World's Classics
XLIII
THE PRINCE
BY
NICCOL6 MACHIAVELLI
THE PRINCE
BY
NICCOL6 MACHIAVELLI
TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY
LUIGI RICCI
HUMPHREY MILFORD
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW
NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE CAPETOWN
BOMBAY CALCUTTA AND MADRAS
NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
Born, Florence „ May 3, 1469
Died, Florence June 22, 1527
The present translation of Machiavelli's * Prince ' was
first published in 'The World's Classics' in 1903, and
reprinted in 1909 and 1921.
(OCT I 6 ^943
Printed in England by the Garden City Press, Letchworth.
PREFACE
*>
OF all Machiavelli's works The Prince is undoubtedly
the greatest ; aiid a new English edition of it is
likely to he welcome to all those who have not the
advantage of reading it in the classical Italian
original.
For a true appreciation of Machiavelli, impossible
in a brief Preface, I must refer the English reader
to Macaulay's Essay on the Italian historian and
statesman. In it he will see how our Author's ideas
and work were wrongfully and wilfully misinter-
preted by the very men who, while profiting by his
wisdom, have with great ingratitude criticised the
statesman and defamed his name, as that of the
inventor of the worst political system ever imagined.
Yet, as his whole life was an indefatigable and un-
remitting endeavour to secure for his native Florence
a good and popular government, and as he lost his
great office of Secretary to the Florentine Republic
on account of his avowed liberal opinions, it is not
only unjust but ridiculous to accuse him of helping
tyrants to enslave the people. What he did was to
show in the most deliberate and in the plainest way
the arts by which free peoples were made slaves ;
and, had his words of advice been always heeded,
no tyrant in Italy or elsewhere could have been
successful in his policy. That he was not listened
to, and his advice scorned and spurned, was not
Machiavelli's fault.
vi NICCOLO MACHIAVELL1
Those who still share the opinion of his interested
detractors should read his private correspondence
with the leaders of liberal ideas in Italy — many of
his letters being still left unpublished in the MS.
Collection of Giuliano Ricci in the National Library,
in the Riccardiana Library (No. 2467), in the
Government Archives (Strozzi, Nos. 133 and 1028)
of Florence, in the Barberini Library, and in the
Collezione Gonnelli of the Palatine Library in
Rome.
LUIGT RICCI
22 ALBKMARLE STREET,
LONDON, W.
CONTENTS
NICCOLO MACHIAVELL1 TO LORENZO THE MAGNIFICENT
CHAP. PAGE
1. The various kinds of Government and the
ways by which they are established . 3
2. Of Hereditary Monarchies ... 4
3. Of Mixed Monarchies .... 5
4 Why the Kingdom of Darius, occupied by
Alexander, did not rebel against the
successors of the latter after his death . 14
5. The way to govern Cities or Dominions
that, previous to being occupied, lived
under their own Laws .... 18
6. Of New Dominions which have been ac-
quired by one's own Arms and Powers . 20
7. Of New Dominions acquired by the Power
of others or by Fortune ... 24
8. Of those who have attained the position of
Prince by villainy .... 32
9. Of the Civic Principality . ' .37
10. How the strength of all States should be
measured ...... 41
11. Of Ecclesiastical Principalities . , 44
12. The different kinds of Militia and Mer-
cenary Soldiers 47
vii
viii NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
CHAP. PAGE
13. Of Auxiliary, Mixed, and Native Troops 53
14. AVTiat the duties of a Prince are with
regard to the Militia .... 67
15. Of the things for which Men, and especi-
ally Princes, are praised or blamed . 60
16. Of Liberality and Niggardliness . . 62
17. Of Cruelty and Clemency, and whether it
is better to be loved or feared . . 65
18. In what way Princes must keep faith . 69
19. That we must avoid being despised and
hated 72
20. Whether Fortresses and other things
which Princes often make are useful or
injurious 83
21. How a Prince must act in order to gain
reputation 88
22. Of the Secretaries of Princes ... 92
23. How Flatterers must be shunned . . 94
24. Why the Princes of Italy have lost their
States 97
25. How much Fortune can do in human
affairs, and how it may be opposed . 99
26. Exhortation to liberate Italy from the
Barbarians .... 103
NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
TO
LORENZO THE MAGNIFICENT
SON OF PIERO DI MEDICI
IT is customary for those who wish to gain the
favour of a prince to endeavour to do so by offer-
ing him gifts of those things which they hold
most precious, or in which they know him to take
especial delight. In this way princes are often
presented with horses, arms, cloth of gold, gems,
and such-like ornaments worthy of their grandeur.
In my desire, however, to offer to Your Highness
some humble testimony of my devotion, I have
been unable to find among my possessions anything
which I hold so dear or esteem so highly as that
knowledge of the deeds of great men which I have
acquired through a long experience of modern
events and a constant study of the past.
The results of my long observations and reflec-
tions are recorded in the little volume which I now
offer to Your Highness : and although I deem this
work unworthy of Your Highness's notice, yet my
confidence in your humanity assures me that you
will accept it, knowing that it is not in my power
2 NICCOI/) MACHIAVELL1
to offer you a greater gift than that of enabling
you to understand in the shortest possible time all
those things which I have learnt through danger
and suffering in the course of many years. I have
not sought to adorn my work with long phrases or
high-sounding words or any of those allurements
and ornaments with which many writers seek to
embellish their books, as I desire no honour for my
work but such as its truth and the gravity of its
subject may justly deserve. Nor will it, I trust,
be deemed presumptuous on the part of a man of
humble and obscure condition to attempt to discuss
and criticise the government of princes ; for in
the same way that landscape painters station them-
selves in the valleys in order to draw mountains or
elevated ground, and ascend an eminence in order
to get a good view of the plains, so it is necessary
to be a prince to be able to know thoroughly the
nature of a people, and to know the nature of
princes one must be one of the populace.
May I trust, therefore, that Your Highness will
accept this little gift in the spirit in which it is
offered ; and if Your Highness will deign to peruse
it, you will recognise in it my ardent desire that
you may attain to that grandeur which fortune and
your own merits presage for you.
And should Your Highness gaze down from the
summit of that eminence towards this humble spot,
you will recognise the great and unmerited suffer-
ings inflicted on me by a cruel fate.
THE PRINCE
CHAPTER I
THE VARIOUS KINDS OP GOVERNMENT AND THE
WAYS BY WHIC1I THEY ARE ESTABLISHED
ALL states and dominions which hold or have
held sway over mankind are either republics or
monarchies. Monarchies are either hereditary
ones, in which the rulers have been for many years
of the same family, or else they are those of recent
foundation. The newly founded ones are either
entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or
else they are, as it were, new members grafted on
to the hereditary possessions of the prince that
annexes them, as is the kingdom of Naples to the
King of Spain. The dominions thus acquired have
either been previously accustomed to the rule of
another prince, or else have been free states, and
they are annexed either by force of arms of the
prince, or of others, or else fall to him by good
fortune or merit.
CHAPTER II
OF HEREDITARY MONARCHIES
I WILL not here speak of republics, having already
treated of them fully in another place. I will deal
only with monarchies, and will show how the
various kinds described above can be governed and
maintained. In the first place, in hereditary states
accustomed to the reigning family the difficulty of
maintaining them is far less than in new monarchies ;
for it is sufficient not to exceed the ancestral usages,
and to accommodate one's self to accidental circum-
stances ; in this way such a prince, if of ordinary
ability, will always be able to maintain his position,
unless some very exceptional and excessive force
deprives him of it ; and even if he be thus deprived
of it, on the slightest misfortune happening to the
new occupier, he will be able to regain it.
We have in Italy the example of the Duke of
Ferrara, who was able to withstand the assaults of
the Venetians in the year '84, and of Pope Julius
in the year '10, for no other reason than because
of the antiquity of his family in that dominion. In
as much as the legitimate prince has less cause and
less necessity to give offence, it is only natural that
he should be more loved ; and, if no extraordi-
nary vices make him hated, it is only reasonable for
his subjects to be naturally attached to him, the
memories and causes of innovations being forgotten
in the long period over which his rule has existed ;
whereas one change always leaves the way prepared
for the introduction of another.
CHAPTER III
OF MIXED MONARCHIES
Bur it is in the new monarchy that difficulties
really exist. Firstly, if it is not entirely new, but
a member as it were of a mixed state, its disorders
spring at first from a natural difficulty which exists
in all new dominions, because men change masters
willingly, hoping to better themselves ; and this
belief makes them take arms against their rulers,
in which they are deceived, as experience shows
them that they have gone from bad to worse. This
is the result of another very natural cause, which is
the necessary harm inflicted on those over whom
the prince obtains dominion, both by his soldiers and
by an infinite number of other injuries unavoidably
caused by his occupation.
Thus you find enemies in all those whom you
have injured by occupying that dominion, and you
cannot maintain the friendship of those who have
helped you to obtain this possession, as you will not
be able to fulfil their expectations, nor can you use
strong measures with them, being under an obliga-
tion to them ; for which reason, however strong
your armies may be, you will always need the
favour of the inhabitants to take possession of a
province. It was from these causes that Louis XII.
of France, though able to occupy Milan without
trouble, immediately lost it, and the forces of
6 NICCOL6 MACHIAVELL1
Ludovico alone were sufficient to take it from him
the first time, for the inhabitants who had willingly-
opened their gates to him, finding themselves
deluded in the hopes they had cherished and not
obtaining those benefits that they had anticipated,
could not bear the vexatious rule of their new prince.
It is indeed true that, after reconquering the
rebel territories they are not so easily lost again,
for the ruler is now, by the fact of the rebellion,
less averse to secure his position by punishing
offenders, investigating any suspicious circumstances,
and strengthening himself in weak places. So that
although the mere appearance of such a person
as Duke Ludovico on the frontier was sufficient to
cause France to lose Milan the first time, to make
her lose her grip of it the second time was only
possible when all the world was against her, and
after her enemies had been defeated and driven out
of Italy ; which was the result of the causes above
mentioned. Nevertheless it was taken from her
both the first and the second time. The general
causes of the first loss have been already discussed ;
it remains now to be seen what were the causes of
the second loss and by what means France could
have avoided it, or what measures might have been
taken by another ruler in that position which were
not taken by the King of France. Be it observed,
therefore, that those states which on annexation are
united to a previously existing state may or may
not be of the same nationality and language. If
they are, it is very easy to hold them, especially if
they are not accustomed to freedom ; and to possess
them securely it suffices that the family of the
princes which formerly governed them be extinct.
For the rest, their old condition not being disturbed,
and there being no dissimilarity of customs, the
people settle down quietly under their new rulers,
as is seen in the case of Burgundy, Brittany,
Gascony, and Normandy, which have been so long
THE PRINCE 7
united to France ; and although there may be some
slight differences of language, the customs of the
people are nevertheless similar, and they can get
along well together, and whoever obtains possession
of them and wishes to retain them must bear in
mind two things : the one, that the blood of their
old rulers is extinct ; the other, to make no altera-
tion either in their laws or in their taxes ; in this
way they will in a very short space of time become
united with their old possessions and form one
state. But when dominions are acquired in a
province differing in language, laws, and customs,
the difficulties to be overcome are great, and it
requires good fortune as well as great industry to
retain them ; one of the best and most certain
means of doing so would be for the new ruler to
take up his residence in them. This would render
their possession more secure and durable, it is what
the Turk has done in Greece ; in spite of all the
other measures taken by him to hold that state, it
would not have been possible to retain it had he
not gone to live there. Being on the spot, dis-
orders can be seen as they arise and can quickly
be remedied, but living at a distance, they are only
heard of when they get beyond remedy. Besides
which, the province is not despoiled by your officials,
the subjects are pleased with the easy accessibility
of their prince ; and wishing to be loyal they have
more reason to love him, and should they be other-
wise they will have greater cause to fear him.
