nevertheless,  he  must  be  cautious  in  believing 
and  acting,  and  must  not  inspire  fear  of  his  own 
accord,  and  must  proceed  in  a  temperate  manner 
with  prudence  and  humanity,  so  that  too  much 
confidence  does  not  render  him  incautious,  and  too 
much  diffidence  does  not  render  him  intolerant. 
From  this  arises  the  question  whether  it  is  better 
to  be  loved  more  than  feared,  or  feared  more  than 
loved.  The  reply  is,  that  one  ought  to  be  both 
feared  and  loved,  but  as  it  is  difficult  for  the  two 
to  go  together,  it  is  much  safer  to  be  feared  than 
loved,  if  one  of  the  two  has  to  be  wanting.  For 
it  may  be  said  of  men  in  general  that  they  are 
ungrateful,  voluble,  dissemblers,  anxious  to  avoid 
danger,  and  covetous  of  gain  ;  as  long  as  you  benefit 
them,  they  are  entirely  yours  ;  they  offer  you  their 
blood,  their  goods,  their  life,  and  their  children, 
as  I  have  before  said,  when  the  necessity  is  remote  ; 
but  when  it  approaches,  they  revolt.  And  the 
prince  who  has  relied  solely  on  their  words,  with- 
out making  other  preparations,  is  ruined,  for  the 
friendship  which  is  gained  by  purchase  and  not 
through  grandeur  and  nobility  of  spirit  is  merited 
but  is  not  secured,  and  at  times  is  not  to  be  had. 
And  men  have  less  scruple  in  offending  one  who 
makes  himself  loved  than  one  who  makes  himself 
feared;  for  love  is  held  by  a  chain  of  obligation 
which,  men  being  selfish,  is  broken  whenever  it 
serves  their  purpose ;  but  fear  is  maintained  by  a 
dread  of  punishment  which  never  fails.  Still,  a 
prince  should  make  himself  feared  in  such  a  way 
that  if  he  does  not  gain  love,  he  at  any  rate  avoids 
hatred ;  for  fear,  and  the  absence  of  hatred  may 
well  go  together,  and  will  be  always  attained  by 
one  who  abstains  from  interfering  with  the  property 
of  his  citizens  and  subjects  or  with  their  women. 
And  when  he  is  obliged  to  take  the  life  of  any  one, 
to  do  so  when  there  is  a  proper  justification  and 
manifest  reason  for  it ;  but  above  all  he  must 


THE  PRINCE  67 

abstain  from  taking  the  property  of  others,  for  men 
forget  more  easily  the  death  of  their  father  than 
the  loss  of  their  patrimony.  Then  also  pretexts 
for  seizing  property  are  never  wanting,  and  one 
who  begins  to  live  by  rapine  will  always  find  some 
reason  for  taking  the  goods  of  others,  whereas 
causes  for  taking  life  are  rarer  and  more  quickly 
destroyed.  But  when  the  prince  is  with  his  army 
and  has  a  large  number  of  soldiers  under  hia 
control,  then  it  is  extremely  necessary  that  he* 
should  not  mind  being  thought  cruel ;  for  without 
this  reputation  he  could  not  keep  an  army  united, 
or  disposed  to  any  duty. 

Among  the  noteworthy  actions  of  Hannibal  ifr 
numbered  this,  that  although  he  had  an  enormous 
army,  composed  of  men  of  all  nations  and  fighting 
in  foreign  countries,  there  never  arose  any  dissension 
either  among  them  or  against  the  prince,  either  in 
good  fortune  or  in  bad.  This  could  not  be  due  to 
anything  but  his  inhuman  cruelty,  which  together 
with  his  infinite  other  virtues,  made  him  always 
venerated  and  terrible  in  the  sight  of  his  soldiers, 
and  without  it  his  other  virtues  would  not  have 
sufficed  to  produce  that  effect.  Thoughtless  writers 
admire  on  the  one  hand  his  actions,  and  on  the 
other  blame  the  principal  cause  of  them.  And  that 
it  is  true  that  his  other  virtues  would  not  have 
sufficed  may  be  seen  from  the  case  of  Scipio  (very 
rare  not  only  in  his  own  times,  but  in  all  times 
of  which  memory  remains),  whose  armies  rebelled 
against  him  in  Spain,  which  arose  from  nothing 
but  his  excessive  kindness,  which  allowed  more 
license  to  the  soldiers  than  was  consonant  with 
military  discipline.  He  was  reproached  with  this 
in  the  senate  by  Fabius  Maximus,  who  called  him 
a  corrupter  of  the  Roman  militia. 

The  Locri  having  been  destroyed  by  one  of 
Scipio's  officers  were  not  revenged  by  him,  nor 
was  the  insolence  of  that  officer  punished,  simply 


68  N1CCOLO  MACHIAVELLI 

by  reason  of  his  easy  nature;  so  much  so,  that 
some  one  wishing  to  excuse  him  in  the  senate,  said 
that  there  were  many  men  who  knew  rather  how 
not  to  err,  than  how  to  correct  the  errors  of  others. 
This  disposition  would  in  time  have  tarnished  the 
fame  and  glory  of  Scipio  had  he  persevered  in  it 
under  the  empire,  but  living  under  the  rule  of  the 
senate  this  harmful  quality  was  not  only  concealed 
but  became  a  glory  to  him.  I  conclude,  therefore, 
with  regard  to  being  feared  and  loved,  that  men 
love  at  their  own  free  will,  but  fear  at  the  will  of 
the  prince,  and  that  a  wise  prince  must  rely  on 
what  is  in  his  power  and  not  on  what  is  in  the 
power  of  others,  and  he  must  only  trouble  himself 
to  avoid  incurring  hatred,  as  has  been  explained. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

IN    WHAT   WAY    PRINCES    MUST    KEEP    FAITH 

How  laudable  it  is  for  a  prince  to  keep  good  faith 
and  live  with  integrity,  and  not  with  astuteness, 
every  one  knows.  Still  the  experience  of  our  times  \. 
shows  those  princes  to  have  done  great  things  who 
have  had  little  regard  for  good  faith,  and  have  been  \ 
able  by  astuteness  to  confuse  men's  brains,  and  i 
who  have  ultimately  overcome  those  who  have  / 
made  loyalty  their  foundation.  You  must  know, 
then,  that  there  are  two  methods  of  fighting,  the 
one  by  law,  the  other  by  force :  the  first  method  is 
that  of  men,  the  second  of  beasts ;  but  as  the  first 
method  is  often  insufficient,  one  must  have  recourse 
to  the  second.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to  know 
well  how  to  use  both  the  beast  and  the  man.  This 
was  covertly  taught  to  princes  by  ancient  writers, 
who  relate  how  Achilles  and  many  others  of  those 
princes  were  given  to  Chiron  the  centaur  to  be 
brought  up,  who  kept  them  under  his  discipline ; 
this  system  of  having  for  teacher  one  who  was 
half  beast  and  half  man  is  meant  to  indicate  that  a 
prince  must  know  how  to  use  both  natures,  and 
that  the  one  without  the  other  is  not  durable.  A 
prince  being  thus  obliged  to  know  well  how  to  act 
as  a  beast  must  imitate  the  fox  and  the  lion,  for 
the  lion  cannot  protect  himself  from  snares,  and 
the  fox  cannot  defend  himself  from  wolves.  One 
69 


70  NICCOLO  MACHIAVELLI 

must  therefore  be  a  fox  to  recognise  snares,  and  a 
lion  to  frighten  wolves.  Those  that  wish  to  be  only 
lions  do  not  understand  this.  Therefore,  a  prudent 

I  ruler  ought  not  to  keep  faith  when  by  so  doing  it   1 
would  be  against  his  interest,  and  when  the  reasons   ! 
which  made  him  bind  himself  no  longer  exist.     Jjf  , 
men  were  all  good,  this  precept  would   not  be  a 
good  one  ;  but  as  they  are  bad,  and  would  not  ob- 

•  serve  their  faith  with  you,  so  you  are  not  bound  to 
keep  faith  with  them.  Nor  are  legitimate  grounds 
ever  wanting  to  a  prince  to  give  colour  to  the 

(non-fulfilment  of  his  promise.  Of  this  one  could  ; 
furnish  an  infinite  number  of  modern  examples, 
and  show  how  many  times  peace  has  been  broken, 
and  how  many  promises  rendered  worthless,  by  the 
faithlessness  of  princes,  and  those  that  have  been 
best  able  to  imitate  the  fox  have  succeeded  best.  But 
it  is  necessary  to  be  able  to  disguise  this  character 
well,  and  to  be  a  great  feigner  and  dissembler;  and 
men  are  so  simple  and  so  ready  to  obey  present 
necessities,  that  one  who  deceives  will  always  find 
those  who  allow  themselves  to  be  deceived.  I  will 
only  mention  one  modern  instance.  Alexander  VI. 
did  nothing  else  but  deceive  men,  he  thought  of 
nothing  else,  and  found  the  way  to  do  it ;  no  man 
was  ever  more  able  to  give  assurances,  or  affirmed 
things  with  stronger  oaths,  and  no  man  observed 
them  less;  however,  he  always  succeeded  in  his 

{deceptions,  as  he  knew  well  this  side  of  the  world. 
It  is  not,  therefore,  necessary  for  a  prince  to 
have  all  the  above-named  qualities,  but  it  is  very 
necessary  to  seem  to  have  them.  I  wo'ul'd  even  be 
bold  to  say  that  to  possess  them  and  to  always 
observe  them  is  dangerous,  but  to  appear  to  possess 
them  is  useful.  Thus  .it  Js  well  to_seem  pious, 
faithful,  humane,  religious,  sincere,  and  also  to 
be  so  ;  but  you  must  have  the  mind  so  watchful 
that  when  it  is  needful  to  be  otherwise  you  may  be 
able  to  change  to  the  opposite  qualities.  And  it 


THE   PRINCE  71 

imust  be  understood  that  a  prince,  and  especially  a 
new  prince,  cannot  observe  all  those  things  which 
'are  considered  good  in  men,  being  often  obliged,  in 
order  to  maintain  the  state,  to  act  against  faith, 
.against  charity,  against  humanity,  and  against 
/religion.  And,  therefore,  he  must  have  a  mind 
disposed  to  adapt  itself  according  to  the  wind,  and 
as  the  variations  of  fortune  dictate,  and,  as  I  said 
before,  not  deviate  from  what  is  good,  if  possible, 
,but  be  able  to  do  evil  if  necessitated.  A  prince 
must  take  great  care  that  nothing  goes  out  of  his 
jmouth  which  is  not  full  of  the  above-named  five 
Equalities,  and,  to  see  and  hear  him,  be  should  seem 
to  be  all  faith,  all  integrity,  all  humanity,  and  all 
1  religion.  And  nothing  is  more  necessary  than  to 
seem  to  have  this  last  quality,  for  men  in  general 
judge  more  by  the  eyes  than  by  the  hands,  for 
every  one  can  see,  but  very  few  have  to  feel. 
Everybody  sees  what  you  appear  to  be,  few  feel 
what  you  are,  and  those  few  will  not  dare  to  oppose 
themselves  to  the  many,  who  have  the  majesty  of 
the  state  to  defend  them  ;  and  in  the  actions  of 
I  men,  and  especially  of  princes,  from  which  there 
is  no  appeal,  the  end  is  everything. 

Let  a  prince  therefore  aim  at  living  and  maintain- 
ing the  state,  the   means   will   always   be  judged 
i  honourable  and  praised  by  every  one,  for  the  vulgar 
is  always  taken  by  appearances  and  the   result  of 
;  things ;  and  the  world  consists  only  of  the  vulgar, 
1  and  the  few  find  a  place  when  the  many  have  nothing 
;  to  rest  upon.     A  certain  prince  of  the  present  time, 
,  whom  it  is  well  not  to  name,  never  does  anything 
;  but  preach  peace  and  good  faith,  but  he  is  really  a 
I  great  enemy  to  both,  and  either  of  them,  had  he 
observed  them,  would  have  lost  him  both  state  and 
reputation  on  many  occasions. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THAT   WE   MUST    AVOID    BEING    DESPISED   AND    HATED 

BUT  as  I  have  now  spoken  of  the  most  important  of 
the  qualities  in  question,  I  will  now  deal  briefly 
with  the  rest  on  the  general  principle,  that  the 
prince  must,  as  already  stated,  avoid  those  things 
which  will  make  him  hated  or  despised  ;  and  when- 
ever he  succeeds  in  this,  he  will  have  done  his  part, 
and  will  find  no  danger  in  other  vices. 

He  will  chiefly  become  hated,  as  I  said,  by  being 
rapacious,  and  usurping  the  property  and  women 
of  his  subjects,  which  he  must  abstain  from  doing, 
and  whenever  one  does  not  attack  the  property 
or  honour  of  the  generality  of  men,  they  will  live 
contented  ;  and  one  will  only  have  to  combat  the 
ambition  of  a  few,  who  can  be  easily  held  in  check 
in  many  ways.  He  is  rendered  despicable  by  being 
thought  changeable,  frivolous,  efteminate,  timid, 
and  irresolute  ;  which  a  prince  must  guard  against 
as  a  rock  of  danger,  and  manage  so  that  his  actions 
show  grandeur,  high  courage,  seriousness,  and 
strength  ;  and  as  to  the  government  of  his  subjects, 
let  his  sentence  be  irrevocable,,  and  let  him  adhere 
to  his  decisions  so  that  no  one  may  think  of  deceiv- 
ing him  or  making  him  change.  The  prince  who 
creates  such  an  opinion  of  himself  gets  a  great 
reputation,  and  it  is  very  difficult  to  conspire 
against  one  who  has  a  great  reputation,  and  he  will 
72 


THE   PRINCE  73 

not  easily  be  attacked,  so  long  as  it  is  known  that 
he  is  esteemed  and  reverenced  by  his  subjects. 
For  a  prince  must  have  two  kinds  of  fear :  one 
internal  as  regards  his  subjects,,  one  external  as 
regards  foreign  powers.  From  the  latter  he  can 
defend  himself  with  good  arms  and  good  friends, 
and  he  will  always  have  good  friends  if  he  has  good 
arms ;  arid  internal  matters  will  always  remain 
quiet,  if  they  are  not  perturbed  by  conspiracy  ;  and 
even  if  external  powers  sought  to  foment  one,  if  he 
has  ruled  and  lived  as  I  have  described,  he  will 
always  if  he  stands  firm  be  able  to  sustain  every 
shock,  as  I  have  shown  that  Nabis  the  Spartan  did. 
But  with  regard  to  the  subjects,  if  not  acted  on 
from  outside,  it  is  still  to  be  feared  lest  they  con- 
spire in  secret,  from  which  the  prince  may  guard 
himself  well  by  avoiding  hatred  and  contempt,  and 
keeping  the  people  satisfied  with  him,  which  it  is 
necessary  to  accomplish,  as  has  been  related  at 
length.  And  one  of  the  most  potent  remedies  that 
a  prince  has  against  conspiracies,  is  that  of  not 
being  hated  or  despised  by  the  mass  of  the  people  ; 
for  whoever  conspires  always  believes  that  he  will 
satisfy  the  people  by  the  death  of  their  prince  ;  but 
if  he  thought  to  offend  them  by  doing  this,  he 
would  fear  to  engage  in  such  an  undertaking,  for 
the  difficulties  that  conspirators  have  to  meet  are 
infinite.  Experience  shows  that  there  have  been 
very  many  conspiracies,  but  few  have  turned  out 
well,  for  whoever  conspires  cannot  act  alone,  and 
cannot  find  companions  except  among  those  who 
are  discontented  ;  and  as  soon  as  you  have  disclosed 
your  intention  to  a  malcontent,  you  give  him  the 
means  of  satisfying  himself,  for  by  revealing  it  he 
can  hope  to  secure  everything  he  wants  ;  to  such  an 
extent  that  seeing  a  certain  gain  by  doing  this,  and 
seeing  on  the  other  hand  only  a  doubtful  one  and 
full  of  danger,  he  must  either  be  a  rare  friend  to 
you  or  else  a  very  bitter  enemy  to  the  prince  if  he 


74  NICCOL6  MACHIAVELLI 

Keeps  faith  with  you.  And  to  reduce  the  matter 
to  narrow  limits,  I  say,  that  on  the  side  of  the 
conspirator  there  is  nothing  hut  fear,  jealousy, 
suspicion,  and  dread  of  punishment  which  frightens 
him ;  and  on  the  side  of  the  prince  there  is  the 
majesty  of  government,  the  laws,  the  protection  of 
friends  and  of  the  state  which  guard  him.  When 
to  these  things  are  added  the  goodwill  of  the 
people,  it  is  impossible  that  any  one  should  have 
the  temerity  to  conspire.  For  whereas  generally  a 
conspirator  has  to  fear  before  the  execution  of  his 
plot,  in  this  case  he  must  also  fear  afterwards, 
having  the  people  for  an  enemy,  when  his  crime  is 
accomplished,  and  thus  not  being  able  to  hope  for 
any  refuge.  *  Numberless  instances  might  be  given 
of  this,  but  I  will  content  myself  with  one  which  took 
place  within  the  memory  of  our  fathers.  Messer 
Annibale  Bentivogli,  Prince  of  Bologna,  ancestor 
of  the  present  Messer  Annibale,  was  killed  by  the 
Canneschi,  who  conspired  against  him.  He  left  no 
relations  but  Messer  Giovanni,  who  was  then  an 
infant,  but  after  the  murder  the  people  rose  up 
and  killed  all  the  Canneschi.  This  arose  from  the 
popular  goodwill  that  the  house  of  Bentivogli  en- 
joyed at  that  time  in  Bologna,  which  was  so  great 
that,  as  there  was  nobody  left  after  the  death  of 
Annibale  who  could  govern  the  state,  the  Bolognese 
hearing  that  there  was  one  of  the  Bentivogli  family 
in  Florence,  who  had  till  then  been  thought  the 
son  of  a  blacksmith,  came  to  fetch  him  and  gave 
him  the  government  of  the  city,  and  it  was  governed 
by  him  until  Messer  Giovanni  was  old  enough  to 
assume  the  government. 

I  conclude,  therefore,  that  a  prince  need  trouble 
little  about  conspiracies  when  the  people  are  well 
disposed,  but  when  they  are  hostile  and  hold  him  in 
hatred,  then  he  must  fear  everything  and  every- 
body. Well-ordered  states  and"  wise  princes  have 
studied  diligently  not  to  drive  the  nobles  to 


THE  PRINCE  75 

desperation,  and  to  satisfy  the  populace  and  keep 
it  contented,  for  this  is  one  of  the  most  important 
matters  that  a  prince  has  to  deal  with.  Among  the 
kingdoms  that  are  well  ordered  and  governed  in 
our  time  is  France,  and  there  we  find  numberless 
good  institutions  on  which  depend  the  liberty  and 
security  of  the  king ;  of  these  the  chief  is  the 
parliament  and  its  authority,  because  he  who 
established  that  kingdom,  knowing  the  ambition 
and  insolence  of  the  great  nobles,  and  deeming  it 
necessary  to  have  a  bit  in  their  mouths  to  check 
them  ;  and  knowing  on  the  other  hand  the  hatred  of 
the  mass  of  the  people  to  the  great,  based  on  fear, 
and  wishing  to  secure  them,  did  not  wish  to  make 
this  the  special  care  of  the  king,  to  relieve  him  of  the 
dissatisfaction  that  he  might  incur  among  the  nobles 
by  favouring  the  people,  and  among  the  people  by 
favouring  the  nobles.  He  therefore  established  a 
third  judge  that,  without  direct  charge  of  the  king, 
kept  in  check  the  great  and  favoured  the  lesser 
people.  Nor  could  any  better  or  more  prudent 
measure  have  been  adopted,  nor  better  precaution  for 
the  safety  of  the  king  and  the  kingdom.  From 
which  another  notable  rule  can  be  drawn,  that 
princes  should  let  the  carrying  out  of  unpopular 
duties  devolve  on  others,  and  bestow  favours  them- 
selves. I  conclude  again  by  saying  that  a  prince 
must  esteem  his  nobles,  but  not  make  himself  hated 
by  the  populace.  It  may  perhaps  seem  to  some, 
that  considering  the  life  and  death  of  many  Roman 
emperors  that  they  are  instances  contrary  to  my 
opinion,  finding  that  some  who  lived  always  nobly 
and  showed  great  strength  of  character,  neverthe- 
less lost  the  empire,  or  were  killed  by  their  subjects 
who  conspired  against  them.  Wishing  to  answer 
these  objections,  1  will  discuss  the  qualities  of  some 
emperors,  showing  the  cause  of  their  ruin  not  to 
be  at  variance  with  what  I  have  stated,  and  I  will 
also  partly  consider  the  things  to  be  noted  by 


76  NICCOL6  MACHIAVELLI 

whoever  reads  the  deeds  of  these  times.  I  will 
content  myself  with  taking  all  those  emperors  who 
succeeded  to  the  empire  from  Marcus  the  philosopher 
to  Maximinus ;  these  were  Marcus,  Commodus  his 
son,  Pertinax,  Heliogabalus,  Alexander,  and  Maxi- 
minus. And  the  first  thing  to  note  is,  that  whereas 
other  princes  have  only  to  contend  against  the  am- 
bition of  the  great  and  the  insolence  of  the  people, 
the  Roman  emperors  had  a  third  difficulty,  that  of 
having  to  support  the  cruelty  and  avarice  of  the 
soldiers,  which  was  such  a  difficulty  that  it  was  the 
cause  of  the  ruin  of  many,  it  being  difficult  to  satisfy 
both  the  soldiers  and  the  people.  For  the  people 
love  tranquillity,  and  therefore  like  princes  who  are 
pacific,  but  the  soldiers  prefer  a  prince  of  military 
spirit,  who  is  insolent,  cruel,  and  rapacious.  They 
wish  him  to  exercise  these  qualities  on  the  people 
so  that  they  may  get  double  pay  and  give  vent  to 
their  avarice  and  cruelty.  Thus  it  came  about  that 
those  emperors  who,  by  nature  or  art,  had  not  such 
a  reputation  as  could  keep  both  parties  in  check, 
invariably  were  ruined,  and  the  greater  number 
of  them  who  were  raised  to  the  empire  being  new 
men,  knowing  the  difficulties  of  these  two  opposite 
dispositions,  confined  themselves  to  satisfying  the 
soldiers,  and  thought  little  of  injuring  the  people. 
This  choice  was  necessary,  princes  not  being  able  to 
avoid  being  hated  by  some  one.  They  must  first 
try  not  to  be  hated  by  the  mass  of  the  people ;  if 
they  cannot  accomplish  this  they  must  use  every 
means  to  escape  the  hatred  of  the  most  powerful 
parties.  And  therefore  these  emperors,  who  being 
new  men  had  need  of  extraordinary  favours,  adhered 
to  the  soldiers  more  willingly  than  to  the  people  ; 
whether  this,  however,  was  of  use  to  them  or  not, 
depended  on  whether  the  prince  knew  how  to 
maintain  his  reputation  with  them. 