Any external Power who wishes to assail that
state will be less disposed to do so ; so that as long
as he resides there he will be very hard to dis-
possess. The other and better remedy is to plant
colonies in one or two of those places which form
as it were the keys of the land, for it is necessary
either to do this or to maintain a large force of
armed men. The colonies will cost the prince
little ; with little or no expense on his part, he
8 NICCOLt) MACH1AVELL1
can send and maintain them ; he only injures
those whose lands and houses are taken to give to
the new inhabitants, and these form but a small
proportion of the state, and those who are injured,
remaining poor and scattered, can never do any harm
to him, and all the others are, on the one hand, not
injured and therefore easily pacified ; and, on the
other, are fearful of offending lest they should be
treated like those who have been dispossessed of
their property. To conclude, these colonies cost
nothing, are more faithful, and give less offence ;
and the injured parties being poor and scattered
are unable to do mischief, as I have shown. For
it must be noted, that men must either be caressed
or else annihilated ; they will revenge themselves
for small injuries, but cannot do so for great ones ;
the injury therefore that we do to a man must be
such that we need not fear his vengeance. But by
maintaining a garrison instead of colonists, one will
spend much more, and consume in guarding it all
the revenues of that state, so that the acquisition
will result in a loss, besides giving much greater
offence, since it injures every one in that state with
the quartering of the army on it ; which being an
inconvenience felt by all, every one becomes an
enemy, and these are enemies which can do mischief,
as, though beaten, they remain in their own homes.
In every way, therefore, a garrison is as useless as
colonies are useful. Further, the ruler of a foreign
province as described, should make himself the
leader and defender of his less powerful neighbours,
and endeavour to weaken the stronger ones, and
take care that his possessions are not entered by
some foreigner not less powerful than himself, who
will always intervene at the request of those who
are discontented either through ambition or fear,
as was seen when the ^Etoli invited the Romans into
Greece ; and in whatever province they entered, it
was always at the request of the inhabitants. And
THE PRINCE 9
the rule is that when a powerful foreigner enters a
province, all the less powerful inhabitants become
his adherents, jnoved by the envy they bear to
those ruling over them ; so much so that with
regard to these minor potentates he has no trouble
whatever in winning them over, for they willingly
join forces with the state that he has acquired.
He has merely to be careful that they do not
assume too much power and authority, and he can
easily with his own forces and their favour put
down those that are powerful and remain in every-
thing the arbiter of that province. And he who
does not govern well in this way will soon lose
what he has acquired, and while he holds it will
meet with infinite difficulty and trouble.
The Romans in the provinces they took, always
followed this policy ; they established colonies,
flattered the less powerful without increasing their
strength, put down the most powerful and did not
allow foreign rulers to obtain influence in them.
I will let the single province of Greece suffice as
an example. They made friends with the Achaei
and the ^Etoli, the kingdom of Macedonia was
cast down, and Antiochus driven out, nor did they
allow the merits of the Achaei or the ^Etoli to
gain them any increase of territory, nor did the
persuasions of Philip induce them to befriend him
without lowering him, nor could the power of
Antiochus make them consent to allow him to hold
any state in that province.
For the Romans did in this case what all wise
princes should do, who look not only at present
dangers but also at future ones and diligently guard
against them ; for being foreseen they can easily be
remedied, but if one waits till they are at hand, the
medicine is no longer in time as the malady has
become incurable ; it happening with this as with
those hectic fevers spoken of by doctors, which at
their beginning are easy to cure but difficult to-
10 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
recognise, but in course of time when they have
not at first been recognised and treated, become
easy to recognise and difficult to cure. Thus it
happens in matters of state ; for knowing afar off
(which it is only given to a prudent man to do) the
evils that are brewing, they are easily cured. But
when, for want of such knowledge, they are allowed
to grow so that every one can recognise them, there
is no longer any remedy to be found. However,
the Romans, observing these disorders while yet
remote, were always able to find a remedy, and
never allowed them to proceed in order to avoid a
war ; for they knew that war was not to be avoided,
and could be deferred only to the advantage of the
other side; they therefore declared war against
Philip and Antiochus in Greece, so as not to have to
fight them in Italy, though they might at the time
have avoided either ; this they did not choose to do,
never caring to do that which is now every day to
be heard in the mouths of our wise men, to enjoy
the benefits of time, but preferring those of their
own virtue and prudence, for time brings with it all
things, and may produce indifferently either good
or evil. But let us return to France and examine
whether she did any of these things ; and I will
speak not of Charles, but of Louis as the one whose
proceedings can be better seen, as he held posses-
sion in Italy for a longer time ; you will then see
that he did the opposite of all those things which
must be done to keep possession of a foreign state.
King Louis was called into Italy by the ambition
of the Venetians, who wished by his coming to gam
half of Lombardy. I will not blame the king for
coming nor for the part he took, because wishing to
plant his foot in Italy, and not having friends in
the country, on the contrary the conduct of King
Charles having caused all doors to be closed to him,
he was forced to accept what friendships he could
find, and his schemes would have quickly been
THE PRINCE 11
successful if he had made no mistakes m his other
proceedings.
The king then having acquired Lombardy re-
gained immediately the reputation lost by Charles.
Genoa yielded, the Florentines became his friends,
the Marquis of Mantua, the Dukes of Ferrara and
Bentivogli, the Lady of Furli, the Lords of Faenza,
Pesaro, Rimini, Camerino, and Piombino, the
inhabitants of Lucca, of Pisa, and of Sienna, all
approached him with offers of friendship. The
Venetians might then have seen the effects of their
temerity, how to gain a few lands in Lombardy
they had made the king ruler over two-thirds of
Italy. Consider how little difficulty the king
would have had in maintaining his reputation in
Italy if he had observed the rules above given, and
kept a firm and sure hold over all those friends of
his, who being many in number, and weak, and
fearful one of the Church, another of the Venetians,
were always obliged to hold fast to him, and by
whose aid he could easily make sure of any who
were still great. But he was hardly in Milan
before he did exactly the opposite, by giving aid to
Pope Alexander to occupy the Romagna. Nor
did he perceive that, in taking this course, he
weakened himself, by casting off his friends and
those who had placed themselves at his disposal,
and strengthened the Church by adding to the
spiritual power, which gives it such authority,
further temporal powers. And having made the
first mistake, he was obliged to follow it up, whilst,
to put a stop to the ambition of Alexander and pre-
vent him becoming ruler of Tuscany, he was forced
to come to Italy. And not content with having
increased the power of the Church and lost his
friends, he now desiring the kingdom of Naples,
divided it with the king of Spain ; and where he
alone was the arbiter of Italy, he now brought in a
companion, so that the ambitious of that province
12 NICCOLO MACH1AVELLI
who were dissatisfied with him might have some one
else to appeal to ; and where he might have left
in that kingdom a king tributary to him, he dis-
possessed him in order to bring in another who was
capable of driving him out. The desire to acquire
possessions is a very natural and ordinary thing, and
when those men do it who can do so successfully,
they are always praised and not blamed, but when
they cannot and yet want to do so at all costs, they
make a mistake deserving of great blame. If
France, therefore, with her own forces could have
taken Naples, she ought to have done so ; if she
could not she ought not to have divided it. And
if the partition of Lombardy with the Venetians is
to be excused, as having been the means of allow-
ing the French king to set foot in Italy, this other
partition deserves blame, not having the excuse of
necessity. Louis had thus made these five mistakes :
he had crushed the smaller Powers, increased the
power in Italy of one ruler, brought into the land
a very powerful foreigner, and he had not come to
live there himself, nor had he established any
colonies. Still these mistakes might, if he had
lived, not have injured him, had he not made the
sixth, that of taking the state from the Venetians ;
for, if he had not strengthened the Church and
brought the Spaniards into Italy, it would have
been right and necessary to humble them ; having
once taken those measures, he ought never to have
consented to their ruin ; because, had the Venetians
been strong, it would have kept the others from
making attempts on Lombardy, partly because the
Venetians would not have consented to any measures
by which they did not get it for themselves, and
partly because the others would not have wanted to
take it from France to give it to Venice, and would
not have had the courage to attack both.
If any one urges that King Louis yielded the
Romagna to Alexander and the kingdom to Spain
THE PRINCE 13
in order to avoid war, I reply, with the reasons
already given, that one ought never to allow a dis-
order to take place in order to avoid war, for war is
not thereby avoided, but only deferred to your dis-
advantage. And if others allege the promise given
by the king to the pope to undertake that enter-
prise for him, in return for the dissolution of his
marriage and for the cardinalship of Rohan, I reply
with what I shall say later on about the faith of
princes and how it is to be observed. Thus King
Louis lost Lombardy through not observing any of
those conditions which have been observed by others
who have taken provinces and wished to retain
them. Nor is this any miracle, but very reasonable
and natural. I spoke of this matter with Cardinal
Rohan at Nantes when Valentine, as Cesare Borgia,
son of Pope Alexander, was commonly called, was
occupying the Romagna, for on Cardinal Rohan
saying to me that the Italians did not understand
war, I replied that the French did not understand
politics, for if they did they would never allow the
Church to become so great. And experience shows
us that the greatness in Italy of the Church and
also of Spain have been caused by France, and her
ruin has proceeded from them. From which may be
drawn a general rule, which never or very rarely
fails, that whoever is the cause of another becoming
powerful, is ruined himself ; for that power is pro-
duced by him either through craft or force ; and
both of these are suspected jby the one that has
become powerful.
CHAPTER IV
THE KINGDOM OP DARIUS, OCCUPIED BY ALEX-
ANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS
OF THE LATTER AFTER HIS DEATH.
CONSIDERING the difficulties there are in holding
a newly acquired state, some may wonder how it
came to pass that Alexander the Great became
master of Asia in a few years, and had hardly
occupied it when he died, from which it might be
supposed that the whole state would have rebelled.
However, his successors maintained themselves in
possession, and had no further difficulty in doing
so than those which arose among themselves from
their own ambitions.
I reply that the kingdoms known to history have
been governed in two ways : either by a prince and
his servants, who, as ministers by his grace and
permission, assist in governing the realm ; or by a
prince and by barons, who hold their positions not
by favour of the ruler but by antiquity of blood.
Such barons have states and subjects of their own,
who recognise them as their lords, and are naturally
attached to them. In those states which are governed
by a prince and his servants, the prince possesses
more authority, because there is no one in the state
regarded as a superior besides himself, and if others
are obeyed it is merely as ministers and officials of
the prince, and no one regards them with any
14
THE PRINCE 15
special affection. Examples of these two kinds of
government in our own time are the Turk and the
King of France. All the Turkish monarchy is
governed by one ruler, the others are his servants,
and dividing his kingdom into " sangiacates/' he
sends to them various administrators, and changes
or recalls them at his pleasure. But the King of
France is surrounded by a large number of ancient
nobles, recognised as such by their subjects, and
loved by them ; they have their prerogatives, which
the king cannot deprive them of without danger to
himself. Whoever now considers these two states
will see that it would be difficult to acquire the
state of the Turk; but having conquered it, it
would be very easy to hold it.
The causes of the difficulty of occupying the
Turkish kingdom are, that the invader could not
be invited by princes of that kingdom, nor hope to
facilitate his enterprise by the rebellion of those
around him, as will be evident from reasons given
above. Because, being all slaves, and bound, it
will be more difficult to corrupt them, and even if
they were corrupted, little effect could be hoped
for, as they would not be able to carry the people
with them for the reasons mentioned. Therefore,
whoever assaults the Turk must be prepared to
meet his united forces, and must rely more on his
own strength than on the disorders of others ; but
having once conquered him, and beaten him in
battle so that he can no longer raise armies, nothing
else is to be feared except the family of the prince,
and if this is extinguished, there is no longer any
one to be feared, the others having no credit with
the people ; and as the victor before the victory
could place no hope in them, so he need not
fear them afterwards. The contrary is the case in
kingdoms governed like that of France, because it is
easy to enter them by winning over some baron of
the kingdom, there being always some malcontents,
16 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
and those desiring innovations. These can, for the
reasons stated, open the way to you and facilitate
victory ; but afterwards, if you wish to keep posses-
sion, infinite difficulties arise, both from those who
have aided you and from those you have oppressed.