From    these   causes    it    resulted    that    Marcus, 
Pertinax,  and  Alexander,  being  all  of  modest  life, 


THE  PRINCE  77 

lovers  of  justice,  enemies  of  cruelty,  humane  and 
benign,  had  all  a  sad  ending  except  Marcus. 
Marcus  alone  lived  and  died  in  honour,  because  he 
succeeded  to  the  empire  by  hereditary  right  and  did 
not  owe  it  either  to  the  soldiers  or  to  the  people ; 
besides  which,  possessing  many  virtues  which  made 
him  revered,  he  kept  both  parties  in  their  place  as 
long  as  he  lived  and  was  never  either  hated  or 
despised.  But  Pertinax  was  created  emperor  against 
the  will  of  the  soldiers,  who  being  accustomed  to 
live  licentiously  under  Commodus,  could  not  put  up 
with  the  honest  life  to  which  Pertinax  wished  to 
limit  them,  so  that  having  made  himself  hated,  and 
to  this  contempt  being  added  because  he  was  old,  he 
was  ruined  at  the  very  beginning  of  his  administra- 
tion. Whence  it  may  be  seen  that  hatred  is  gained 
as  much  by  good  works  as  by  evil,  and  therefore,  as 
I  said  before,  a  prince  who  wishes  to  maintain  the 
state  is  often  forced  to  do  evil,  for  when  that  party, 
whether  populace,  soldiery,  or  nobles,  whichever 
it  be  that  you  consider  necessary  to  you  for  keep- 
ing your  position,  is  corrupt,  you  must  follow  its 
humour  and  satisfy  it,  and  in  that  case  good  works 
will  be  inimical  to  you.  But  let  us  come  to  Alex- 
ander, who  was  of  such  goodness,  that  among  other 
things  for  which  he  is  praised,  it  is  said  that  in  the 
fourteen  years  that  he  reigned  no  one  was  put  to 
death  by  him  without  a  fair  trial.  Nevertheless, 
being  considered  effeminate,  and  a  man  who  allowed 
himself  to  be  ruled  by  his  mother,  and  having  thus 
fallen  into  contempt,  the  army  conspired  against 
him  and  killed  him.  Looking,  on  the  other  hand, 
at  the  qualities  of  Commodus,  Severus,  Antoninus, 
Caracalla,  and  Maximinus,  you  will  find  them 
extremely  cruel  and  rapacious ;  to  satisfy  the 
soldiers  there  was  no  injury  which  they  would  not 
inflict  on  the  people,  and  all  except  Severus  ended 
badly.  Severus,  however,  had  such  abilities  that  by 
maintaining  the  soldiers  friendly  to  him,  he  was 


78  NICCOLO  MACHIAVELLI 

able  to  reign  happily,  although  he  oppressed  the 
people,  for  his  virtues  made  him  so  admirable  in  the 
sight  both  of  the  soldiers  and  the  people  that  the 
latter  were,  as  it  were,  astonished  and  stupefied,  while 
the  former  were  respectful  and  contented.  As  the 
deeds  of  this  ruler  were  great  for  a  new  prince,,  I 
will  briefly  show  how  well  he  could  use  the  qualities 
of  the  fox  and  the  lion,  whose  natures,  as  I  said 
before,  it  is  necessary  for  a  prince  to  imitate. 
Knowing  the  sloth  of  the  Emperor  Julian,  Severus, 
who  was  leader  of  the  army  in  Slavonia,  persuaded 
the  troops  that  it  would  be  well  to  go  to  Rome  to 
avenge  the  death  of  Pertinax,  who  had  been  slain 
by  the  Imperial  guard,  and  under  this  pretext, 
without  revealing  his  aspirations  to  the  throne, 
marched  with  his  army  to  Rome  and  was  in  Italy 
before  his  design  was  known.  On  his  arrival  in 
Rome  the  senate  elected  him  emperor  through 
fear,  and  Julian  died.  There  remained  after  this 
beginning  two  difficulties  to  be  faced  by  Severus 
before  he  could  obtain  the  whole  control  of  the 
empire  :  one  in  Asia,  where  Nigrinus,  head  of  the 
Asiatic  armies,  had  declared  himself  emperor ;  the 
other  in  the  west  from  Albinus,  who  also  aspired  to 
the  empire.  And  as  he  judged  it  dangerous  to  show 
himself  hostile  to  both,  he  decided  to  attack  Nigrinus 
and  deceive  Albinus,  to  whom  he  wrote  that  having 
been  elected  emperor  by  the  senate  he  wished  to 
share  that  dignity  with  him  ;  he  sent  him  the  title 
of  Caesar  and,  by  deliberation  of  the  senate,  he  was 
declared  his  colleague ;  all  of  which  was  accepted 
as  true  by  Albinus.  But  when  Severus  had  defeated 
and  killed  Nigrinus,  and  pacified  things  in  the  East, 
he  returned  to  Rome  and  charged  Albinus  in  the 
senate  with  having,  unmindful  of  the  benefits  re- 
ceived from  him,  traitorously  sought  to  assassinate 
him,  and  stated  that  he  was  therefore  obliged  to  go 
and  punish  his  ingratitude.  He  then  went  to 
France  to  meet  him,  and  there  deprived  him  of  both 


THE  PRINCE  79 

his  position  and  his  life.  Whoever  examines  in 
detail  the  actions  of  Severus,  will  find  him  to  have 
been  a  very  ferocious  lion  and  an  extremely  astute 
fox,  and  will  see  him  to  have  been  feared  and 
respected  by  all  and  not  hated  by  the  army  ;  and 
will  not  be  surprised  that  he,  a  new  man,  should 
have  been  able  to  hold  the  empire  so  well,  since  his 
great  reputation  defended  him  always  from  that 
hatred  that  his  rapacity  might  have  produced  in 
the  people.  But  Antoninus  his  son  was  also  a  man 
of  great  ability,  and  possessed  qualities  that  rendered 
him  admirable  in  the  sight  of  the  people  and  also 
made  him  popular  with  the  soldiers,  for  he  was  a 
military  man,  capable  of  enduring  the  most  extreme 
hardships,  disdainful  of  delicate  food,  and  every 
other  luxury,  which  made  him  loved  by  all  the 
armies.  However,  his  ferocity  and  cruelty  were  so 
great  and  unheard  of,  through  his  having,  after 
executing  many  private  individuals,  caused  a  large 
part  of  the  population  of  Rome  and  all  that  of 
Alexandria  to  be  killed,  that  he  became  hated  by  all 
the  world  and  began  to  be  feared  by  those  about 
him  to  such  an  extent  that  he  was  finally  killed  by 
a  centurion  in  the  midst  of  his  army.  Whence  it  is 
to  be  noted  that  this  kind  of  death,  which  proceeds 
from  the  deliberate  action  of  a  determined  man, 
cannot  be  avoided  by  princes,  since  any  one  who 
does  not  fear  death  himself  can  inflict  it,  but  a 
prince  need  not  fear  much  on  this  account,  as  such 
actions  are  extremely  rare.  He  must  only  guard 
against  committing  any  grave  injury  to  any  one  he 
makes  use  of,  or  has  about  him  for  his  service,  like 
Antoninus  had  done,  having  caused  the  death  with 
contumely  of  the  brother  of  that  centurion,  and 
also  threatened  him  every  day,  although  he  still 
retained  him  in  his  bodyguard,  which  was  a  foolish 
and  dangerous  thing  to  do,  as  the  fact  proved. 
But  let  us  come  to  Commodus,  who  might  easily 
have  kept  the  empire,  having  succeeded  to  it  by 


80  NICCOLO  MACHIAVELLI 

heredity,  being  the  son  of  Marcus,  and  it  would  have 
sufficed  for  him  to  follow  in  the  steps  of  his  father 
to  have  satisfied  both  the  people  and  the  soldiers. 
But  being  of  a  cruel  and  bestial  disposition,  in  order 
to  be  able  to  exercise  his  rapacity  on  the  people,  he 
sought  to  amuse  the  soldiers  and  render  them 
licentious  ;  on  the  other  hand,  by  not  maintaining 
his  dignity,  by  often  descending  into  the  theatre  to 
fight  with  gladiators  and  committing  other  con- 
temptible actions,  little  worthy  of  the  imperial 
dignity,  he  became  despicable  in  the  eyes  of  the 
soldiers,  and  being  hated  on  the  one  hand  and 
despised  on  the  other,  he  was  conspired  against 
and  killed.  There  remains  to  be  described  the 
character  of  Maximinus.  He  was  an  extremely 
warlike  man,  and  as  the  armies  were  annoyed 
with  the  effeminacy  of  Alexander,  which  we  have 
already  spoken  of,  he  was  after  the  death  of  the 
latter  elected  emperor.  He  did  not  enjoy  it  for 
long,  as  two  things  made  him  hated  and  despised  : 
the  one  his  base  origin,  as  he  had  been  a  shepherd  in 
Thrace,  which  was  generally  known  and  caused 
great  disdain  on  all  sides  ;  the  other,  because  he  had 
at  the  commencement  of  his  rule  deferred  going  to 
Rome  to  take  possession  of  the  Imperial  seat,  and 
had  obtained  a  reputation  for  great  cruelty,  having 
through  his  prefects  in  Rome  and  other  parts  of 
the  empire  committed  many  acts  of  cruelty.  The 
whole  world  being  thus  moved  by  indignation  for 
the  baseness  of  his  blood,  and  also  by  the  hatred 
caused  by  fear  of  his  ferocity,  he  was  conspired 
against  first  by  Africa  and  afterwards  by  the  senate 
and  all  the  people  of  Rome  and  Italy.  His  own 
army  also  joined  them,  for  besieging  Aquileia  and 
finding  it  difficult  to  take,  they  became  enraged 
at  his  cruelty,  and  seeing  that  he  had  so  many 
enemies,  they  feared  him  less  and  put  him  to  death. 
I  will  not  speak  of  Heliogabalus,  of  Macrinus,  or 
Julian,  who  being  entirely  contemptible  were 


THE   PRINCE  81 

immediately  suppressed,  but  I  will  come  to  the 
conclusion  of  this  discourse  by  saying  that  the 
princes  of  our  time  have  less  difficulty  than  these 
of  being  obliged  to  satisfy  in  an  extraordinary 
degree  their  soldiers  in  their  states ;  for  although 
they  must  have  a  certain  consideration  for  them, 
yet  it  is  soon  settled,  for  none  of  these  princes  have 
armies  that  are  inextricably  bound  rp  with  the 
administration  of  the  government  and  the  rule  of 
their  provinces  as  were  the  armies  of  the  Roman 
empire ;  and  therefore  if  it  was  then  necessary  to 
satisfy  the  soldiers  rather  than  the  people,  it  was 
because  the  soldiers  could  do  more  than  the  people ; 
now,  it  is  more  necessary  to  all  princes,  except 
the  Turk  and  the  Soldan,  to  satisfy  the  people  than 
the  soldiers,  for  the  people  can  do  more  than  the 
soldiers.  I  except  the  Turk,  because  he  always 
keeps  about  him  twelve  thousand  infantry  and 
fifteen  thousand  cavalry,  on  which  depend  the 
security  and  strength  of  his  kingdom  ;  and  it  is 
necessary  for  him  to  postpone  every  other  considera- 
tion of  the  people  to  keep  them  friendly.  It  is  the 
same  with  the  kingdom  of  the  Soldan,  which  being 
entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  soldiers,  he  is  bound  to 
keep  their  friendship  regardless  of  the  people.  And 
it  is  to  be  noted  that  this  state  of  the  Soldan  is 
different  from  that  of  all  other  princes,  being 
similar  to  the  Christian  pontificate,  which  cannot  be 
called  either  a  hereditary  kingdom  or  a  new  one, 
for  the  sons  of  the  dead  prince  are  not  his  heirs,  but 
he  who  is  elected  to  that  position  by  those  who  have 
authority.  And  as  this  order  is  ancient  it  cannot  be 
called  a  new  kingdom,  there  being  none  of  these 
difficulties  which  exist  in  new  ones  ;  as  although  the 
prince  is  new,  the  rules  of  that  state  are  old  and 
arranged  to  receive  him  as  if  he  were  their  hereditary 
lord.  But  returning  to  our  matter,  I  say  that 
whoever  studies  the  preceding  argument  will  see 
that  either  hatred  or  contempt  were  the  causes  of 


82  NICCOLO  MACHIAVELLI 

the  ruin  of  the  emperors  named,  and  will  also 
observe  how  it  came  about  that,  some  of  them  acting 
in  one  way  and  some  in  another,  in  both  ways  there 
were  some  who  had  a  fortunate  and  others  an  un- 
fortunate ending.  As  Pertinax  and  Alexander  were 
both  new  rulers,  it  was  useless  and  injurious  for 
them  to  try  and  imitate  Marcus,  who  was  a  hereditary 
prince  ;  and  similarly  with  Caracalla,  Commodus, 
and  Maximinus  it  was  pernicious  for  them  to 
imitate  Severus,  as  they  had  not  sufficient  ability  to 
follow  in  his  footsteps.  Thus  a  new  prince  cannot 
imitate  the  actions  of  Marcus,  in  his  dominions,  nor 
is  it  necessary  for  him  to  imitate  those  of  Severus  ; 
but  he  must  take  from  Severus  those  portions  that 
are  necessary  to  found  his  state,  and  from  Marcus 
thosie  that  are  useful  and  glorious  for  conserving  a 
state  that  is  already  established  and  secure. 