Nor is it sufficient to extinguish the family of the
prince, for there remain those nobles who will make
themselves the head of new changes, and being
neither able to content them nor exterminate
them, you will Jose the state whenever an occasion
arises. Now if you will consider what was the
nature of the government of Darius you will fma
it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and tnere-
fore Alexander had first to completely overthrow it
and seize the country, after which victory, Darius
being dead, the state remained secure to Alexander,
for the reasons discussed above. And his successors,
had they remained united, might have enjoyed it
in peace, nor did any tumults arise in the kingdom
except those fomented by themselves. But it is
impossible to possess with such ease countries con-
stituted like France.
Hence arose the frequent rebellions of Spain,
France, and Greece against the Romans, owing to
the numerous principalities which existed in those
states ; for, as long as the memory of these lasted,
the Romans were always uncertain of their pos-
sessions ; but when the memory of these princi-
palities had been extinguished they became, with
the power and duration of the empire, secure pos-
sessions.
And afterwards the latter could, when fighting
among themselves, draw each one with him a portion
of these provinces, according to the authority he
had established there, and these provinces, when
the family of their ancient princes was extinct,
recognised no other rulers but the Romans. Con-
sidering these things, therefore, let no one be sur-
prised at the facility with which Alexander could hold
THE PRINCE 17
Asia, and at the difficulties that others have had in
holding acquired possessions, like Pyrrhus and many
others ; as this was not caused hy the greater or
smaller ability of the conqueror, but depended on
the dissimilarity of the conditions.
CHAPTER V
THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OB DOMINIONS THAT,
PREVIOUS TO BEING OCCUPIED, LIVED UNDER
THEIR OWN LAWS.
WHEN those states which have heen acquired are
accustomed to live at liberty under their own laws,
there are three ways of holding them. The first is
to ruin them ; the second is to go and live there in
person ; the third is to allow them to live under
their own laws, taking tribute of them, and creating
there within the country a state composed of a few
who will keep it friendly to you. Because this
state, being created by the prince, knows that it
cannot exist without his friendship and protection,
and will do all it can to keep them, and a city used
to liberty can be more easily held by means of its
citizens than in any other way, if you wish to
preserve it. There is the example of the Spartans
and the Romans. The Spartans held Athens and
Thebes by creating within them a state of a few
people ; nevertheless they lost them. The Romans,
in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia,
destroyed them, but did not lose them. They
wanted to hold Greece in almost the same way as
the Spartans held it, leaving it free and under its
own laws, but they did not succeed ; so that they
were compelled to destroy many cities in that
province in order to keep it, because in truth there
18
THE PRINCE 19
is no sure method of holding them except by ruin-
ing them. And whoever becomes the ruler of a
free city and does not destroy it, can expect to be
destroyed by it, for it can always find a motive for
rebellion in the name of liberty and of its ancient
usages, which are forgotten neither by lapse of
time nor by benefits received, and whatever one
does or provides, so long as the inhabitants are
not separated or dispersed, they do not forget that
name and those usages, but appeal to them at once
in every emergency, as did Pisa after being so
many years held in servitude by the Florentines.
But when cities or provinces have been accustomed
to live under a prince, and the family of that prince
is extinguished, being on the one hand used to
obey, ami on the other not having their old prince,
they cannot unite in choosing one from among
themselves, and they do not know how to live in
freedom, so that they are slower to take arms, and
a prince can win them over with greater facility
and establish himself securely. But in republics
there is greater life, greater hatred, and more
desire for vengeance ; they do not and cannot cast
aside the memory of their ancient liberty, so that
the surest way is either to destroy them or reside
in them.
CHAPTER VI
OF NEW DOMINIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN ACQUIRED
BY ONE'S OWN ARMS AND POWERS
LET no one marvel if in speaking of new dominions
both as to prince and state, I bring- forward very
exalted instances, for as men walk almost always
in the paths trodden by others, proceeding in their
actions by imitation, and not being always able to
follow others exactly, nor attain to the excellence
of those they imitate, a prudent man should always
follow in the path trodden by great men and
imitate those who are most excellent, so that if he
does not attain to their greatness, at any rate he
will get some tinge of it. He will do like prudent
archers, who when the place they wish to hit is too
far off, knowing how far their bow will carry, aim
at a spot much higher than the one they wish to
hit, not in order to reach this height with their
arrow, but by help of this high aim to hit the spot
they wish to. I say then that in new dominions,
where there is a new prince, it is more or less easy to
hold them according to the greater or lesser ability
of him who acquires them. And as the fact of a
private individual becoming a prince presupposes
either great ability or good fortune, it would appear
that either of these things would mitigate in part
many difficulties. Nevertheless those who have been
wanting as regards good fortune have maintained
20
THE PRINCE 21
themselves best. The matter is also facilitated by
the prince being obliged to reside personally in his
territory, having no others. But to come to those
who have become princes through their own merits
and not by fortune, I regard as the greatest,
Cyrus. Romulus, Tbqseus. and such like. And
although one should not speak of Moses, he having
merely carried out what was ordered him by God,
still he deserves admiration, if only for that grace
which made him worthy to speak with God. Cut
regarding Cyrus and others who have acquired or
founded kingdoms, they will all be found worthy
of admiration ; and if their particular actions and
methods are examined they will not appear very
different from those of Moses, although he had so
great a Master. And in examining their life and
deeds it will be seen that they owed nothing to
fortune but the opportunity which gave them matter
to be shaped into the form that they thought fit ;
and without that opportunity their powers would
have been wasted, and without their powers the
opportunity would have come in vain. It was thus
necessary that Moses should find the people of Israel
slaves in Egypt and oppressed by the Egyptians, so
that they were disposed to follow him in order to
escape from their servitude. It was necessary that
Romulus should be unable to remain in Alba, and
should have been exposed at his birth, in order
that he might become King of Rome and founder
of that nation. It was necessary that Cyrus should
find the Persians discontented with the empire of
the Medes, and the Medes weak and effeminate
through long peace. Theseus could not have
showed his abilities if he had not found the
Athenians dispersed.
These opportunities, therefore, gave these men
their chance, and their own great qualities enabled
them to profit by them, so as to ennoble their
country and augment its fortunes. Those who by
22 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
heroic means such as these hecome princes, ohtain
their dominions with difficulty but retain them
easily, and the difficulties which they have in ac-
quiring their dominions arise in part from the new
rules and regulations that they have to introduce
in order to establish their position securely. It
must be considered that there is nothing more
difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success,
nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a
new order of things. For the reformer has enemies
in all those who profit by the old order, and only
lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit
by the new order, this lukewarmness arising partly
from fear of their adversaries, who have the laws in
their favour ; and partly from the incredulity of
mankind, who do not truly believe in anything
new until they have had actual experience of it.
Thus it arises that on every opportunity for attack-
ing the reformer, his opponents do so with the zeal
of partisans, the others only defend him half-
heartedly, so that between them he runs great
danger. ' It is necessary, however, in order to
investigate thoroughly this question, to examine
whether these innovators are independent, or
whether they depend upon others, that is to say,
whether in order to carry out their designs they
have to entreat or are able to force. In the first
case they invariably succeed ill, and accomplish
nothing ; but when they can depend on their own
strength and are able to use force, they rarely fail.
Thus it comes about that all armed prophets have
conquered and unarmed ones failed ; for besides
what has been already said, the character of people
varies, and it is easy to persuade them of a thing,
but difficult to keep them in that persuasion. And
so it is necessary to order things so that when they
no longer believe, they can be made to believe by
force. Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus would
not have been able to make their institutions
THE PRINCE 23
observed for so long had they been disarmed, as
happened in our own time to Fra Girolamo
Savonarola, who failed entirely in his new rules
when the multitude began to disbelieve in him,
and he had no means of holding fast those who
had believed nor of compelling the unbelievers to
believe. Therefore such men as these have great
difficulty in making their way, and all their dangers
are met on the road and must be overcome by their
own abilities ; but when once they have overcome
them and have begun to be held in veneration,
and have suppressed those who envied them, they
remain powerful and secure, honoured and happy.
To the high examples given I will add a lesser one,
which, however, is to be compared in some measure
with them and will serve as an instance of all such
cases, that of Jerone of Syracuse, who from a
private individual became Prince of Siracusa, with-
out other aid from fortune beyond the opportunity ;
for the Siracusans being oppressed elected him as
their captain, from which by merit he was made
prince ; while still in private life his virtues were
such that it was written of him, that he lacked
nothing to reign but the kingdom. He abolished
the old militia, raised a new one, abandoned his
old friendships and formed new ones; and as he
had thus friends and soldiers of his own, he was
able on this foundation to build securely, so that
while he had great trouble in acquiring his position
he had little in maintaining it.
CHAPTER VII
OF NEW DOMINIONS ACQUIRED BY THE POWER OF
OTHERS OR BY FORTUNE
THOSE who rise from private citizens to be princes
merely by fortune have little trouble in rising- but
very much in maintaining their position. They
meet with no difficulties on the way as they fly
over them, but all their difficulties arise when
they are established. Such are they who are
granted a state either for money, or by favour of
him who grants it, as happened to many in Greece,
in the cities of Ionia and of the Hellespont, who
were created princes by Darius in order to hold
these places for his security and glory ; such were
also those emperors who from private citizens
became emperors by bribing the army. Such as
these depend absolutely on the good will and
fortune of those who have raised them, both of
which are extremely inconstant and unstable.
They neither know how to, nor are in a position to
maintain their rank, for unless he be a man of
great genius it is not likely that one who has always
lived in a private position should know how to
command, and they are unable to command because
they possess no forces which will be friendly and
faithful to them. Moreover, states quickly founded,
like all other things which are born and grow
rapidly, cannot have deep roots, so that the first
24
THE PRINCE 25
storm destroys them, unless, as already said, the
man who thus becomes a prince is of such great]
genius as to be able to take immediate steps for|
maintaining what fortune has thrown into his lap,!
and lay afterwards those foundations which others|
make before becoming princes. With regard ta
these two methods of becoming a prince, — by ability
or by good fortune, I will here adduce two examples
which have taken place within our memory, those
of Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia.
Francesco, by appropriate means and through great
abilities, from citizen became Duke of Milan, and
what he had attained after a thousand difficulties he
maintained with little trouble. On the other hand,
Cesare Borgia, commonly called Duke Valentine,
acquired the state through the fortune of his father
and by the same means lost it, and that although
every measure was adopted by him and everything
done that a prudent and capable man could do to
establish himself firmly in that state that the arms
and the favours of others had given him. For, as
we have said, he who does not lay his foundations
beforehand may by great abilities do so afterwards,
although with great trouble to the architect and
danger to the building. If, then, one considers the
progress made by the duke, it will be seen how
firm were the foundations he had laid to his future
power, which I do not think it superfluous to
examine, as I know of no better precepts for a new
prince to follow than the example of his actions ;
and if his measures were not successful, it was
through no fault of his own but only by the most
extraordinary malignity of fortune. In wishing to
aggrandise the duke his son, Alexander VI. had to
meet very great difficulties both present and future.
In the first place, he saw no way of making him
ruler of any state that was not a possession of the
Church. And in attempting to take that of the
Church, he knew that the Duke of Milan and the
26 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and
Rimini were already under the protection of the
Venetians. He saw, moreover, that the arms of
Italy, especially of those who might have served
him, were in the hands of those who would fear the
greatness of the pope, and therefore he could not
depend upon them, being all under the Orsinis and
Colonnas and their adherents. It was, therefore,
necessary to disturb the existing condition and
bring about disorders in the states of Italy in order
to obtain secure mastery over a part of them ; this
was easy, for he found the Venetians, who, actuated
by other motives, had invited the French into Italy,
which he not only did not oppose, but facilitated
by dissolving the marriage of King Louis. The
king came thus into Italy with the aid of the
Venetians and the consent of Alexander, and had
hardly arrived at Milan before the pope obtained
troops from him for his enterprise in the Romagna,
which he carried out by means of the reputation of
the king. The duke having thus obtained the
Romagna and defeated the Colonnas, was hindered
in maintaining it and proceeding further by two
things : the one, his forces, of which he doubted
the fidelity ; the other the will of France, that is to
say, he feared lest the arms of the Orsini of which
he had availed himself should fail him, and not only
hinder him in obtaining more but take from him
what he had already conquered, and he also
feared that the king might do the same. He had
evidence of this as regards the Orsini when, after
taking Faenza, he assaulted Bologna and observed
their backwardness in the assault. And as regards
the king, he perceived his designs when, after
taking the dukedom of Urbino, he attacked
Tuscany, and the king made him desist from that
enterprise ; whereupon the duke decided to depend
no longer on the fortunes and arms of others.