CHAPTER  XX 

WHETHER    FORTRESSES    AND    OTHER    THINGS    WHICH 
PRINCES    OFTEN    MAKE    ARE    USEFUL   OR    INJURIOUS 

SOME  princes,  in  order  to  securely  hold  their  posses- 
sions, have  disarmed  their  subjects,  some  others 
have  kept  their  subject  lands  divided,  into  parts, 
others  have  fomented  enmities  against  themselves, 
others  have  endeavoured  to  win  over  those  whom 
they  suspected  at  the  commencement  of  their  rule  : 
some  have  constructed  fortresses,  others  have 
ruined  and  destroyed  them.  And  although  one 
cannot  pronounce  a  definite  judgment  as  to  these 
things  without  going  into  the  particulars  of  the 
state  to  which  such  a  deliberation  is  to  be  applied, 
still  I  will  speak  in  such  a  broad  way  as  the  matter 
will  permit  of. 

A  new  prince  has  never  been  known  to  disarm 
his  subjects,  on  the  contrary,  when  he  has  found! 
them  disarmed  he  has  always  armed  them,  for  by 
arming  them  these  arms  become  your  own,  those 
that  you  suspected  become  faithful  and  those  that 
were  faithful  remain  so,  and  from  being  merely 
subjects  become  your  partisans.  And  since  all  the 
subjects  cannot  be  armed,  when  you  benefit  those 
that  you  arm,  you  can  deal  more  safely  with  the 
others ;  and  this  different  treatment  that  they 
notice  renders  your  men  more  obliged  to  you,  the 
others  will  excuse  you,  judging  that  those  have 


84  N1CCOLO   MACHIAVELLI 

necessarily  greater  merit  who  have  greater  danger 
and  heavier  duties.  But  when  you  disarm  them, 
you  commence  to  offend  them  and  show  that  you 
distrust  them  either  through  cowardice  or  lack  of 
confidence,  and  hoth  of  these  opinions  generate 
hatred  against  you.  And  as  you  cannot  remain 
unarmed,  you  are  obliged  to  resort  to  a  mercenary 
militia,  of  which  we  have  already  stated  the  value  ; 
and  even  if  it  were  good  it  cannot  be  sufficient  in 
number  to  defend  you  against  powerful  enemies 
and  suspected  subjects.  But,  as  I  have  said,  a  new 
prince  in  a  new  dominion  always  has  his  subjects 
armed.  History  is  full  of  such  examples.  But 
when  a  prince  acquires  a  new  state  as  an  addition 
to  his  old  one,  then  it  is  necessary  to  disarm  that 
state,  except  those  who  in  acquiring  it  have  sided 
with  you  ;  and  even  these  one  must,  when  time 
and  opportunity  serve,  render  weak  and  effeminate, 
and  arrange  things  so  that  all  the  arms  of  the  new 
state  are  in  the  hands  of  your  own  soldiers  who  in 
your  old  state  live  near  you. 

Our  forefathers  and  those  who  were  esteemed 
wise  used  to  say  that  it  was  necessary  to  hold 
Pistoia  by  means  of  factious  and  Pisa  with  fortresses, 
and  for  this  purpose  they  fomented  differences 
Among  their  subjects  in  some  town  in  order  to 
possess  it  more  easily.  This,  in  those  days  when 
Jtaly  was  fairly  divided,  was  doubtless  well  done, 
l>ut  does  not  seem  to  me  to  be  a  good  precept 
for  the  present  time,  for  I  do  not  believe  that  the 
divisions  thus  created  ever  do  any  good  ;  on  the 
contrary  it  is  certain  that  when  the  enemy 
approaches  the  cities  thus  divided  will  be  at  once 
lost,  for  the  weaker  faction  will  always  side  with 
the  enemy  and  the  other  will  not  be  able  to  stand. 
The  Venetians,  actuated,  I  believe,  by  the  aforesaid 
motives,  cherished  the  Guelf  and  Ghibelline  factions 
in  the  cities  subject  to  them,  and  although  they 
never  allowed  them  to  come  to  bloodshed,  they  yet 


THE  PRINCE  85 

encouraged  these  differences  among  them,  so  that 
the  citizens,  heing  occupied  in  their  own  quarrels, 
might  not  act  against  them.  This,  however,  did 
not  avail  them  anything,  as  was  seen  when,  after  the 
defeat  of  Vaila,  a  part  of  those  subjects  immediately 
took  courage  and  took  from  them  the  whole  state. 
Such  methods,  besides,  argue  weakness  in  a  prince, 
for  in  a  strong  government  such  dissensions  will 
never  be  permitted.  They  are  profitable  only  in 
time  of  peace,  as  by  means  of  them  it  is  easy  to 
manage  one's  subjects,  but  when  it  comes  to  war, 
the  fallacy  of  such  a  policy  is  at  once  shown. 
Without  doubt  princes  become  great  when  they 
overcome  difficulties  and  opposition,  and  therefore 
fortune,  especially  when  it  wants  to  render  a  new 
prince  great,  who  has  greater  need  of  gaining  a 
great  reputation  than  a  hereditary  prince,  raises 
up  enemies  and  compels  him  to  undertake  wars 
against  them,  so  that  he  may  have  cause  to  over- 
come them,  and  thus  raise  himself  higher  by  means 
of  that  ladder  which  his  enemies  have  brought  him. 
There  are  many  who  think  therefore  that  a  wise 
prince  ought,  when  he  has  the  chance,  to  foment 
astutely  some  enmity,  so  that  by  suppressing  it  he 
will  augment  his  greatness.  Princes,  and  especially 
new  ones,  have  found  more  faith  and  more  useful- 
ness in  those  men,  whom  at  the  beginning  of  their 
power  they  regarded  with  suspicion,  than  in  those 
they  at  first  confided  in.  Pandolfo  Petrucci,  Prince 
of  Siena,  governed  his  state  more  by  those  whom  he 
suspected  than  by  others.  But  of  this  we  cannot 
speak  at  large,  as  it  varies  according  to  the  subject ; 
I  will  merely  say  that  these  men  who  at  the  begin- 
ning of  a  new  government  were  enemies,  if  they 
are  of  a  kind  to  need  support  to  maintain  their 
position,  can  be  very  easily  gained  by  the  prince, 
and  they  are  the  more  compelled  to  serve  him  faith- 
fully as  they  know  they  must  by  their  deeds  cancel 
the  bad  opinion  previously  held  of  them,  and  thus 


86  NICCOLC)  MACHIAVELLI 

the  prince  will  always  derive  greater  help  from 
them  than  from  those  who,  serving  him  with  greater 
security,  neglect  his  interests  And  as  the  matter 
requires  it,  I  will  not  omit  to  remind  a  prince  who 
has  newly  taken  a  state  with  the  secret  help  of 
its  inhabitants,  that  he  must  consider  well  the 
motives  that  have  induced  those  who  have  favoured 
him  to  do  so,  and  if  it  is  not  natural  affection  for 
him,  but  only  because  they  were  not  contented  with 
the  state  as  it  was,  he  will  have  great  trouble  and 
difficulty  in  maintaining  their  friendship,  because  it 
will  be  impossible  for  him  to  content  them.  And 
on  well  examining  the  cause  of  this  in  the  examples 
drawn  from  ancient  and  modern  times  it  will  be 
seen  that  it  is  much  easier  to  gain  the  friendship  of 
those  men  who  were  contented  with  the  previous 
condition  and  were  therefore  at  first  enemies,  than 
that  of  those  who  not  being  contented,  became  his 
friends  and  helped  him  to  occupy  it  It  has  been 
the  custom  of  princes  in  order  to  be  able  to  hold 
securely  their  state,  to  erect  fortresses,  as  a  bridle 
and  bit  to  those  who  have  designs  against  them, 
and  in  order  to  have  a  secure  refuge  against  a 
sudden  assault.  I  approve  this  method,  because  it 
was  anciently  used.  Nevertheless,  Messer  Niccolo 
Vitelli  has  been  seen  in  our  own  time  to  destroy 
two  fortresses  in  Citta  di  Castello  in  order  to  keep 
that  state.  Guid'  Ubaldo,  Duke  of  Urbino,  on 
returning  to  his  dominions  from  which  he  had  been 
driven  by  Cesare  Borgia,  razed  to  their  foundations 
all  the  fortresses  of  that  province,  and  considered 
that  without  them  it  would  be  more  difficult  for 
him  to  lose  again  the  state.  The  Bentivogli,  in 
returning  to  Bologna,  used  similar  measures. 
Therefore  fortresses  may  or  may  not  be  useful 
according  to  the  times  ;  if  they  do  good  in  one  way, 
they  do  harm  in  another. 

The  question  may  be  discussed  thus :    a  prince 
who  fears  his  own  people  more  than  foreigners  ought 


THE  PRINCE  87 

to  build  fortresses,  but  he  who  has  greater  fear  of 
foreigners  than  of  his  own  people  ought  to  do  with- 
out them.  The  castle  of  Milan  built  by  Francesco 
Sforza  has  given  and  will  give  more  trouble  to  the 
house  of  Sforza  than  any  other  disorder  in  that 
state.  Therefore  the  best  fortress  is  to  be  found 
in  the  love  of  the  people,  for  although  you 
may  have  fortresses  they  will  not  save  you  if  you 
are  hated  by  the  people.  When  once  the  people 
have  taken  arms  against  you,  there  will  never  be 
lacking  foreigners  to  assist  them.  In  our  times  we 
do  not  see  that  they  have  profited  any  ruler,  except 
the  Countess  of  Forli  on  the  death  of  her  consort 
Count  Girolamo,  for  she  was  thus  enabled  to  escape 
the  popular  rising  and  await  help  from  Milan  and 
recover  the  state ;  the  circumstances  being  then 
such  that  no  foreigner  could  assist  the  people.  But 
afterwards  they  were  of  little  use  to  her  when 
Cesare  Borgia  attacked  her  and  the  people  being 
hostile  to  her  allied  themselves  with  the  foreigner. 
So  that  then  and  before  it  would  have  been  safer 
for  her  not  to  be  hated  by  the  people  than  to  have 
the  fortresses.  Having  considered  these  things  I 
would  therefore  praise  the  one  who  erects  fortresses 
and  the  one  who  does  not,  and  would  blame  any  one 
who,  trusting  in  them,  thinks  little  of  being  hated 
by  his  people. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

HOW    A    PRINCE    MUST   ACT    IN    ORDER   TO    GAIN 
REPUTATION 

NOTHING  causes  a  prince  to  be  so  much  esteemed 
as  great  enterprises  and  setting  a  rare  example. 
We  have  in  our  own  day  Ferdinand,  King  of 
Aragon,  at  present  King  of  Spain.  He  may  almost 
be  termed  a  new  prince,  because  from  a  weak  king 
he  has  become  for  fame  and  glory  the  first  king  in 
Christendom,  and  if  you  regard  his  actions  you  will 
find  them  all  very  great  and  some  of  them  extra- 
ordinary. At  the  beginning  of  his  reign  he  assailed 
Granada,  and  that  enterprise  was  the  foundation 
of  his  state.  At  first  he  did  it  leisurely  and  with- 
out fear  of  being  interfered  with  ;  lie  kept  the 
minds  of  the  barons  of  Castile  occupied  in  this 
enterprise,  so  that  thinking  only  of  that  war  they 
did  not  think  of  making  innovations,  and  he  thus 
acquired  reputation  and  power  over  them  without 
their  being  aware  of  it.  He  was  able  with  the 
money  of  the  Church  and  the  people  to  maintain 
his  armies,  and  by  that  long  war  lay  the  founda- 
tions of  his  military  power,  which  afterwards  has 
made  him  famous.  Besides  this,  to  be  able  to 
undertake  greater  enterprises,  and  always  under 
the  pretext  of  religion,  he  had  recourse  to  a  pious 
cruelty,  driving  out  the  Moors  from  his  kingdom 
and  despoiling  them.  No  more  admirable  or  rare 
88 


THE   PRINCE  89 

example  can  be  found.  He  also  attacked  under 
the  same  pretext  Africa,  undertook  his  Italian  enter- 
prise, and  has  lately  attacked  France ;  so  that  he 
has  continually  contrived  great  things,  which  have 
kept  his  subjects'  minds  uncertain  and  astonished, 
and  occupied  in  watching  their  result. 

And  these  actions  have  arisen  one  out  of  the 
other,  so  that  they  have  left  no  time  for  men  to 
settle  down  and  act  against  him.  It  is  also  very 
profitable  for  a  prince  to  give  some  rare  examples 
of  himself  in  the  internal  administration,  like 
those  related  of  Messer  Bernabo  of  Milan,  when 
it  happens  that  some  one  does  something  extra- 
ordinary, either  good  or  evil,  in  civil  life,  and  to 
take  a  means  of  rewarding  or  punishing  him  which 
will  be  much  talked  about.  And  above  all  a  prince 
must  endeavour  in  every  action  to  obtain  fame  for 
being  great  and  excellent.  A  prince  is  further 
esteemed  when  he  is  a  true  friend  or  a  true  enemy, 
when,  that  is,  he  declares  himself  without  reserve 
in  favour  of  some  one  against  another. 

This  policy  is  always  more  useful  than  remaining 
neutral.  For  if  two  neighbouring  powers  come  to 
blows,  they  are  either  such  that  if  one  wins,  you 
will  have  to  fear  the  victor,  or  else  not.  In  either 
of  these  two  cases  it  will  be  better  for  you  to 
declare  yourself  openly  and  make  war,  because  in 
the  first  case  if  you  do  not  declare  yourself,  you 
will  fall  a  prey  to  the  victor,  to  the  pleasure  and 
satisfaction  of  the  one  who  has  been  defeated,  and 
you  will  have  no  reason  nor  anything  to  defend 
you  and  nobody  to  receive  you.  For,  whoever 
wins  will  not  desire  friends  whom  he  suspects  and 
who  do  not  help  him  when  in  trouble,  and  whoever 
loses  will  not  receive  you  as  you  did  not  take  up 
arms  to  assist  his  cause.  Antiochus  went  to  Greece, 
being  sent  by  the  ^Etoli  to  expel  the  Romans.  He 
sent  orators  to  the  Achaei  who  were  friends  of  the 
Romans  to  encourage  them  to  remain  neutral,  on 


90  NICCOLO  MACHIAVELL1 

the  other  hand  the  Romans  persuaded  them  to  take 
up  arms  on  their  side.  The  matter  was  brought 
before  the  council  of  the  Achaei  for  deliberation, 
where  the  ambassador  of  Antiochus  sought  to  per- 
suade them  to  remain  neutral,  to  which  the  Roman 
ambassador  replied  :  (( As  to  what  is  said  that  it  is 
best  and  most  useful  for  your  state  not  to  meddle 
in  our  war,  nothing  is  further  from  the  truth  ;  for 
if  you  do  not  meddle  in  it  you  will  become,  without 
any  favour  or  any  reputation,  the  prize  of  the 
victor."  And  it  will  always  happen  that  the  one 
who  is  not  your  friend  will  want  you  to  remain 
neutral,  and  the  one  who  is  your  friend  will  require 
you  to  declare  yourself  by  taking  arms.  Irresolute 
princes,  to  avoid  present  dangers,  usually  follow 
the  way  of  neutrality  and  are  mostly  ruined  by  it. 
But  when  the  prince  declares  himself  frankly  in 
favour  of  one  side,  if  the  one  to  whom  you  adhere 
conquers,  even  if  he  is  powerful  and  you  remain  at 
his  discretion,  he  is  under  an  obligation  to  you  and 
friendship  has  been  established,  and  men  are  never 
so  dishonest  as  to  oppress  you  with  such  ingratitude. 
Moreover,  victories  are  never  so  prosperous  that 
the  victor  does  not  need  to  have  some  scruples, 
especially  as  to  justice.  But  if  he  to  whom  you 
adhere  loses,  you  are  sheltered  by  him,  and  so  long 
as  he  can,  he  will  assist  you  ;  you  become  the  com- 
panion of  a  fortune  which  may  rise  again.  In  the 
second  case,  when  those  who  fight  are  such  that  you 
have  nothing  to  fear  from  the  victor,  it  is  still 
more  prudent  on  your  part  to  adhere  to  one  ;  for 
you  go  to  the  ruin  of  one  with  the  help  of  him 
who  ought  to  save  him  if  he  were  wise,  and  if  he 
conquers  he  rests  at  your  discretion,  and  it  is  im- 
possible that  he  should  not  conquer  with  your  help. 
And  here  it  should  be  noted  that  a  prince  ought 
never  to  make  common  cause  with  one  more  power- 
ful than  himself  to  injure  another,  unless  necessity 
forces  him  to  it,  as  before  said ;  for  if  he  wins  you 


THE   PRINCE  91 

rest  at  his  discretion,  and  princes  must  avoid  as 
much  as  possible  being  at  the  discretion  of  others. 
The  Venetians  united  with  France  against  the  Duke 
of  Milan,  although  they  could  have  avoided  that 
union,  and  from  it  resulted  their  own  ruin.  But 
when  one  cannot  avoid  it,  as  happened  to  the 
Florentines  when  the  pope  and  Spain  went  with 
their  armies  to  attack  Lombardy,  then  the  prince 
ought  to  join  for  the  above  reasons.  Let  no  state 
believe  that  it  can  follow  a  secure  policy,  rather  let 
it  think  that  all  are  doubtful.  This  is  found  in 
the  nature  of  things,  that  one  never  tries  to  avoid 
one  difficulty  without  running  into  another,  but 
prudence  consists  in  being  able  to  know  the  nature 
of  the  difficulties,  and  talking  the  least  harmful  as 
good.  A  prince  must  also  show  himself  a  lover  of 
merit,  and  honour  those  who  excel  in  every  art. 
Moreover  he  must  encourage  his  citizens  to  follow 
their  callings  quietly,  whether  in  commerce,  or 
agriculture,  or  any  other  trade  that  men  follow,  so 
that  this  one  shall  not  refrain  from  improving  his 
possessions  through  fear  that  they  may  be  taken 
from  him,  and  that  one  from  starting  a  trade  for 
fear  of  taxes ;  but  he  should  offer  rewards  to  who- 
ever does  these  things,  and  to  whoever  seeks  in  any 
way  to  improve  his  city  or  state.  Besides  th'is,  he 
ought,  at  convenient  seasons  of  the  year,  to  keep 
the  people  occupied  with  festivals  and  spectacles  ; 
and  as  every  city  is  divided  either  into  trades  or 
into  classes,  he  ought  to  pay  attention  to  all  these 
things,  mingle  with  them  from  time  to  time,  and 
give  them  an  example  of  his  humanity  and  magni- 
ficence, always  holding  firm,  however",  the  majesty 
of  his  dignity,  which  must  never  be  allowed  to  fad 
in  anything  whatever. 


CHAPTER  XXII 

OP   THE    SECRETARIES    OP   PRINCES 

THE  choice  of  a  prince's  ministers  is  a  matter  of  no 
little  importance ;  they  are  either  good  or  not  ac- 
cording to  the  prudence  of  the  prince.  The  first 
impression  that  one  gets  of  a  ruler  and  of  his  brains 
is  from  seeing  the  men  that  he  has  about  him. 
When  they  are  competent  and  faithful  one  can 
always  consider  him  wise,  as  he  has  been  able  to 
recognise  their  ability  and  keep  them  faithful.  But 
when  they  are  the  reverse,  one  can  always  form  an 
unfavourable  opinion  of  him,  because  the  first  mis- 
take that  he  makes  is  in  making  this  choice.  There 
was  nobody  who  knew  Messer  Antonio  da  Venafro 
as  the  minister  of  Pandolfo  Petrucci,  Prince  of 
Siena,  who  did  not  consider  Pandolfo  to  be  a  very 
prudent  man,  having  him  for  his  minister.  There 
are  three  different  kinds  of  brains,  the  one  under- 
stands things  unassisted,  the  other  understands 
things  when  shown  by  others,  the  third  understands 
neither  alone  nor  with  the  explanations  of  others. 
The  first  kind  is  most  excellent,  the  second  also 
excellent,  but  the  third  useless.  It  is  therefore 
evident  that  if  Pandolfo  was  not  of  the  first  kind, 
he  was  at  any  rate  of  the  second.  For  every  time 
that  one  has  the  judgment  to  know  the  good  and 
evil  that  any  one  does  or  says,  even  if  he  has  no 
invention,  yet  he  recognises  the  bad  and  good  works 
92 


THE  PRINCE  93 

or  his  minister  and  corrects  the  one  and  supports 
the  other  ;  and  the  minister  cannot  hope  to  deceive 
him  and  therefore  remains  good.  For  a  prince  to 
be  able  to  know  a  minister  there  is  this  method 
which  never  fails.  When  you  see  the  minister 
think  more  of  himself  than  of  you,  and  in  all  his 
actions  seek  his  own  profit,  such  a  man  will  never 
be  a  good  minister,  and  you  can  never  rely  on  him  ; 
for  whoever  has  in  hand  the  state  of  another  must 
never  think  of  himself  but  of  the  prince,  and  not 
call  to  mind  anything  but  what  relates  to  him. 
And,  on  the  other  hand,  the  prince,  in  order  to 
retain  his  fidelity  ought  to  think  of  his  minister, 
honouring  and  enriching  him,  doing  him  kindnesses, 
and  conferring  on  him  honours  and  giving  him 
responsible  tasks,  so  that  the  great  honours  and 
riches  bestowed  on  him  cause  him  not  to  desire 
other  honours  and  riches,  and  the  tasks  he  has  to 
fulfil  make  him  fearful  of  changes,  knowing  that 
he  could  not  execute  them  without  the  prince. 
When  princes  and  their  ministers  stand  in  this 
relation  to  each  other,  they  can  rely  the  one  upon 
the  other ;  when  it  is  otherwise,  the  end  is  always 
injurious  either  for  one  or  the  other  of  them. 


CHAPTER  XXili 

HOW    FLATTERERS    MUST    BE    SHUNNED 

I  MUST  not  omit  an  important  subject,  and  a  mistake 
which  princes  can  with  difficulty  avoid,  if  they  are 
not  very  prudent,  or  if  they  do  not  make  a  good 
choice.  And  this  is  with  regard  to  flatterers,  of 
which  courts  are  full,  because  men  take  such 
pleasure  in  their  own  things  and  deceive  themselves 
about  them  that  they  can  with  difficulty  guard 
against  this  plague ;  and  by  wishing  to  guard 
against  it  they  run  the  risk  of  becoming  contempt- 
ible. Because  there  is  no  other  way  of  guarding 
one's  self  against  flattery  than  by  letting  men 
understand  that  they  will  not  offend  you  by  speak- 
ing the  truth  ;  but  when  every  one  can  tell  you  the 
truth,  you  lose  their  respect.  A  prudent  prince 
must  therefore  take  a  third  course,  by  choosing  in 
his  state  wise  men,  and  giving  these  alone  full 
liberty  to  speak  the  truth  to  him,  but  only  of  those 
things  that  he  asks  and  of  nothing  else ;  but  he 
must  ask  them  about  everything  and  hear  their 
opinion,  and  afterwards  deliberate  by  himself  in 
his  own  way,  and  in  these  councils  and  with  each 
of  these  men  comport  himself  so  that  every  one  may 
see  that  the  more  freely  he  speaks,  the  more  he 
will  be  acceptable.  Outside  these  he  should  listen 
to  no  one,  go  about  the  matter  deliberately,  and  be 
determined  in  his  decisions.  Whoever  acts  other- 
94 