The first thing he did was to weaken the parties of
THE PRINCE 27
the Orsinis and Colonnas in Rome by gaining all
their adherents who were gentlemen and making
them followers of himself, by granting them large
pensions, and appointing them to commands and
offices according to their rank, so that their attach-
ment to their parties was extinguished in a few
months, and entirely concentrated on the duke.
After this he awaited an opportunity for crushing
the Orsinis, having dispersed the adherents of the
Colonna family, and when the opportunity arrived
he made good use of it, for the Orsini seeing at
length that the greatness of the duke and of the
Church meant their own ruin, convoked a diet at
Magione in the Perugino. Hence sprang the
rebellion of Urbino and the tumults in Romagna
and infinite dangers to the duke, who overcame
them all with the help of the French ; and having
regained his reputation, neither trusting France nor
other foreign forces in order not to have to oppose
them, he had recourse to stratagem. He dissembled
his aims so well that the Orsini, through the media-
tion of Signor Pavolo, made their peace with him,
which the duke spared no efforts to make secure,
presenting them with robes, money, and horses, so
that in their simplicity they were induced to come
to Sinigaglia and fell into his hands. Having thus
suppressed these leaders and made their partisans
his friends, the duke had laid a very good founda-
tion to his power, having all the Romagna with the
duchy of Urbino, and having gained the favour of
the inhabitants, who began to feel the benefit of his
rule. And as this part is worthy of note and of
imitation by others, I will not omit mention of it.
When he took the Romagna, it had previously
been governed by weak rulers,- who had rather
despoiled their subjects than governed them, and
given them more cause for disunion than for union,
so that the province was a prey to robbery, assaults,
and every kind of disorder. He, therefore, judged
28 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
it necessary to give them a good government in
order to make them peaceful and obedient to his
rule. For this purpose he appointed Messer
Remiro d' Oreo, a cruel and able man, to whom he
gave the fullest authority. This man, in a short
time, was highly successful in rendering the country
orderly and united, whereupon the duke, not
deeming such excessive authority expedient, lest
it should become hateful, appointed a civil court
of justice in the middle of the province under an
excellent president, to which each city appointed
its own advocate. And as he knew that the harsh-
ness of the past had engendered some amount of
hatred, in order to purge the minds of the people
and to win them over completely, he resolved to
show that if any cruelty had taken place it was not
by his orders, but through the harsh disposition of
his minister. And taking him on some pretext,
he had him placed one morning in the public
square at Cesena, cut in half, with a piece of wood
and blood-stained knife by his side. The ferocity
of this spectacle caused the people both satisfaction
and amazement. But to return to where we left off.
The duke being now powerful and partly secured
against present perils, being armed himself, and
having in a great measure put down those neigh-
bouring forces which might injure him, had now to
get the respect of France, if he wished to proceed
with his acquisitions, for he knew that the king,
who had lately discovered his error, would not give
him any help. He began therefore to seek fresh
alliances and to vacillate with France in the
expedition that the French made towards the
kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards, who were
besieging Gaeta. His intention was to assure
himself of them, which he would soon have suc-
ceeded in doing if Alexander had lived. These
were the measures taken by him with regard to the
present. As to the future, he feared that a new
THE PRINCE 29
successor to the Church might not be friendly
to him and might seek to deprive him of what
Alexander had given him, and he sought to provide
against this in four ways. Firstly, by destroying
all who were of the blood of those ruling families
which he had despoiled, in order to deprive the pope
of any opportunity. Secondly, by gaining the
friendship of the Roman nobles, so that he might
through them hold as it were the pope in check.
Thirdly, by obtaining as great a hold on the College
as he could. Fourthly, by acquiring such power
before the pope died as to be able to resist alone
the first onslaught. Of these four things he had at
the death of Alexander accomplished three, and the
fourth he had almost accomplished.
For of the dispossessed rulers he killed as many
as he could lay hands on, and very few escaped; he
had gained to his party the Roman nobles ; and he
had a great share in the College. As to new
possessions, he designed to become lord of Tuscany,
and already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and
had assumed the protectorate over Pisa ; and as he
had no longer to fear the French (for the French
had been deprived of the kingdom of Naples by the
Spaniards in such a way that both parties were
obliged to buy his friendship) he seized Pisa. After
this, Lucca and Siena at once yielded, partly
through envy of the Florentines and partly through
fear ; the Florentines had no resources, so that, had
he succeeded as he had done before, in the very year
that Alexander died he would have gained such
strength and renown as to be able to maintain him-
self without depending on the fortunes or strength
of others, but solely by his own power and ability.
But Alexander died five years after he had first
drawn his sword. He left him with the state of
Romagna only firmly established, and all the
other schemes in mid-air, between two very power-
ful and hostile armies, and suffering from a fatal
30 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
illness. But the valour and ability of the duke
were such, and he knew so well how to win over
men or vanquish them, and so strong were the
foundations that he had laid in this short time, that
if he had not had those two armies upon him, or else
had been in good health, he would have survived
every difficulty. And that his foundations were good
is seen from the fact that the Romagna waited for him
more than a month ; in Rome, although half dead,
he remained secure, and although the Baglioni,
Vitelli, and Orsini entered Rome they found no
followers against him. He was able, if not to make
pope whom he wished, at any rate to prevent a pope
being created whom he did not wish. But if at the
death of Alexander he had been well everything
would have been easy. And he told me on the day
that Pope Julius II. was created, that he had thought
of evei ything which might happen on the death of
his father, and provided against everything, except
that he had never thought that at his father's death
he would be dying himself. Reviewing thus all the
actions of the duke, I find nothing to blame, on the
contrary, I feel bound, as I have done, to hold him
up as an example to be imitated by all who by
fortune and with the arms of others have risen to
power. For with his great courage and high ambition
he could not have acted otherwise, and his designs
were only frustrated by the short life of Alexander
and his own illness.
Whoever, therefore, deems it necessary in his new
principality to secure himself against enemies, to
gain friends, to conquer by force or fraud, to make
himself beloved and feared by the people, followed
and reverenced by the soldiers, to destroy those
who can and may injure him, introduce innovations
into old customs, to be severe and kind, magnani-
mous and liberal, suppress the old militia, create a
new one, maintain the friendship of kings and
princes in such a way that they are glad to benefit
THE PRINCE 31
him and fear to injure him, such a one can find no
better example than the actions of this man. The
only thing he can be accused of is that in* the
creation of Julius II. he made a bad choice ; for, as
has been said, not being able to choose his own pope,
he could still prevent any one being made pope,
and he ought never to have permitted any of those
cardinals to be raised to the papacy whom he had
injured, or who when pope would stand in fear of
him. For men commit injuries either through fear
or through hate.
Those whom he had injured were, among others,
San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna, San Giorgio, and
Ascanio. All the others, if assumed to the ponti-
ficate, would have had to fear him except Rohan
and the Spaniards ; the latter through their re-
lationship and obligations to him, the former
from his great power, being related to the King of
France. For these reasons the duke ought above
all things to have created a Spaniard pope ; and if
unable to, then he should have consented to Rohan
being appointed and not San Pietro ad Vincula.
And whoever thinks that in high personages new
benefits cause old offences to be forgotten, makes a
great mistake. The duke, therefore, erred in this
choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin.
CHAPTER VIII
OF THOSE WHO HAVE ATTAINED THE POSITION OP
PRINCE BY VILLAINY
BUT as there are still two ways of becoming prince
which cannot be attributed entirely either to fortune
or to ability, they must not be passed over, although
one of them could be more fully discussed if we
were treating of republics. These are when one
becomes prince by some nefarious or villainous
means, or when a private citizen becomes the prince
of his country through the favour of his fellow-
citizens. And in speaking of the former means,
I will give two examples, one ancient, the other
modern, without entering further into the merits
of this method, as I judge them to be sufficient for
any one obliged to imitate them. Agathocles the
Sicilian rose not only from private life but from
the lowest and most abject position to be King of
Syracuse. The son of a potter, he led a life of the
utmost wickedness through all the stages of his
fortune. Nevertheless, his wickedness was accom-
panied by such vigour of mind and body that, having
joined the militia, he rose through all its grades to
be praetor of Syracuse. Having been appointed to
this position, and having decided to become prince,
and to hold with violence and without the support
of others that which had been granted him ; and
having imparted his design to Hamilcar the Car-
32
THE PRINCE 33
thaginian, who with his armies was fighting in
Sicily, he called together one morning the people
and senate of Syracuse, as if he had to deliberate
on matters of importance to the republic, and at a
given signal had all the senators and the richest
men of the people killed by his soldiers ; after their
death he occupied and held rule over the city
without any civil disorders. And although he was
twice beaten by the Carthaginians and ultimately
besieged, he was able not only to defend the city,
but leaving a portion of his forces for its defence,
with the remainder he invaded Africa, and in a
short time liberated Syracuse from the siege and
Drought the Carthaginians to great extremities, so
that they were obliged to come to terms with him,
and remain contented with the possession of Africa,
leaving Sicily to Agathocles. Whoever considers,
therefore, the actions and qualities of this man,
will see few if any things which can be attributed
to fortune ; for, as above stated, it was not by the
favour of any person, but through the grades of
the militia, which he had gained with a thousand
hardships and perils, that he arrived at the position
of prince, which he afterwards maintained by so
many courageous and perilous expedients. It can-
not be called a virtue to kill one's fellow-citizens,
betray one's friends, be without faith, without pity,
and without religion, by which methods one may
indeed gain an empire, but not glory. For if the
virtuesofAgathoclesinbraviugandovercomingperils,
and his greatness of soul in supporting and sur-
mounting obstacles be considered, one sees no reason
for holding him inferior to any of the most renowned
captains. Nevertheless his barbarous cruelty and
inhumanity, together with his countless atrocities,
do not permit of his being named among the most
famous men. We cannot attribute to fortune or
merit that which he achieved without either. In
our own times, during the reign of Alexander VI.,
D
34 NICCOLO MACHIAVELL1
Oliverotto du Fermo had been left a young boy
under the care of his maternal uncle, Giovanni
Fogliani, who brought him up, and sent him in
early youth to fight under Paolo Vitelli, in order
that he might, under that discipline, obtain a
good military position. On the death of Paolo he
fought under his brother Vitellozzo, and in a very
short time, being of great intelligence, and active in
mind and body, he became one of the leaders of
his troops. But deeming it servile to be under
others, he resolved, with the help of some citizens
of Fermo, who preferred servitude to the liberty of
their country, and with the favour of the Vitellis,
to occupy Fermo; he therefore wrote to Giovanni
Fogliaui, how, having been for many years away
from home, he wished to come to see him and his
city, and in some measure to revisit his estates.
And as he had only laboured to gain honour, in
order that his fellow-citizens might see that he
had not spent his time in vain, he wished to come
honourably accompanied by one hundred horsemen,
his friends and followers, and prayed him that he
would be pleased to order that he should be
received with honour by the citizens of Fermo, by
which he would honour not only him, Oliverotto,
but also himself, as he had been his pupil.