THE   PRINCE  95 

wise  either  acts  precipitately  through  flattery  or 
else  changes  often  through  the  variety  of  opinions, 
from  which  it  happens  that  he  is  little  esteemed.  I 
will  give  a  modern  instance  of  this.  Pre'  Luca,  a 
follower  of  Maximilian,  the  present  emperor,  speak- 
ing of  his  majesty  said  that  he  never  took  counsel 
with  anybody,  and  yet  that  he  never  did  anything 
as  he  wished  ;  this  arose  from  his  following  the 
contrary  method  to  the  aforesaid.  As  the  emperor 
is  a  secret  mail  he  does  not  communicate  his  designs 
to  any  one  or  take  aiiy  one's  advice,  but  as  on  putting 
them  into  effect  they  begin  to  be  known  and  dis- 
covered, they  begin  to  be  opposed  by  those  he  lias 
about  him,  and  he  is  easily  diverted  from  his  pur- 
pose. Hence  it  comes  to  pass  that  what  he  does 
one  day  he  undoes  the  next,  no  one  ever  under- 
stands what  he  wishes  or  intends  to  do,  and  no 
reliance  is  to  be  placed  on  his  deliberations.  A 
prince,  therefore,  ought  always  to  take-  counsel, 
but  only  when  he  wishes,  riot  when  others  wish  ; 
on  the  contrary  he  ought  to  discourage  absolutely 
attempts  to  advise  him  unless  he  asks  it,  but  he 
ought  to  be  a  great  asker,  and  a  patient  hearer  of 
the  truth  about  those  things  which  he  has  inquired 
of;  indeed,  if  he  finds  that  any  one  has  scruples 
in  telling  him  the  truth  he  should  be  angry.  And 
since  some  think  that  a  prince  who  gains  the  re- 
putation of  being  prudent  is  so  considered,  not  by 
his  nature  but  by  the  good  councillors  he  has  about 
him,  they  are  undoubtedly  deceived.  It  is  an  in- 
fallible rule  that  a  prince  who  is  not  wise  himself 
cannot  be  well  advised,  unless  by  chance  he  left 
himself  entirely  in  the  hands  of  one  man  who  ruled 
him  in  everything,  and  happened  to  be  a  very 
prudent  man.  In  this  case  he  may  doubtless  be 
well  governed,  but  it  would  not  last  long,  for  that 
governor  would  in  a  short  time  deprive  him  of  the 
state  ;  but  by  taking  counsel  with  many,  a  prince 
who  is  not  wise  will  never  have  united  councils  and 


96  NICCOLO  MACHI A VELLI 

will  not  be  able  to  unite  them  for  himself.  The 
councillors  will  all  think  of  their  own  interests,  and 
he  will  be  unable  either  to  correct  or  to  understand 
them.  And  it  cannot  be  otherwise,  for  men  will 
always  be  false  to  you  unless  they  are  compelled  by 
necessity  to  be  true. 

Therefore  it  must  be  concluded  that  wise  counsels, 
from  whoever  they  come,  must  necessarily  be  due 
to  the  prudence  of  the  prince,  and  not  the  prudence 
of  the  prince  to  the  good  counsels  received. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

WHY    THE    PRINCES    OF   ITALY   HAVE    LOST   THEIR 
STATES 

THE  before-mentioned  things,  if  prudently  observed, 
make  a  new  prince  seem  ancient,  and  render  him 
at  once  more  secure  and  firmer  in  the  state  than  if 
he  had  been  established  there  of  old.  For  a  new 
prince  is  much  more  observed  in  his  actions  than 
a  hereditary  one,  and  when  these  are  recognised 
as  virtuous,  he  gains  men  more  and  they  are 
more  bound  to  him  than  if  he  were  of  the  ancient 
blood.  For  men  are  much  more  taken  by  present 
than  by  past  things,  and  when  they  find  them- 
selves well  off  in  the  present,  they  enjoy  it  and 
seek  nothing  more ;  on  the  contrary,  they  will  do 
all  they  can  to  defend  him,  so  long  as  the  prince  is 
not  in  other  things  wanting  to  himself.  And  thus 
he  will  have  the  double  glory  of  having  founded 
a  new  realm  and  adorned  it  and  fortified  it  with 
good  laws,  good  arms,  good  friends  and  good 
examples ;  as  he  will  have  double  shame  who  is 
born  a  prince  and  through  want  of  prudence  has 
lost  it. 

And  if  one  considers  those  rulers  who  have  lost 
their  position  in  Italy  in  our  days,  such  as  the  King 
of  Naples,  the  Duke  of  Milan  and  others,  one  will 
find  in  them  first  a  common  defect  as  to  their 
arms,  for  the  reasons  discussed  at  length,  then  we 


98  NICCOLO  MACHIAVELLI 

observe  that  some  of  them  either  had  the  people 
hostile  to  them,  or  that  if  the  people  were  friendly 
they  were  not  able  to  make  sure  of  the  nobility,  for 
without  these  defects,  states  are  not  lost  that  have 
enough  strength  to  be  able  to  keep  an  army  in  the 
field.  Philip  of  Macedon,  not  the  father  of  Alexander 
the  Great,  but  the  one  who  was  conquered  by  Titus 
Quinteus,  did  not  possess  a  great  state  compared  to 
the  greatness  of  Rome  and  Greece  which  assailed 
him,  but  being  a  military  man  and  one  who  knew 
how  to  divert  the  people  and  make  sure  of  the  great, 
he  was  able  to  sustain  the  war  against  them  for 
many  years  ;  and  if  at  length  he  lost  his  power  over 
several  cities,  he  was  still  able  to  keep  his  kingdom. 
Therefore,  those  of  our  princes  who  had  held  their 
possessions  for  many  years  must  not  accuse  fortune 
for  having  lost  them,  but  rather  their  own  negli- 
gence ;  for  having  never  in  quiet  times  considered 
that  things  might  change  (as  it  is  a  common  fault 
of  men  not  to  reckon  on  storms,  in  fair  weather) 
when  adverse  times  came,  they  only  thought  of 
fleeing  from  them,  instead  of  defending  themselves  ; 
and  hoped  that  the  people,  enraged  by  the  insolence 
of  the  conquerors,  would  recall  them.  This  measure, 
when  others  are  wanting,  is  good  ;  but  it  is  very 
bad  to  have  neglected  the  other  remedies  for  that 
one,  for  nobody  would  desire  to  fall  because  he 
believed  that  he  would  then  find  some  one  to  pick 
him  up.  This  may  or  may  not  take  place,  and  if  it 
does,  it  is  not  with  safety  to  you,  as  that  defence  is 
known  to  be  cowardly  and"  not  to  be  depended  on  ; 
and  only  those  defences  are  good,  certain  and 
durable,  which  depend  only  on  yourself  and  your 
own  ability 


CHAPTER  XXV 

HOW    MUCH    FORTUNE    CAN    DO    IN    HUMAN  AFFAIRS  / 
AND    HOW    IT    MAY    BE    OPPOSED 

IT  is  not  unknown  to  me  how  many  have  been  and 
are  of  opinion  that  worldly  events  are  so  governed 
by  fortune  and  by  God,  that  men  cannot  by  their 
prudence  change  them,  and  that  on  the  contrary 
there  is  no  remedy  whatever,  and  for  this  they  may 
judge  it  to  be  useless  to  toil  much  about  them,  but 
let  things  be  ruled  by  chance.  This  opinion  has 
been  more  believed  in  in  our  day,  from  the  great 
changes  that  have  been  seen,  and  are  daily  seen, 
beyond  every  human  conjecture. 

When  I  think  about  them  at  times,  I  am  partly 
inclined  to  share  this  opinion.  Nevertheless,  that 
our  freewill  may  not  be  altogether  extinguished,  I 
think  it  may  be  true  .that  fortune^  is  the  ruler^of 
half  our  actions,  but  that  she  allows'TEe  otEer  half 
or  a  little  less  to  be  governed  by  us.  1  would  com- 
pare her  to  an  impetuous  river  that,  when  turbulent, 
inundates  the  plains,  ruins  trees  and  buildings, 
removes  earth  from  this  side  and  places  it  on  the 
other ;  every  one  flies  before  it,  and  everything 
yields  to  its  fury  without  being  able  to  oppose 
it ;  and  yet  though  it  is  of  such  a  kind,  still 
when  it  is  quiet,  men  can  make  provision  against 
it  by  dams  and  banks,  so  that  when  it  rises  it  will 
either  go  into  a  canal  or  its  rush  will  not  be  so  wild 
99 


100 

and  dan  ownnW^  l almiJfljJ^if Vi  fortune, 
which  shows  her  powej^ffT6fe-no  measures  have 
been  taken  to  resist  her,  and  turns  her  fury  where 
she  knows  that  no  dams  or  barriers  have  been  made 
to  hold  her.  And  if  you  regard  Italy,  which  has 
been  the  seat  of  these  changes,  and  who  has  given 
the  impulse  to  them,  you  will  see  her  to  be  a 
country  without  dams  or  barriers  of  any  kind.  If 
she  had  been  protected  by  proper  measures,  like 
Germany,  Spain,  and  France,  this  inundation  would 
not  have  caused  the  great  changes  that  it  has, 
or  would  not  have  happened  at  all.  This  must 
suffice  as  regards  opposition  to  fortune  in  general. 
But  limiting  myself  more  to  particular  cases,  I 
would  point  out  how  one  sees  a  certain  prince 
to-day  fortunate  and  to-morrow  ruined,  without 
seeing  that  he  has  changed  in  character  or  other- 
wise. I  believe  this  arises  in  the  first  place  from 
the  causes  that  we  have  already  discussed  at 
length  ;  that  is  to  say,  because  the  prince  who  bases 
himself  entirely  on  fortune  is  ruined  when  fortune 
varies.  I  also  believe  that  he  is  happy  whose  mode 
of  proceeding  accords  with  the  needs  of  the  times, 
and  similarly  he  is  unfortunate  whose  mode  of  pro- 
ceeding is  opposed  to  the  times.  For  one  sees  that 
men  in  those  things  which  lead  them  to  the  aim 
that  each  one  has  in  view,  namely,  glory  and  riches, 
proceed  in  various  ways ;  one  with  circumspection, 
another  with  impetuosity,  one  by  violence,  another 
by  cunning,  one  with  patience,  another  with  the 
reverse  ;  and  each  by  these  diverse  ways  may  arrive 
at  his  aim.  One  sees  also  two  cautious  men,  one  of 
whom  succeeds  in  his  designs,  and  the  other  not, 
and  in  the  same  way  two  men  succeed  equally  by 
different  methods,  one  being  cautious,  the  other 
impetuous,  which  arises  only  from  the  nature  of  the 
times,  which  does  or  does  not  conform  to  their 
method  of  proceeding.  From  this  results,  as  I  have 
said,  that  two  men,  acting  differently,  attain  the 


THE  PRINCE  101 

same  effect,  and  of  two  others  acting  in  the  same 
way,  one  arrives  at  his  good  and  not  the  other. 
From  this  depend  also  the  changes  in  fortune,  for  if 
it  happens  that  time  and  circumstances  are  favour- 
able to  one  who  acts  with  caution  and  prudence  he 
will  be  successful,  but  if  time  and  circumstances 
change  he  will  be  ruined,  because  he  does  not 
change  his  mode  of  proceeding.  No  man  is  found 
able  to  adapt  himself  to  this,  either  because  he 
cannot  deviate  from  that  to  which  his  nature  dis- 
poses him,  or  else  because  having  always  prospered 
by  walking  in  one  path,  he  cannot  persuade  himself 
that  it  is  well  to  leave  it ;  and  therefore  the  cautious 
man,  when  it  is  time  to  act  suddenly,  does  not  know 
how  to  do  so  and  is  consequently  ruined  ;  for  if  one 
could  change  one's  nature  with  time  and  circum- 
stances, fortune  would  never  change.  Pope  Julius 
II.  acted  impetuously  in  everything  he  did  and 
found  the  times  and  conditions  so  in  conformity 
with  that  mode  of  proceeding,  that  he  always  ob- 
tained a  good  result.  Consider  the  first  war  that 
he  made  against  Bologna  while  Messer  Giovanni 
Bentivogli  was  still  living.  The  Venetians  were 
not  pleased  with  it,  the  King  of  Spain  and  like- 
wise France  had  objections  to  this  enterprise,  not- 
withstanding which  with  his  fierce  and  impetuous 
disposition  he  engaged  personally  in  the  expedition. 
This  move  caused  both  Spain  and  the  Venetians  to 
halt  and  hesitate,  the  latter  through  fear,  the 
former  through  the  desire  to  regain  the  entire 
kingdom  of  Naples.  On  the  other  hand,  he  engaged 
with  him  the  King  of  France,  because  seeing  him 
make  this  move  and  desiring  his  friendship  in  order 
to  put  down  the  Venetians,  that  king  judged  that  he 
could  not  refuse  him  his  troops  without  manifest 
injury.  Thus  Julius  by  his  impetuous  move 
achieved  what  no  other  pontiff  with  the  utmost 
human  prudence  would  have  succeeded  in  doing, 
because,  if  he  had  waited  till  all  arrangements  had 


102  NICCOLO  MACHIAVELLI 

been  made  and  everything  settled  before  leaving 
Rome,  as  any  other  pontiff  would  have  done,  it 
would  never  have  taken  place.  For  the  king  of 
France  would  have  found  a  thousand  excuses,  and 
the  others  would  have  inspired  him  with  a  thousand 
fears.  I  will  omit  his  other  actions,  which  were  all 
of  this  kind  and  which  all  succeeded  well,  and  the 
shortness  of  his  life  did  not  suffer  him  to  experience 
the  contrary,  for  had  times  succeeded  in  which  it 
was  necessary  to  act  with  caution,  his  ruin  would 
have  resulted,  for  he  would  never  have  deviated 
from  these  methods  to  which  his  nature  disposed 
him.  I  conclude  then  that  fortune  varying  and 
men  remaining  fixed  in  their  ways,  they  are  success- 
ful so  long  as  these  ways  conform  to  each  other,  but 
when  they  are  opposed  to  each  other  then  they  are 
unsuccessful.  I  certainly  think  that  it  is  better  to 
be  impetuous  than  cautious,  for  fortune  is  a  woman, 
and  it  is  necessary,  if  you  wish  to  master  her,  to 
conquer  her  by  force  ;  and  it  can  be  seen  that  she 
lets  herself  be  overcome  by  these  rather  than  by 
those  who  proceed  coldly.  And  therefore,  like  a 
woman,  she  is  a  friend  to  the  young,  because  they 
are  less  cautious,  fiercer,  and  master  her  with  greater 
audacity. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

EXHORTATION    TO    LIBERATE    ITALY   FROM    THE 
BARBARIANS 

HAVING  now  considered  all  the  things  we  have 
spoken  of,  and  thought  within  myself  whether  at 
present  the  time  was  not  propitious  in  Italy  for  a 
new  prince,  and  if  there  was  not  a  state  of  things 
which  offered  an  opportunity  to  a  prudent  and 
capable  man  to  introduce  a  new  system  that  would 
do  honour  to  himself  and  good  to  the  mass  of  the 
people,  it  seems  to  me  that  so  many  things  concur 
to  favour  a  new  ruler  that  I  do  not  know  of  any 
time  more  fitting  for  such  an  enterprise.  And  if, 
as  I  said,  it  was  necessary  in  order  that  the  power 
of  Moses  should  be  displayed  that  the  people  of 
Israel  should  be  slaves  in  Egypt,  and  to  give  scope 
for  the  greatness  and  courage  of  Cyrus  that  the 
Persians  should  be  oppressed  by  the  Medes,  and  to 
illustrate  the  pre-eminence  of  Theseus  that  the 
Athenians  should  be  dispersed,  so  at  the  present 
time,  in  order  that  the  might  of  an  Italian  genius 
might  be  recognised,  it  was  necessary  that  Italy 
should  be  reduced  to  her  present  condition,  and 
that  she  should  be  more  enslaved  than  the  Hebrews, 
more  oppressed  than  the  Persians,  and  more  scattered 
than  the  Athenians  ;  without  a  head,  without  order, 
beaten,  despoiled,  lacerated,  and  overrun,  and  that 
she  should  have  suffered  ruin  of  every  kind.  And 
103 


104  N1CCOLO   MACHIAVELLI 

although  before  now  a  spirit  has  been  shown  by  some 
which  gave  hope  that  he  might  be  appointed  by  God 
for  her  redemption,  yet  at  the  highest  summit  of  his 
career  he  was  thrown  aside  by  fortune,  so  that  now, 
almost  lifeless,  she  awaits  one  who  may  heal  her 
wounds  and  put  a  stop  to  the  rapine  and  pillaging 
of  Lombardy,  to  the  rapacity  and  extortion  in  the 
kingdom  and  in  Tuscany,  and  cure  her  of  those 
sores  which  have  long  been  festering.  Behold  how 
she  prays  God  to  send  some  one  to  redeem  her  from 
this  barbarous  cruelty  and  insolence.  Behold  her 
ready  and  willing  to  follow  any  standard  if  only 
there  be  some  one  to  raise  it.  There  is  nothing  now 
she  can  hope  for  but  that  your  illustrious  house  may 
place  itself  at  the  head  of  this  redemption,  being  by 
its  power  and  fortune  so  exalted,  and  being  favoured 
by  God  and  the  Church,  whose  leadership  it  now 
occupies.  Nor  will  this  be  very  difficult  to  you,  if 
you  call  to  mind  the  actions  and  lives  of  the  men 
I  have  named.  And  although  those  men  were  rare 
and  marvellous,  they  were  none  the  less  men,  and 
had  each  of  them  less  occasion  than  the  present,  for 
their  enterprise  was  not  juster  than  this,  nor  easier, 
nor  was  God  more  their  friend  than  He  is  yours. 
Here  is  a  just  cause  ;  for  that  war  is  just  which  is 
necessary ;  and  those  arms  are  merciful  where  no 
hope  exists  save  in  them.  Here  is  the  greatest 
willingness,  nor  can  there  be  great  difficulty  where 
there  is  great  willingness,  provided  that  the  measures 
are  adopted  of  those  whom  I  have  set  before  you  as 
examples.  Besides  this,  unexampled  wonders  have 
been  seen  here  performed  by  God,  the  sea  has  been 
opened,  a  cloud  has  shown  you  the  road,  the  rock 
has  given  forth  water,  manna  has  rained,  and 
everything  has  contributed  to  your  greatness,  the 
remainder  must  be  done  by  you.  God  will  not  do 
everything,  in  order  not  to  deprive  us  of  freewill 
and  the  portion  of  the  glory  that  falls  to  our  lot. 
It  is  no  marvel  that  none  of  the  before-mentioned 


THE  PRINCE  105 

Italians  have  done  that  which  it  is  to  be  hoped  your 
illustrious  house  may  do  ;  and  if  in  so  many  revolu- 
tions in  Italy  and  so  many  warlike  operations,  it 
always  seems  as  if  the  military  capacity  were  extinct, 
this  is  because  the  ancient  methods  were  not  good, 
and  no  one  has  arisen  who  knew  how  to  discover 
new  ones.  Nothing  does  so  much  honour  to  a 
newly-risen  man  than  the  new  laws  and  measures 
which  he  introduces.  These  things,  when  they  are 
well  based  and  have  greatness  in  them,  render  him 
revered  and  admired,  and  there  is  not  lacking  scope 
in  Italy  for  the  introduction  of  every  kind.  Here 
there  is  great  virtue  in  the  members,  if  it  were 
not  wanting  in  the  heads.  Look  how  in  duels  and 
in  councils  of  a  few  the  Italians  are  superior  in 
strength,  dexterity,  and  intelligence.  But  when  it 
comes  to  armies  they  make  a  poor  show ;  which 
proceeds  entirely  from  the  weakness  of  the  leaders, 
for  those  that  know  are  not  obedient,  and  every  one 
thinks  that  he  knows,  there  being  hitherto  nobody 
who  has  raised  himself  so  high  both  by  valour  and 
fortune  as  to  make  the  others  yield.  Hence  it  comes 
about  that  in  all  this  time,  in  all  the  wars  waged 
during  the  last  twenty  years,  whenever  there  has 
been  an  army  entirely  Italian  it  has  always  been 
a  failure,  as  witness  first  Taro,  then  Alexandria, 
Capua,  Genoa,  Vaila,  Bologna,  and  Mestri.  If  your 
illustrious  house,  therefore,  wishes  to  follow  those 
great  men  who  redeemed  their  countries,  it  is  before 
all  things  necessary,  as  the  true  foundation  of  every 
undertaking,  to  provide  yourself  with  your  own 
forces,  for  you  cannot  have  more  faithful,  or  truer 
and  better  soldiers.  And  although  each  one  of 
them  may  be  good,  they  will  together  become  better 
when  they  see  themselves  commanded  by  their 
prince,  and  honoured  and  supported  by  him.  It  is 
therefore  necessary  to  prepare  such  forces  in  order 
to  be  able  with  Italian  prowess  to  defend  the  country 
from  foreigners.  And  although  both  the  Swiss  and 


106  NICCOLO  MACHIAVELLI 

Spanish  infantry  are  deemed  terrible,  none  the  less 
they  each  have  their  defects,  so  that  a  third  order 
might  not  only  oppose  them,  but  be  confident  of 
overcoming  them.  For  the  Spaniards  cannot  sustain 
the  attack  of  cavalry,  and  the  Swiss  have  to  fear 
infantry  which  meets  them  with  resolution  equal 
to  their  own.  From  which  it  has  resulted,  as  will 
be  seen  by  experience,  that  the  Spaniards  cannot 
sustain  the  attack  of  French  cavalry,  and  the  Swiss 
are  overthrown  by  Spanish  infantry.  And  although 
a  complete  example  of  the  latter  has  not  been  seen, 
yet  an  instance  was  furnished  in  the  battle  of 
Ravenna,  where  the  Spanish  infantry  attacked  the 
German  battalions,  which  observe  the  same  order 
as  the  Swiss.  The  Spaniards,  through  their  bodily 
agility  and  aided  by  their  bucklers,  had  entered 
between  and  under  their  pikes  and  were  in  a  position 
to  attack  them  safely  without  the  Germans  being 
able  to  defend  themselves ;  and  if  the  cavalry  had 
not  charged  them  they  would  have  utterly  destroyed 
them.  Knowing  therefore  the  defects  of  both  these 
kinds  of  infantry,  a  third  kind  can  be  created  which 
can  resist  cavalry  and  need  not  fear  infantry,  and 
this  will  be  done  not  by  the  creation  of  armies  but 
by  a  change  of  system.  And  these  are  the  things 
which,  when  newly  introduced,  give  reputation  and 
grandeur  to  a  new  prince.  This  opportunity  must 
not,  therefore,  be  allowed  to  pass,  for  letting  Italy  at 
length  see  her  liberator.  I  cannot  express  the  love 
with  which  he  would  be  received  in  all  those 
provinces  which  have  suffered  under  these  foreign 
invasions,  with  what  thirst  for  vengeance,  with 
what  steadfast  faith,  with  what  love,  with  what 
grateful  tears.  What  doors  would  be  closed  against 
him?  What  people  would  refuse  him  obedience? 
What  envy  could  oppose  him  ?  What  Italian  would 
rebel  against  himr  This  barbarous  domination 
stinks  in  the  nostrils  of  every  one.  May  your 
illustrious  house  therefore  assume  this  task  with 


THE  PRINCE  107 

that  courage  and  those  hopes  which  are  inspired  by 
a  just  cause,  so  that  under  its  banner  our  fatherland 
may  be  raised  up,  and  under  its  auspices  be  verified 
that  saying  of  Petrarch  : 

Valour  against  fell  wrath 

Will  take  up  arms ;  and  be  the  combat  quickly  sped  1 

For,  sure,  the  ancient  worth, 

That  in  Italians  stirs  the  heart,  is  not  yet  dead. 


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THE   WORLD'S   CLASSICS 


LIST  OF  THE  SERIES 

The  figures  in  parentheses  denote  the  number  of  the  took  in  the  series 

Aeschylus.    The  Seven  Plays.  Translated  by  LEWIS  CAMPBELL.   (117) 
Ainsworth  (W.  Harrison).    The  Tower  of  London.    (162) 
A  Kempis  (Thomas).    Of  the  Imitation  of  Christ.    (49) 
Aristophanes.     Frere's  translation  of  the  Acharnians,  Knights,  Birds, 

and  Frogs.     Introduction  by  W.  W.  MERRY.    (134) 
Arnold  (Matthew).    Poems.    Intro,  by  Sir  A.  T.  QuiLLER-Coucn.  (85) 
Aurelius  (Marcus).    Thoughts.    Trans.  J.  JACKSON.    (60) 
Austen  (Jane).    Emma.     Introduction  by  E.  V.  LUCAS.    (129) 
Bacon.    The  Advancement  of  Learning,  and  the  New  Atlantis.     Intro- 
duction by  Professor  CASE.     (93) 
Essays.     (24) 

Barham.    The  Ingoldsby  Legends.    (9) 
Barrow  (Sir  John).     The  Mutiny  of  the  Bounty.     Introduction  by 

Admiral  Sir  CYPRIAN  BRIDGE.    (195) 
Betham-Ed wards  (M.).    The  Lord  of  the  Harvest.     Introduction  by 

FREDERIC  HARRISON.    (194) 

Blackmore  (R.  D.).    Lorna  Doone.    Intro,  by  T.  H.  WARRBH.    (171) 
Borrow.     The  Bible  in  Spain.    (75) 
Lavengro.    (66). 
The  Romany  Rye.    (73) 
Wild  Wales.    (224) 
Bronte  Sisters. 