Giovanni did not fail in any duty towards his
nephew ; he caused him to* be honourably received
by the people of Fermo, and lodged him in his
own houses. After waiting some days to arrange
all that was necessary to his villainous projects,
Oliverotto invited Giovanni Fogliani and all the
principal men of Fermo to a grand banquet. After
the dinner and the entertainments usual at such
feasts, Oliverotto artfully introduced certain im-
portant matters of discussion, speaking of the
greatness of Pope Alexander, and of his sou Cesare,
and of their enterprises. To which discourses
Giovanni and others having replied, he all at once
THE PRINCE 35
rose, saying that these matters should be spoken of
in a more secret place, and withdrew into a room
where Giovanni and the other citizens followed him.
They were no sooner seated than soldiers rushed
out of hiding-places and killed Giovanni and all the
others. After which massacre Oliverotto mounted
his horse, rode through the town and besieged the
chief magistrate in his palace, so that through fear
they were obliged to obey him and form a govern-
ment, of which he made himself prince. And all
those being dead who, if discontented, could injure
him, he fortified himself with new orders, civil and
military, in such a way that within the year that
he held the principality he was not only safe him-
self in the city of Fermo, but had become formid-
able to all his neighbours. And his overthrow
would have been difficult, like that of Agathocles, if
he had not allowed himself to be deceived by Cesare
Borgia, when he besieged the Orsinis and Vitellis
at Sinigaglia, as already related, where he also was
taken, one year after the parricide he had committed,
and strangled, together with Vitellozzo, who had
been his teacher in ability and atrocity. Some may
wonder how it came about that Agathocles, and others
like him, could, after infinite treachery and cruelty,
live secure for many years in their country and
defend themselves from external enemies without
being conspired against by their subjects ; although
many others have, through their cruelty, been
unable to maintain their position in times of peace,
not to speak of the uncertain times of war.
I believe this arises from the cruelties being used
well or badly. Well used may be called those (if it
is permissible to use the word well of evil) which are
committed once for the need of securing one's self,
and which afterwards are not persisted in, but are
exchanged for measures as useful to the subjects as
possible. Cruelties ill used are those which , although
at first few, increase rather than diminish with
36 NICCOL6 MACHIAVELL1
time. Those who follow the former method may
remedy in some measure their condition, both with
God and man ; as did Agathocles. As to the others,
it is impossible for them to maintain themselves.
Whence it is to be noted, that in taking a state
the conqueror must arrange to commit all his
cruelties at once, so as not to have to recur to them
every day, and so as to be able, by not making fresh
changes, to reassure people and win them over by
benefiting them. Whoever acts otherwise, either
through timidity or bad counsels, is always obliged
to stand with knife in hand, and can never depend
on his subjects, because they, through continually
fresh injuries, are unable to depend upon him.
For injuries should be done all together, so that
being less tasted, they will give less offence.
Benefits should be granted little by little, so that
they may be better enjoyed. And above all, a prince
must live with his subjects in such a way that no
accident should make him change it, for good or
fevil ; for necessity arising in adverse times, you are
;not in time with severity, and the good that you
,do does not profit you, as it is judged to be forced,
land you will derive no benefit whatever from it.
CHAPTER IX
OF THE CIVIC PRINCIPALITY
BUT we now come to the case where a citizen
becomes prince not through crime or intolerable
violence, but by the favour of his fellow-citizens,
which may be called a civic principality. To
arrive at this position depends not entirely oa
worth or entirely on fortune, but rather on cunning'
assisted by fortune. One attains it by help of
popular favour or by the favour of the aristocracy.
For in every city these two opposite parties are to-
be found, arising from the desire of the populace ta
avoid the oppression of the great, and the desire of
the great to command and oppress the people.
And from these two opposing interests arises in the-
city one of three effects : either absolute govern-
ment, liberty, or license. The former is created
either by the populace or the nobility depending
on the relative opportunities of the two parties ; for
when the nobility see that they are unable to resist
the people they unite in creating one of their
number prince, so as to be able to carry out their
own designs under the shadow of his authority.
The populace, on the other hand, when unable to
resist the nobility, endeavour to create a prince in
order to be protected by his authority. He who
becomes prince by help of the nobility has greater
difficulty in maintaining his power than he who is
37
38 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
raised by the populace, for he is surrounded by
those who think themselves his equals, and is thus
unable to direct or command as he pleases. But
one who is raised to the leadership by popular
favour finds himself alone, and has no one or very
few who are not ready to obey him. Besides
which, it is impossible to satisfy the nobility by
fair dealing and without inflicting injury on others,
whereas it is very easy to satisfy the mass of the
people in this way. For the aim of the people is
more honest than that of the nobility, the latter
desiring to oppress, and the former merely to avoid
oppression. It must also be added that the prince
can never insure himself against a hostile populace
on account of their number, but he can against the
hostility of the great, as they are but few. The
worst that a prince has to expect from a hostile
people is to be abandoned, but from hostile nobles
ne has to fear not only abandonment but their
active opposition, and as they are more far-seeing
and more cunning, they are always in time to save
themselves and take sides with the one who they
expect will conquer. The prince is, moreover,
obliged to live always with the same people, but he
can easily do without the same nobility, being able
to make and unmake them at any time, and increase
their position or deprive them of it as he pleases.
And to throw further light on this part, I would
say, that the nobles are to be considered in two
different manners ; that is, they are either to be ruled
so as to make them entirely depend on your fortunes,
or else not. Those that are thus bound to you and
are not rapacious, must be honoured and loved ;
those who are not bound must be considered in
two ways, they either do this through pusillanimity
and natural want of courage, and in this case you
ought to make use of them, and especially such as
are of good counsel, so that they may honour you
in prosperity and in adversity you have not to fear
THE PRINCE 39
them. But when they are not bound to you of set
purpose and for ambitious ends, it is a sign that
they think more of themselves than of you ; and
from such men the prince must guard himself and
look upon them as secret enemies, who will help to
ruin him when in adversity. One, however, who
becomes prince by favour of the populace, must
maintain its friendship, which he will lind easy, the
people asking nothing but not to be oppressed.
But one who against the people's wishes becomes
prince by favour of the nobles, should above all
endeavour to gain the favour of the people ; this
will be easy to him if he protects them. And as
men, who receive good from those they expected
evil from, feel under a greater obligation to their
benefactor, so the subject populace will become
even better disposed towards him than if he had
become prince through their favour. The prince
can win their favour in many ways, which vary
according to circumstances, for which no certain
rule can be given, and will therefore be passed over.
I will only say, in conclusion, that it is necessary
for a prince to possess the friendship of the people ;
otherwise he has no resource in times of adversity.
Nabis, prince of the Spartans, sustained a siege
by the whole of Greece and a victorious Roman
army, and defended against them his country and
maintained his own position. It sufficed when the
danger arose for him to make sure of a few, which
would not have been enough if the populace had
been hostile to him. And let no one oppose my
opinion in this by quoting the trite proverb, ' ' He
who builds on the people, builds on mud " ; because
that is true when a private citizen relies upon the
people and persuades himself that they will liberate
him if he is oppressed by enemies or by the magis-
trates ; in this case he might often find himself
deceived, as happened in Rome to the Gracchi and
in Florence to Messer Georgio Scali.
40 N1CCOLO MACHIAVELLI
But when it is a prince who founds himself on
this basis,, one who can command and is a man of
courage, and does not get frightened in adversity,
and does not neglect other preparations, and one
who by his own courage and measures animates
the mass of the people, he will not find himself
deceived by them, and he will find that he has laid
his foundations well. Usually these principalities
are in danger when the prince from the position oi
a civil ruler changes to an absolute one, for these
princes either command themselves or by means
of magistrates. In the latter case their position
is weaker and more dangerous, for they are at
the mercy of those citizens who are appointed
magistrates, who can, especially in times of
adversity, with great facility deprive them of their
position, either by acting against them or by not
obeying them. The prince is not in time, in such
dangers, to assume absolute authority, for the
citizens and subjects who are accustomed to take
their orders from the magistrates are not ready in
these emergencies to obey his, and he will always
in doubtful times lack men whom he can rely on.
Such a prince cannot base himself on what he sees
in quiet times, when the citizens have need of the
state ; for then every one is full of promises and
each one is ready to die for him when death is far
off ; but in adversity, when the state has need of
citizens, then he will find but few. And this
experience is the more dangerous, in that it can
only be had once. Therefore a wise prince will
seek means by which his subjects will always and in
every possible condition of things have need of his
government, and then they will always be faithful
to him.
CHAPTER X
HOW THE STRENGTH OP ALL STATES SHOULD
BE MEASURED
IN examining the character of these principalities
it is necessary to consider another point, namely,
whether the prince has such a position as to be
able in case of need to maintain himself alone, or
whether he has always need of the protection of
others. The better to explain this I would say,
that I consider those capable of maintaining them-
selves alone who can, through abundance of men or
money, put together a sufficient army, and hold
the field against any one who assails them ; and I
consider to have need of others, those who cannot
take the field against their enemies, but are obliged
to take refuge within their walls and stand on the
defensive. We have already discussed the former
case and will speak in future of it as occasion arises.
In the second case there is nothing to be said
except to encourage such a prince to provision and
fortify his own town, and not to trouble about the
country. And whoever has strongly fortified his
town and, as regards the government of his sub-
jects, has proceeded as we have already described
and will further relate, will be attacked with great
reluctance, for men are always averse to enterprises
in which they foresee difficulties, and it can never
appear easy to attack one who has his town well
41
42 N1CCOLO MACHIAVELL1
guarded and is not hated by the people. The
cities of Germany are extremely liberal, have little
surrounding country, and obey the emperor when
they choose, and they do not fear him or any other
potentate that they have about them. They are
fortified in such a manner that every one thinks
that to reduce them would be tedious and difficult,
for they all have the necessary moats and bastions,
sufficient artillery, and always keep in the public
storehouses food and drink and fuel for one year.
Beyond which, to keep the lower classes satisfied,
and without loss to the public, they have always
enough means to give them work for one year in
these employments which form the nerve and life
of the town, and in the industries by which the
lower classes live ; military exercises are still held
in reputation, and many regulations are in force
for maintaining them. 'A prince, therefore, who
possesses a strong city and does not make himself
hated, cannot be assaulted ; and if he were to be
so, the assailant would be obliged to retire shame-
fully ; for so many things change, that it is almost
impossible for any one to hold the field for a year
with his armies idle. And to those who urge that
the people, having their possessions outside and
seeing them burnt, will not have patience, and
the long siege and self-interest will make them
forget their prince, I reply that a powerful and
courageous prince will always overcome those
difficulties by now raising the hopes of his subjects
that the evils will not last long, now impressing
them with fear of the enemy's cruelty, now by
dextrously assuring himself of those who appear
too bold. Besides which, the enemy would naturally
burn and ruin the country on first arriving and in
the time when men's minds are still hot and eager
to defend themselves, and therefore the prince has
still less to fear, for after some days, when people
have cooled down, the damage is done, the evil has
THE PRINCE 43
been suffered, and there is no remedy, so that they
are the more ready to unite with their prince, as it
appears that he is under an obligation to them,
their houses having been burnt and their possessions
ruined in his defence.
It is the nature of men to be us much bound by
the benefits that they confer as by those they receive.
From which it follows that, everything considered,
a prudent prince will not find it difficult to uphold
the courage of his subjects both at the commence-
ment and during a state of siege, if he possesses
provisions and means to defend himself.
CHAPTER XI
OP ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES
IT now remains to us only to speak of ecclesiastical
principalities, with regard to which the difficulties
lie wholly before they are possessed. They are
acquired either by ability or by fortune; but are
maintained without either, for they are sustained
by the ancient religious customs, which are so
powerful and of such quality, that they keep their
princes in power in whatever manner they proceed
and live. These alone have a state without defend-
ing it, have subjects without governing them, and
the states, not being defended, are not taken from
them ; the subjects not being governed do not
disturb themselves, and neither think of nor are
capable of alienating themselves from them. Only
these principalities, therefore, are secure and happy.
But as they are upheld by higher causes, which the
human mind cannot attain to, I will abstain from
speaking of them ; for being exalted and maintained
by God, it would be the work of a presumptuous
and foolish man to discuss them.
However, I might be asked how it has come about
that the Church has reached such great temporal
power, when, previous to Alexander VI. , the Italian
potentates, — and not merely the really powerful
ones, but every lord or baron, however insignificant,
held it in slight esteem as regards temporal power ;
44
THE PRINCE 45
whereas now it is dreaded by a king of France,
whom it has been able to drive out of Italy, and
has also been able to ruin the Venetians. There-
fore, although this is well known, I do not think
it superfluous to call it to mind. Before Charles,
King of France, came into Italy, this country was
under the rule of the pope, the Venetians, the
King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and the
Florentines. These potentates had to have two
chief cares : one, that no foreigner should enter
Italy by force of arms, the other that none of the
existing governments should extend its dominions.
Those chiefly to be watched were the pope and the
Venetians. To keep back the Venetians required
the ruin of all the others, as in the defence of
Ferrara, and to keep down the pope they made
use of the Roman barons. These were divided into
two factions, the Orsinis and the Colonnas, and as
there was constant quarrelling between them, and
they were constantly under arms, before the eyes
of the pope, they kept the papacy weak and infirm.
And although there arose now and then a resolute
pope like Sextus, yet his fortune or ability was
never able to liberate him from these evils. The
shortness of their life was the reason of this, for in
the course of ten years which, as a general rule, a
pope lived, he had great difficulty in suppressing
even one of the factions, and if, for example, a
pope had almost put down the Colonnas, a new
pope would succeed who was hostile to the Orsinis,
which caused the Colonnas to spring up again, and
he was not in time to suppress them. This caused
the temporal power of the pope to be of little
esteem in Italy.
Then arose Alexander VI. who, of all the pontiffs
who have ever reigned, best showed how a pope
might prevail both by money and by force. With
Duke Valentine as his instrument, and on the
occasion of the French invasion, he did all that I
46 NICCOLO MACHIAVELL1
have previously described in speaking of the actions
of the duke. And although his object was to
aggrandise not the Church but the duke, what he
did resulted in the aggrandisement of the Church,
which after the death of the duke became the
heir of his labours. Then came Pope Julius, who
found the Church powerful, possessing all Romagna,
all the Roman barons suppressed, and the factions
destroyed by the severity of Alexander, He also
found the way open for accumulating wealth in
ways never used before the time of Alexander.
These measures were not only followed by Julius,
but increased ; he resolved to gain Bologna, put
down the Venetians and drive the French from
Italy, in all which enterprises he was successful.
He merits the greater praise, as he did everything
to increase the power of the Church and not of
any private person. He also kept the Orsini and
Colonna parties in the conditions in which he
found them, and although there were some leaders
among them who might have made changes, there
were two things that kept them steady : one, the
greatness of the Church, which they dreaded ; the
other, the fact that they had no cardinals, who are
the origin of the tumults among them. For these
parties are never at rest when they have cardinals.
for these stir up the parties both within Rome and
outside, and the barons are forced to defend them.
Thus from the ambitions of prelates arise the dis-
cords and tumults among the barons. His holiness,
Pope Leo X. , therefore, has found the pontificate in
a very powerful condition, from which it is hoped,
that as those popes made it great by force of
armies, so he through his goodness and infinite
other virtues will make it both great and venerated.
CHAPTER Xll
THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF MILITIA AND
MERCENARY SOLDIERS
HAVING now discussed fully the qualities of
these principalities of which I proposed to treat,
and partially considered the causes of their pro-
sperity or failure, and having also showed the
methods hy which many have sought to obtain
such states, it now remains for me to treat generally
of the methods of attack and defence that can be
used in each of them. We have said already how
necessary it is for a prince to have his foundations
good, otherwise he is certain to be ruined. The
chief foundations of all states, whether new, old,
or mixed, are good laws and good arms. And
as there cannot be good laws where there are not
good arms, and where there are good arms there
should be good laws, I will not now discuss the
laws, but will speak of the arms. I say, therefore,
that the arms by which a prince defends his posses-
sions are either his own, or else mercenaries, or
auxiliaries, or mixed. The mercenaries and auxil-
iaries are useless and dangerous, and if any one
keeps his state based on the arms of mercenaries,
he will never stand firm or sure, as they are dis-
united, ambitious, without discipline, faithless, bold
amongst friends, cowardly amongst enemies, they
have no fear of God, and keep no faith with men.
47
48 NICCOL6 MACHIAVELLI
Ruin is only deferred as long as the assault is post-
poned ; in peace you are despoiled by them, and in
war by the enemy. The cause of this is that they
have no love or other motive to keep them in the
field beyond a trifling wage, which is not enough to
make them ready to die for you. They are quite
willing to be your soldiers so long as you do not
make war, but when war comes, it is either fly or
be off. I ought to have little trouble in proving
this, since the ruin of Italy is now caused by
nothing else but through her having relied for
many years on mercenary arms. These were some-
what improved in a few cases, and appeared courage-
ous among themselves, but when the foreigner
came they showed their worthlessness. Thus it
came about that King Charles of France was allowed
to take Italy without the slightest trouble, and those
who said that it was owing to our sins, spoke the
truth, but it was not the sins that they believed
but those that I have related. And as it was the
sins of princes, they too have suffered the punish-
ment I will explain more fully the defects of
these arms. Mercenary captains are either very
capable men or not ; if they are, you cannot rely
upon them, for they will always aspire to their own
greatness, either by oppressing you, their master,
or by oppressing others against your intentions ;
but if the captain is not an able man, he will
generally ruin you. And if it is replied to this,
that whoever has armed forces will do the same,
whether these are mercenary or not, 1 would reply
that as armies are to be used either by a prince or
by a republic, the prince must go in person to take
the position of captain, and the republic must send
its own citizens. If the one sent turns out incom-
petent, it must change him ; and if capable, keep
him by law from going beyond the proper limits.
And it is seen by experience that only princes and
armed republics make very great progress, whereas
THE PRINCE 49
mercenary forces do nothing but damage, and also
an armed republic submits less easily to the rule of
one of its citizens than a republic armed by foreign
forces. Rome and Sparta were for many centuries
well armed and free. The Swiss are well armed
and enjoy great freedom. As an example of mer-
cenary armies in antiquity there are the Cartha-
ginians, who were oppressed by their mercenary
soldiers, after the termination of the first war
with the Romans, even while they still had their
own citizens as captains. Philip of Macedon was
made captain of their forces by the Thebans after
the death of Epaminondas, and after gaining the
victory he deprived them of liberty. The Milanese,
on the death of Duke Philip, hired Francesco
Sforza against the Venetians, who having overcome
the enemy at Caravaggio, allied himself with them
to oppress the Milanese his employers. The father
of this Sforza, being a soldier in the service of the
Queen Giovanna of Naples, left her suddenly un-
armed, by which she was compelled, in order not
to lose the kingdom, to throw herself into the
arms of the King of Aragon. And if the Venetians
and Florentines have in times past increased their
dominions by means of such forces, and their
captains have not made themselves princes but
have defended them, I reply that the Florentines
in this case have been favoured by chance, for of
the capable leaders whom they might have feared,
some did not conquer, some met with opposition,
and others directed their ambition elsewhere. The
one who did not conquer was Sir John Hawkwood,
whose fidelity could not be known as he was not
victorious, but every one will admit that, had he con-
quered, the Florentines would have been athismercy.
Sforza had always the Bracceschi against him, they
being constantly at enmity. Francesco directed
his ambition towards Lombardy ; Braccio against
the Church and the kingdom of Naples. But let
60 NICCOL6 MACHIAVELL1
us look at what followed a short time ago. The
Florentines appointed Paolo Vitelli their captain,
a man of great prudence, who had risen from a
private station to the highest reputation. If he
had taken Pisa no one can deny that it was highly
important for the Florentines to retain his friend-
ship, because had he become the soldier of their
enemies they would have had no means of opposing
him ; and in order to retain him they would have
been obliged to obey him. As to the Venetians, if
one considers the progress they made, it will be
seen that they acted surely and gloriously so long
as they made war with their own forces; that it
was before they commenced their enterprises on
land that they fought courageously with their own
gentlemen and armed populace, but when they
began to fight on laud they abandoned this virtue,
and began to follow the Italian custom. And at
the commencement of their land conquests they
had not much to fear from their captains, their
land possessions not being very large, and their
reputation being great, but as their possessions
increased, as they did under Carmagnola, they had
an example of their mistake. For seeing that he was
very powerful, after he had defeated the Duke of
Milan, and knowing, on the other hand, that he was
not enterprising in warfare, they considered that
they would not make any more conquests with him,
and they neither would nor could dismiss him, for
fear of losing what they had already gained. They
were therefore obliged, in order to make sure
of him, to have him killed. They then had for
captains Bartolommeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San
Severino, Count di Pitigliano, and such like, from
whom they had to fear loss instead of gain, as
happened subsequently at Vaila, where in one day
they lost what they had laboriously gained in eight
hundred years ; for with these forces, only slow
and trifling acquisitions are made, but sudden
THE PRINCE 51
and miraculous losses. And as I have cited these
examples from Italy, which has now for many years
been governed by mercenary forces, I will now deal
more largely with them, so that having seen their
origin and progress, they can be better remedied.
You must understand that in these latter times, as
soon as the empire began to be repudiated in Italy
and the pope to gain greater reputation in temporal
matters, Italy was divided into many states ; many
of the principal cities took up arms against their
nobles, who, favoured by the emperor, had held them
in subjection, and the Church encouraged this in
order to increase its temporal power. In many
other cities one of the inhabitants became prince.
Thus Italy having fallen almost entirely into the
hands of the Church and a few republics, and the
priests and other citizens not being accustomed to
bear arms, they began to hire foreigners as soldiers.
The first to bring reputation for this kind of
militia was Alberigo da Como, a native of Romagna.
The discipline of this man produced, among others,
Braccio and Sforza, who were in their day the
arbiters of Italy. After these came all those
others who up to the present day have commanded
the armies of Italy, and the result of their prowess
has been that Italy has been overrun by Charles,
preyed on by Louis, tyrannised over by Ferrando,
and insulted by the Swiss. The system adopted by
them was, in the first place, to increase their own
reputation by discrediting the infantry. They did
this because, as they had no country and lived on
their earnings, a few foot soldiers did not augment
their reputation, and they could not maintain a large
number and therefore they restricted themselves
almost entirely to cavalry, by which with a smaller
number they were well paid and honoured. They
reduced things to such a state that in an army
of 20,000 soldiers there were not 2000 foot.
They had also used every means to spare them-
52 NICCOLO MACHIAVELL1
selves and the soldiers any hardship or fear by not
killing each other in their encounters, but taking
prisoners without a blow. They made no attacks
on fortifications by night ; and those in the fortifica-
tions did not attack the tents at night, they made
no stockades on ditches round their camps, and did
not take the field in winter. All these things were
permitted by their military rules, and adopted, as
we have said, to avoid trouble and danger, so that
they have reduced Italy to slavery and degradation.
CHAPTER XIII
OF AUXILIARY, MIXED, AND NATIVE TROOPS
AUXILIARY forces, which are the other kind of
useless forces, are when one calls on a potentate to
come and aid one with his troops, as was done in
recent times by Julius, who seeing the wretched
failure of his mercenary forces, in his Ferrara
enterprise, had recourse to auxiliaries, and arranged
with Ferrando, King of Spain, that he should help
him with his armies. These forces may be good in
themselves, but they are always dangerous for those
who borrow them, for if they lose you are defeated,
and if they conquer you remain their prisoner.