Charlotte  Bronte.    Jane  Eyre,    (i) 
bhirley.     (14) 
Villette.    (47) 

The  Professor,   and  the  Poems  of  Charlotte,  Emily,  and  Anne 
Bronte.     Introduction  by  THEODORE  WATTS-DbNTON.     (78) 
Emily  Bronte'.    Wuthering  Heights.    (10) 
Anne  Bronte.    Agnes  Grey.    (141) 

The  Tenant  of  Wildfell  Hall.    (67) 

Brown  (Dr.  John).  Horae  Subsecivae.   Intro,  by  AUSTIN  DOBSON.  (118) 
Browning  (Elizabeth  Barrett).    Poems:  A  Selection.    (176) 
Browning  (Robert).    Poems  and  Plays,  1833-1842.    (58) 

Poems,  1842-1864.     (137) 

Buckle.    The  History  of  Civilization  in  England.    3  vols.    (41,  48,  53) 
Bunyan.    The  Pilgrim's  Progress.    (12) 
Burke.    Works.    6  vols. 

Vol.  I.     General  Introduction  by  Judge  WILLIS  and  Preface  by  F.  W. 

RAFFETY.    (71) 

Vols.  II,  IV,  V,  VI.    Prefaces  by  F.  W.  RAFFETY.    (81,  112-114) 
Vol.  III.    Preface  by  F.  H.  WILLIS,    (m) 


THE  WORLD'S  CLASSICS 


List  of  the  Series — continued 

Burns.    Poems.    (34) 

Butter.     The  Analogy  of  Religion.      Edited,  with  Notes,  by  W.  E. 

GLADSTONE.    (136) 
Byron.    Poems :  A  Selection.    (180) 
Carlyle.    On  Heroes  and  Hero- Worship.    (62) 

Past  and  Present.    Introduction  by  G.  K.  CHESTERTON.    (153) 

Sartor  Resartus.    (19) 

The  French  Revolution.  Intro.  C.  R.  L.  FLETCHER,  a  vols.  (125,  126) 

The  Life  of  John  Sterling.    Introduction  by  W.  HALE  WHITE.     (144) 
Cervantes.  Don  Quixote.  Translated  by  C.  JERVAS.  Intro,  and  Notes  by 
J.  FiTZMAURICB-KELLY.   2  vols.    With  a  frontispiece.    (130,  131) 
Chaucer.    The  Canterbury  Tales.    (76) 

Chaucer.  The  Works  of.  From  the  text  of  Professor  SKEAT.  3  vols. 
Vol.  I  (42);  Vol.  II  (56);  Vol.  Ill,  containing  the  whole  of  the 
Canterbury  Tales  (76) 

Cobbold.    Margaret  Catchpole.    Intro,  by  CLEMENT  SHORTER.    (119) 
Coleridge.    Poems.    Introduction  by  Sir  A.  T.  QuiLLER-Coucn.    (99) 
Collins  (Wilkie).    The  Woman  in  White.    (226). 
Cooper  (T.  Fenimore).    The  Last  of  the  Mohicans.    (163) 
Cowper.    Letters.    Selected,  with  Introduction,  by  E.  V.  LUCAS.    (138) 
Darvrin.    The  Origin  of  Species.    With  a  Note  by  GRANT  ALLBN.    (n) 
Defoe.    Captain  Singleton.   Intro,  by  THEODORE  WATTS-DuNTON.   (82) 

Robinson  Crusoe.     (17) 

De  Quincey.    Confessions  of  an  English  Opium-Eater.    (23) 
Dickens.      Great  Expectations.     With  6  Illustrations  by  WARWICK 
GOBLE.    (128) 

Oliver  Twist.    (8) 

Pickwick  Papers.    With  43  Illustrations  by  SEYMOUR  and  'Pniz'. 

2  VOls.      (l2O,   12 1) 

Tale  of  Two  Cities.    (38) 
Dufferin  (Lord).     Letters  from  High  Latitudes.     Illustrated.     With 

Introduction  by  R.  W.  MACAN.    (158) 
Eliot  (George).    Adam  Bede.    (63) 

Felix  Holt.    Introduction  by  VIOLA  MBYNELL.    (179) 

Rornola.     Introduction  by  VIOLA  MEYNELL.     (178) 

Scenes  of  Clerical  Life.    Introduction  by  ANNIE  MATHESON.    (155) 

Silas  Marner,  The  Lifted  Veil,  and  Brother  Jacob.    Introduction  by 

THEODORE  WATTS-DUNTON.    (80) 
The  Mill  on  the  Floss.    (31) 
Emerson.    English  Traits,  and  Representative  Men.    (30) 

Essays.    First  and  Second  Series.    (6) 

English  Critical  Essays  (Nineteenth  Century).  Selected  and  Edited 
by  EDMUND  D.  JONES.  (206) 


THE  WORLD'S   CLASSICS 


List  of  the  Series — continued 

English  Essays.    Chosen  and  arranged  by  W.  PEACOCK.    (32) 
English  Essays,  1600-1900  (Book  of).    Chosen  by  S.  V.  MAKOWEU 

and  B.  H.  BLACKWELL.    (172) 
English  Letters.    (Fifteenth  to   Nineteenth  Centuries.)    Selected  and 

edited  by  M.  DUCKITT  and  H.  WRAGG.    (192) 
English  Prose.    Chosen  and  arranged  by  W.  PEACOCK. 

Mandeville  to  Ruskin.    (45) 

Wycliffe  to  Clarendon.     (219) 

Milton  to  Gray.    (220) 

Walpole  to  Lamb.    (221) 

Landor  to  Holmes    (222) 

Mrs.  Gaskell  to  Henry  James.    (223) 
English  Prose:  Narrative,  Descriptive,  and  Dramatic.    Selected 

by  H.  A.  TREBLE.    (204) 

English    Short    Stories.      (Nineteenth    Century.)      Introduction   by 
Prof.  HUGH  WALKER.    (193) 

Second  Series.    (228) 

English  Songs  and  Ballads.    Compiled  by  T.  W.  H.  CROSLAND.   (13) 
English  Speeches,  from  Burke  to  Gladstone.    Selected  by  EDGAR 

R.JONES,  M.P.    (191). 

Fielding.    Journal  of  a  Voyage  to  Lisbon,  &c.    Intro.  A.  DOBSON.    (142) 
Gait  (John).    The  Entail.     Introduction  by  JOHN  AyscouGH.    (177) 
Gaskell  (Mrs.).    Introductions  by  CLEMENT  SHORTER. 

Cousin  Pliillis,  and  other  Tales,  &c.     (168) 

Cranford,  The  Cage  at  Cranford,  and  the  Moorland  Cottage,     (no) 

Lizzie  Leigh,  The  Grey  Woman,  and  other  Tales,  &c.     (175) 

Mary  Barton.    (86) 

North  and  South.    (154) 

Right  at  Last,  and  other  Tales,  &c.    (203) 

Round  the  Sofa.    (190) 

Ruth.    (88) 

Sylvia's  Lovers.    (156) 

Wives  and  Daughters.    (157) 

Life  of  Charlotte  Bronte.    (214) 

Gibhon.    Decline  and  Fall  of  the  Roman  Empire.    With  Maps.    7  vols. 
(35,  44,  5*i  64,  69,  74) 

Autobiography.     Introduction  by  J.  B.  BURY.    (139) 
Goethe.     Faust,  Part  I  (with  Marlowe's  Dr.  Faustus).     Translated  by 

JOHN  ANSTER.     Introduction  by  Sir  A  W.  WARD.    (135) 
Goldsmith.    Poems.    Introduction  and  Notes  by  AUSTIN  DOBSON.   (123) 


The  Vicar  of  Wakefield.     (4) 
Grant  (James).    The  Captain  of  the  Guard.     (159) 
Hawthorne.    The  Scarlet  Letter.    (26) 

Hazlitt.    Characters  of  Shakespeare's  Plays.     Introduction  by  Sir  A. 
QUILLER-COUCH.      (205) 

Lectures  on  the  English  Comic  Writers.    Introduction  by  R.  BRIMLEY 
JOHNSON.    (124) 

Sketches  and  Essays,     (i*) 

Spirit  of  the  Age.     (57)     * 

Table-Talk.     (5) 

Winterslow.     (25) 


579QIF, 


WORLD'S    CLASSICS 


List  of  the  Series — continued 

Shakespearean  Criticism.  A  Selection.  Edited  with  Intro.,  b 
D.  NICHOL  SMITH.  (212) 

Shelley.    Poems.    A  Selection.    (187) 

Sheridan.    Plays.    Introduction  by  JOSEPH  KNIGHT.    (79) 

Smith  (Adam).    The  Wealth  of  Nations,    2  vols.    (54,  59) 

Smith  (Alexander).  Dreamthorp,  with  Selections  from  Last  Leaves 
Introduction  by  Prof.  HUGH  WALKER.  (200) 

Smollett.  Travels  through  France  and  Italy.  Introduction  by  THOMAI 
SECCOMBE.  (90) 

Sophocles.    Th'e  Seven  Plays.    Trans.  LEWIS  CAMPBELL.    (116) 

Southey  (Robert).  Letters.  Selected,  with  an  Introduction  and  Notes 
by  MAURICE  H.  FITZGERALD.  (169) 

Sterne.    Tristram  Shandy.    (40) 

Swift.    Gulliver's  Travels.    (20) 

Taylor  (Meadows).    Confessions  of  a  Thug.    (207) 

Tennyson  (Lord).    Poems.    (3) 

Thackeray.    Book  of  Snobs,  Sketches  and  Travels  in  London,  &c.   (50 
Henry  Esmond.     (28) 
Pendennis.    Introduction  by  EDMUND  GOSSE.    2  vols.    (91,  92) 

Thoreau.    Walden.    Introduction  by  THEODORE  WATTS-DUNTON.  (68) 

Tolstoy.    Essays  and  Letters.    Translated  by  AYLMER  MAUDE.    (46) 
Twenty-three  Tales.     Translated  by  L.  and  A.  MAUDE.    (72) 
The  Cossacks.    Translated  by  L.  and  A.  MAUUE.     (208) 
Resurrection.    Trans.  L.  MAUDE.     Intro.  A.  MAUDE.     (209) 
Anna  Karenina.    Trans.  AYLMER  MAUDE.    2  vols.     (210,  211) 
A  Confession,  and  What  I  believe.     Trans.  AYLMER  MAUDE.     (229) 

Trollope.    The  Three  Clerks.    Intro,  by  W.  TEIGNMOUTH  SHORE.  (i4< 
The  Warden.    (217) 

Virgil.    Translated  by  DRYDEN.    (37) 

Virgil.    The  Aeneid  and  the  Georgics.    Trans.  J.  RHOADES.    (227) 

Watts-Dunton  (Theodore).    Aylwin.    (52) 

Wells  (Charles).  Joseph  and  his  Brethren.  With  an  Introduction  by 
ALGERNON  CHARLES  SWINBURNE,  and  a  Note  on  Rossetti  and 
Charles  Wells  by  THEODORE  WATTS-DuNTON.  (143) 

White  (Gilbert).    The  Natural  History  of  Selborne.    (22) 

Whitman.    Poems.     Introduction  by  E.  DE  SELINCOURT.    (218) 

Whittier.    Poems.    A  Selection.    (188) 

Wordsworth.    Poems :  A  Selection.    (189) 


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