And although ancient history is full of examples of
this, I will not depart from the example of Pope
Julius II., which is still fresh. Nothing could
be less prudent than the course lie adopted ; for,
wishing to take Ferrara, he put himself entirely
into the power of a foreigner. But by good fortune
there arose a third cause which prevented him
reaping the effects of his bad choice ; for when
his auxiliaries were beaten at Ravenna, the Swiss
rose up and drove back the victors, against all
expectation of himself or others, so that he was not
taken prisoner by the enemy which had fled, nor
by his own auxiliaries, having conquered by other
arms than theirs. The Florentines, being totally
disarmed, hired 10,000 Frenchmen to attack Pisa,
53
54 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
by which measure they ran greater risk than at any
period of their struggles. The emperor of Con-
stantinople, to oppose his neighbours, put 10,000
Turks into Greece, who after the war would not go
away again, which was the beginning of the servi-
tude of Greece to the infidels. Any one, therefore,
who wishes not to conquer, would do well to use
these forces, which are much more dangerous than
mercenaries, as with them ruin is complete, for they
are all united, and owe obedience to others, whereas
with mercenaries, when they have conquered, it
requires more time and a good opportunity for them
to injure you, as they do not form a single body and
have been engaged and paid by you, therefore a
third party that you have made leader cannot at
once acquire enough authority to be able to injure
you. In a word, the greatest dangers with mercen-
aries lies in their cowardice and reluctance to fight,
but with auxiliaries the danger lies in their courage.
A wise prince, therefore, always avoids these forces
and has recourse to his own, and would prefer
rather to lose with his own men than conquer with
the forces of others, not deeming it a true victory
which is gained by foreign arms. I never hesitate
to cite the example of Cesare Borgia and his actions.
This duke entered Romagna with auxiliary troops,
leading forces composed entirely of French soldiers,
and with these he took Imola and Forli ; but as
they seemed unsafe, he had recourse to mercenaries,
and hired the Orsini and Vitelli ; afterwards finding
these uncertain to handle, unfaithful and dangerous,
he suppressed them, and relied upon his own men.
And the difference between these forces can be
easily seen if one considers the difference between
the reputation of the duke when he had only the
French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and
when he had to rely on himself and his own
soldiers. His reputation will be found to have
constantly increased, and he was never so highly
THE PRINCE 55
esteemed as when every one saw that he was the
sole master of his forces.
I do not wish to go away from re< ent Italian
instances, but I cannot omit Hiero of Syracuse,
whom I have already mentioned. This man being1,
as I said, made head of the army by the Syracusaris,
immediately recognised the uselessness of that
mercenary militia which was composed like our
Italian mercenary troops, and as he thought it
unsafe either to retain them or dismiss them, he
had them cut in pieces and thenceforward made war
with his own arms and not those of others. I would
also call to mind a figure out of the Old Testament
which well illustrates this point. When David
offered to Saul to go and fight with the Philistine
champion Goliath, Saul, to encourage him, armed
him with his own arms, which when David had
tried on he refused saying, that with them he could
not fight so well ; he preferred, therefore, to face the
enemy with his own sling and knife. In short, the
arms of others either fail away from you, or orer-
burden you, or else impede you. Charles VI II., father
of King Louis XI., having through good fortune and
bravery liberated France from the English, recog-
nised this necessity of being armed with his cwu
forces, and established in his kingdom a system of
men-at-arms and infantry. Afterwards King Louis
his son abolished the infantry and began to hire
Swiss, which mistake being followed byothers is, as
may now be seen, a cause of danger to that kingdom.
For by giving such reputation to the Swiss, France
has disheartened all her own troops, the infantry
having been abolished and the men-at-arms being
obliged to foreigners for assistance ; for being
accustomed to fight with Swiss troops, they think
they cannot conquer without them. Whence it
comes that the French are insufficiently strong to
oppose the Swiss, and without the aid of the Swiss
they will not venture against others. The armies
56 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
of the French are thus of a mixed kind, partly
mercenary and partly her own ; taken together
they are much better than troops entirely composed
of mercenaries or auxiliaries, but much inferior to
national forces.
CHAPTER XIV
WHAT THE DUTIES OF A PRINCE ARE WITH REGARD
TO THE MILITIA
A PRINCE should therefore have no other aim or
thought, nor take up any other thing for his study,
but war and its order and discipline, for that is the
only art that is necessary to one who commands,
and it is of such virtue that it not only maintains
those who are born princes, but often enables men
of private fortune to attain to that rank. And one
sees, on the other hand, that when princes think
more of luxury than of arms, they lose their state.
The chief cause which makes any one lose it, is the
contempt of this art, and the way to acquire it is
to be well versed in the same. Francesco Sforza,
through being well armed, became, from a private
position, Duke of Milan ; his sons, through wishing
to avoid the fatigue and hardship of war, from
dukes became private persons. For among other
evils caused by being disarmed, it renders you con-
temptible ; which is one of those disgraceful things
which a prince must guard against, as will be ex-
plained later. Because there is no comparison
whatever between an armed man and a disarmed
one ; it is not reasonable to suppose that one who
is armed will obey willingly one who is unarmed ;
or that any unarmed man will remain safe among
armed servants. For one being disdainful and the
57
<58 NICCOLO MACHIAVELL1
other suspicious, it is not possible for them to act
well together. And yet a prince who is ignorant
of military matters, besides the other misfortunes
already mentioned, cannot be esteemed by his
soldiers, nor have confidence in them. He ought,
therefore, never to let his thoughts stray from
the exercise of war; and in peace he ought to
practise it more than in war, which he can do in
two ways : both by action and by study. As to
action, he must, besides keeping his men well
•disciplined and exercised, engage continually in
hunting, and thus accustom his body to hardships ;
^.nd on the other hand learn the nature of the land,
how the mountains rise, how the valleys are dis-
posed, where the plains lie, and understand the
nature of the rivers and swamps, and to this he
should devote great attention. This knowledge is
useful in two ways. In the first place, one learns to
know one's country, and can the better see how to
defend it. Then by means of the knowledge and
experience gained in one locality, one can easily
understand any other that it may be necessary to
venture on, for the hills and valleys, plains and
rivers of Tuscany, for instance, have a certain
resemblance to those of other provinces, so that
from a knowledge of the country in one province
-one can easily arrive at a knowledge of others.
And that prince who is lacking in this skill is
wanting in the first essentials of a leader ; for it is
this which teaches how to find the enemy, take up
quarters, lead armies, arrange marches and occupy
positions with advantage. Philopoemen, prince of
the Achaei, among other praises bestowed on him
by writers, is lauded because in times of peace he
thought of nothing but the methods of warfare,
-and when he was in the country with his friends,
he often stopped and asked them : If the enemy
were on that hill and we found ourselves here with
our army, which of us would have the advantage ?
THE PRINCE 59
How could we safely approach him maintaining our
order? If we wished to retire, what ought we to
do? If they retired, how should we follow them?
And he put before them as they went along all the
cases that might happen to an army, heard their
opinion, gave his own, fortifying it by argument ;
so that through these continued cogitations there
could never happen any incident when leading his
armies for which he was not prepared. But as to
exercise for the mind, the prince ought to read
history and study the actions of eminent men, see
how they acted in warfare, examine the causes of
their victories and losses in order to imitate the
former and avoid the latter, and above all, do as
some eminent men have done in the past, who have
imitated some one, who has been much praised and
glorified, and have always kept their deeds and
actions before them, as they say Alexander the
Great imitated Achilles, Caesar Alexander, and
Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of Cyrus
written by Xenophon, will perceive in the life of
Scipio how gloriously he imitated him, and how, in
chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio
conformed to those qualities of Cyrus described by
Xenophon.
A wise prince should follow similar methods and
never remain idle in peaceful times, but by industry
make such good use of the time as may serve him
in adversity, so that when fortune changes she
may find him prepared to resist her blows.
CHAPTER XV
OF THE THINGS FOB WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY
PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED
IT remains now to be seen what are the methods
and rules for a prince as regards his subjects and
friends. And as I know that many have written
of this, I fear that my writing about it may be
deemed presumptuous, differing as I do, especi-
ally in this matter, from the opinions of others.
But my intention being to write something of
use to those who understand it, it appears to me
more proper to go to the real truth of the matter
than to its imagination ; and many have imagined
republics and principalities which have never been
seen or known to exist in reality ; for how we live
is so far removed from how we ought to live, that
he who abandons what is done for what ought to
be done, will rather learn to bring about his own
ruin than his preservation. A man who wishes to
make a profession of goodness in everything must
necessarily come to grief among so many who are
not good. Therefore it is necessary for a prince,
who wishes to maintain himself, to learn how not
to be good, and to use it and not use it according
to the necessity of the case. Leaving on one side
then those things which concern only an imaginary
prince, and speaking of those that are real, I state
that all men, when spoken of, and especially
60
THE PRINCE 61
princes, who are placed at a greater height, are
noted for some of those qualities which bring them
either praise or blame. Thus one is considered
liberal, another miserly ; one a free giver, another
rapacious ; one cruel, another merciful ; one a
breaker of his word, another faithful ; one effeminate
and pusillanimous, another fierce and high-spirited ;
one humane, another proud ; one lascivious, another
chaste ; one frank, another astute ; one hard,
another easy ; one serious, another frivolous ; one
religious, another incredulous, and so on. I know
that every one will admit that it would be highly
praiseworthy in a prince to possess all the above-
named qualities that are reputed good, but as they
cannot all be possessed or observed, human condi-
tions not permitting of it, it is necessary that he
should be prudent enough to avoid the disgrace of
those vices which would lose him the state, and
guard himself against those which will not lose it
him, if possible, but if not able to, he can indulge
them with less scruple. And yet he must not mind
incurring the disgrace of those vices, without which
it would be difficult to save the state, for if one
considers well, it will be found that some things
which seem virtues would, if followed, lead to one's
ruin, and some others which appear vices result,
if followed, in one's greater security and wellbeing.
CHAPTER XVI
OF LIBERALITY AND NIGGARDLINESS
BEGINNING now with the first qualities above
named, I say that it would be well to be considered
liberal ; nevertheless liberality used in such a way
that you are not feared will injure you, because if
used virtuously and in the proper way, it will not be
known, and you will not incur the disgrace of the
contrary vice. But one who wishes to obtain the
reputation of liberality among men, must not omit
every kind of sumptuous display, and to such an
extent that a prince of this character will consume
by such means all his resources, and will be at last
compelled, if he wishes to maintain his name for
liberality, to impose heavy charges on his people,
become an extortioner, and do everything possible
to obtain money. This will make his subjects begin
to hate him, and he will be little esteemed being
poor, so that having by this liberality injured many
and benefited but few, he will feel the first little
disturbance and be endangered by every accident.
If he recognises: this and wishes to change his
system, he incurs at once the charge of niggardli-
ness ; a prince, therefore, not being able to
exercise this virtue of liberality without risk if it
is known, must not, if he is prudent, object to be
called miserly. In course of time he will be
thought more liberal, when it is seen that by his
62
THE PRINCE 63
parsimony his revenue is sufficient, that he can de-
fend himself against those who make war on himr
and undertake enterprises without burdening his-
people, so that he is really liberal to all those from
whom he does not take, who are infinite in number,
and niggardly to all to whom he does not give, who
are few.
In our times we have seen nothing great done
except by those who have been esteemed niggardly ;
the others have all been ruined. Pope Julius II.,
although he had made use of a reputation for liber-
ality in order to attain the papacy, did not seek to
retain it afterwards, so that he might be able to
make war on the King of France, and he carried
on so many wars without imposing an extraordinary
tax, because his extra expenses were covered by the
parsimony he had so long practised. The present
King of Spain, if he had been thought liberal, would
not have engaged in and won so many enterprises.
For these reasons a prince must care little for the
reputation of being a miser, if he wishes to avoid
robbing his subjects, if he wishes to be able to defend
himself, to not become poor and contemptible, and
not to be forced to become rapacious ; this vice of
niggardliness is one of those vices which enable him
to reign. If it is said that Caesar attained the empire
through liberality, and that many others have
reached the highest positions through being liberal
or being thought so, I would reply that you are
either a prince already or else on the way to become
one. In the first case, this liberality is harmful ;
in the second, it is certainly necessary to be con-
sidered liberal, and Cajsar was one of those who
wished to attain the mastery over Rome, but if
after attaining it he had lived and had not
moderated his expenses, he would have destroyed
that empire. And should any one reply that there
have been many princes, who have done great things
with their armies, who have been thought extremely
64 N1CCOLO MACHIAVELLI
liberal, I would answer by saying that the prince
may either spend his own wealth and that of his
subjects or the wealth of others. In the first case
he must be sparing, but in the second he must not
neglect to be very liberal. This liberality is very
necessary to a prince who marches with his armies,
and lives by plunder, sacking and extorting, and is
dealing with the wealth of others, for without it he
would not be followed by his soldiers. And you
may be very generous indeed with what is not the
property of yourself or your subjects, as were Cyrus,
CsBsar, and Alexander ; for spending the wealth
of others will not diminish your reputation, but
increase it, only spending your own resources will
injure you. There is nothing which destroys itself
so much as liberality, for by using it you lose the
power of using it, and become either poor and des-
picable, or, to escape poverty, rapacious and hated.
And of all things that a prince must guard against,
the most important are being despicable or hated,
and liberality will lead you to one or other of these
conditions. It is, therefore, wiser to have the name
of a miser, which produces disgrace without hatred,
than to incur of necessity the name of being
rapacious, which produces both disgrace and hatred.
CHAPTER XV11
OF CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT 18
BETTER TO BE LOVED OR FEARED
PROCEEDING to the other qualities before named, I
say that every prince must desire to be considered
merciful and not cruel. He must, however, take
care not to misuse this mercifulness. Cesare Borgia
was considered cruel, but his cruelty had settled
the Romagna, united it, and brought it peace and
confidence. If this is considered a benefit, it will
be seen that he was really much more merciful
than the Florentine people, who, to avoid the name
of cruelty, allowed Pistoia to be destroyed. A
prince, therefore, must not mind incurring the
charge of cruelty for the purpose of keeping his
subjects united and confident ; for, with a very few
examples, he will be more merciful than those
who, from excess of tenderness, allow disorders to
arise, from whence spring murders and rapine ; for
these as a rule injure the whole community, while
the executions carried out by the prince injure only
one individual. And of all princes, it is impossible
for a new prince to escape the name of cruel,
new states being always full of dangers. Where-
fore Virgil makes Dido excuse the inhumanity of
her rule by its being new, where she says :
Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt
Moliri, et late fines custode tueri.
F
66 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
Nevertheless, he must be cautious in believing
and acting, and must not inspire fear of his own
accord, and must proceed in a temperate manner
with prudence and humanity, so that too much
confidence does not render him incautious, and too
much diffidence does not render him intolerant.
From this arises the question whether it is better
to be loved more than feared, or feared more than
loved. The reply is, that one ought to be both
feared and loved, but as it is difficult for the two
to go together, it is much safer to be feared than
loved, if one of the two has to be wanting. For
it may be said of men in general that they are
ungrateful, voluble, dissemblers, anxious to avoid
danger, and covetous of gain ; as long as you benefit
them, they are entirely yours ; they offer you their
blood, their goods, their life, and their children,
as I have before said, when the necessity is remote ;
but when it approaches, they revolt. And the
prince who has relied solely on their words, with-
out making other preparations, is ruined, for the
friendship which is gained by purchase and not
through grandeur and nobility of spirit is merited
but is not secured, and at times is not to be had.
And men have less scruple in offending one who
makes himself loved than one who makes himself
feared; for love is held by a chain of obligation
which, men being selfish, is broken whenever it
serves their purpose ; but fear is maintained by a
dread of punishment which never fails. Still, a
prince should make himself feared in such a way
that if he does not gain love, he at any rate avoids
hatred ; for fear, and the absence of hatred may
well go together, and will be always attained by
one who abstains from interfering with the property
of his citizens and subjects or with their women.
And when he is obliged to take the life of any one,
to do so when there is a proper justification and
manifest reason for it ; but above all he must
THE PRINCE 67
abstain from taking the property of others, for men
forget more easily the death of their father than
the loss of their patrimony. Then also pretexts
for seizing property are never wanting, and one
who begins to live by rapine will always find some
reason for taking the goods of others, whereas
causes for taking life are rarer and more quickly
destroyed. But when the prince is with his army
and has a large number of soldiers under hia
control, then it is extremely necessary that he*
should not mind being thought cruel ; for without
this reputation he could not keep an army united,
or disposed to any duty.
Among the noteworthy actions of Hannibal ifr
numbered this, that although he had an enormous
army, composed of men of all nations and fighting
in foreign countries, there never arose any dissension
either among them or against the prince, either in
good fortune or in bad. This could not be due to
anything but his inhuman cruelty, which together
with his infinite other virtues, made him always
venerated and terrible in the sight of his soldiers,
and without it his other virtues would not have
sufficed to produce that effect. Thoughtless writers
admire on the one hand his actions, and on the
other blame the principal cause of them. And that
it is true that his other virtues would not have
sufficed may be seen from the case of Scipio (very
rare not only in his own times, but in all times
of which memory remains), whose armies rebelled
against him in Spain, which arose from nothing
but his excessive kindness, which allowed more
license to the soldiers than was consonant with
military discipline. He was reproached with this
in the senate by Fabius Maximus, who called him
a corrupter of the Roman militia.
The Locri having been destroyed by one of
Scipio's officers were not revenged by him, nor
was the insolence of that officer punished, simply
68 N1CCOLO MACHIAVELLI
by reason of his easy nature; so much so, that
some one wishing to excuse him in the senate, said
that there were many men who knew rather how
not to err, than how to correct the errors of others.
This disposition would in time have tarnished the
fame and glory of Scipio had he persevered in it
under the empire, but living under the rule of the
senate this harmful quality was not only concealed
but became a glory to him. I conclude, therefore,
with regard to being feared and loved, that men
love at their own free will, but fear at the will of
the prince, and that a wise prince must rely on
what is in his power and not on what is in the
power of others, and he must only trouble himself
to avoid incurring hatred, as has been explained.
CHAPTER XVIII
IN WHAT WAY PRINCES MUST KEEP FAITH
How laudable it is for a prince to keep good faith
and live with integrity, and not with astuteness,
every one knows. Still the experience of our times \.
shows those princes to have done great things who
have had little regard for good faith, and have been \
able by astuteness to confuse men's brains, and i
who have ultimately overcome those who have /
made loyalty their foundation. You must know,
then, that there are two methods of fighting, the
one by law, the other by force : the first method is
that of men, the second of beasts ; but as the first
method is often insufficient, one must have recourse
to the second. It is therefore necessary to know
well how to use both the beast and the man. This
was covertly taught to princes by ancient writers,
who relate how Achilles and many others of those
princes were given to Chiron the centaur to be
brought up, who kept them under his discipline ;
this system of having for teacher one who was
half beast and half man is meant to indicate that a
prince must know how to use both natures, and
that the one without the other is not durable. A
prince being thus obliged to know well how to act
as a beast must imitate the fox and the lion, for
the lion cannot protect himself from snares, and
the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. One
69
70 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
must therefore be a fox to recognise snares, and a
lion to frighten wolves. Those that wish to be only
lions do not understand this. Therefore, a prudent
I ruler ought not to keep faith when by so doing it 1
would be against his interest, and when the reasons !
which made him bind himself no longer exist. Jjf ,
men were all good, this precept would not be a
good one ; but as they are bad, and would not ob-
• serve their faith with you, so you are not bound to
keep faith with them. Nor are legitimate grounds
ever wanting to a prince to give colour to the
(non-fulfilment of his promise. Of this one could ;
furnish an infinite number of modern examples,
and show how many times peace has been broken,
and how many promises rendered worthless, by the
faithlessness of princes, and those that have been
best able to imitate the fox have succeeded best. But
it is necessary to be able to disguise this character
well, and to be a great feigner and dissembler; and
men are so simple and so ready to obey present
necessities, that one who deceives will always find
those who allow themselves to be deceived. I will
only mention one modern instance. Alexander VI.
did nothing else but deceive men, he thought of
nothing else, and found the way to do it ; no man
was ever more able to give assurances, or affirmed
things with stronger oaths, and no man observed
them less; however, he always succeeded in his
{deceptions, as he knew well this side of the world.
It is not, therefore, necessary for a prince to
have all the above-named qualities, but it is very
necessary to seem to have them. I wo'ul'd even be
bold to say that to possess them and to always
observe them is dangerous, but to appear to possess
them is useful. Thus .it Js well to_seem pious,
faithful, humane, religious, sincere, and also to
be so ; but you must have the mind so watchful
that when it is needful to be otherwise you may be
able to change to the opposite qualities. And it
THE PRINCE 71
imust be understood that a prince, and especially a
new prince, cannot observe all those things which
'are considered good in men, being often obliged, in
order to maintain the state, to act against faith,
.against charity, against humanity, and against
/religion. And, therefore, he must have a mind
disposed to adapt itself according to the wind, and
as the variations of fortune dictate, and, as I said
before, not deviate from what is good, if possible,
,but be able to do evil if necessitated. A prince
must take great care that nothing goes out of his
jmouth which is not full of the above-named five
Equalities, and, to see and hear him, be should seem
to be all faith, all integrity, all humanity, and all
1 religion. And nothing is more necessary than to
seem to have this last quality, for men in general
judge more by the eyes than by the hands, for
every one can see, but very few have to feel.
Everybody sees what you appear to be, few feel
what you are, and those few will not dare to oppose
themselves to the many, who have the majesty of
the state to defend them ; and in the actions of
I men, and especially of princes, from which there
is no appeal, the end is everything.
Let a prince therefore aim at living and maintain-
ing the state, the means will always be judged
i honourable and praised by every one, for the vulgar
is always taken by appearances and the result of
; things ; and the world consists only of the vulgar,
1 and the few find a place when the many have nothing
; to rest upon. A certain prince of the present time,
, whom it is well not to name, never does anything
; but preach peace and good faith, but he is really a
I great enemy to both, and either of them, had he
observed them, would have lost him both state and
reputation on many occasions.
CHAPTER XIX
THAT WE MUST AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED
BUT as I have now spoken of the most important of
the qualities in question, I will now deal briefly
with the rest on the general principle, that the
prince must, as already stated, avoid those things
which will make him hated or despised ; and when-
ever he succeeds in this, he will have done his part,
and will find no danger in other vices.
He will chiefly become hated, as I said, by being
rapacious, and usurping the property and women
of his subjects, which he must abstain from doing,
and whenever one does not attack the property
or honour of the generality of men, they will live
contented ; and one will only have to combat the
ambition of a few, who can be easily held in check
in many ways. He is rendered despicable by being
thought changeable, frivolous, efteminate, timid,
and irresolute ; which a prince must guard against
as a rock of danger, and manage so that his actions
show grandeur, high courage, seriousness, and
strength ; and as to the government of his subjects,
let his sentence be irrevocable,, and let him adhere
to his decisions so that no one may think of deceiv-
ing him or making him change. The prince who
creates such an opinion of himself gets a great
reputation, and it is very difficult to conspire
against one who has a great reputation, and he will
72
THE PRINCE 73
not easily be attacked, so long as it is known that
he is esteemed and reverenced by his subjects.
For a prince must have two kinds of fear : one
internal as regards his subjects,, one external as
regards foreign powers. From the latter he can
defend himself with good arms and good friends,
and he will always have good friends if he has good
arms ; arid internal matters will always remain
quiet, if they are not perturbed by conspiracy ; and
even if external powers sought to foment one, if he
has ruled and lived as I have described, he will
always if he stands firm be able to sustain every
shock, as I have shown that Nabis the Spartan did.
But with regard to the subjects, if not acted on
from outside, it is still to be feared lest they con-
spire in secret, from which the prince may guard
himself well by avoiding hatred and contempt, and
keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is
necessary to accomplish, as has been related at
length. And one of the most potent remedies that
a prince has against conspiracies, is that of not
being hated or despised by the mass of the people ;
for whoever conspires always believes that he will
satisfy the people by the death of their prince ; but
if he thought to offend them by doing this, he
would fear to engage in such an undertaking, for
the difficulties that conspirators have to meet are
infinite. Experience shows that there have been
very many conspiracies, but few have turned out
well, for whoever conspires cannot act alone, and
cannot find companions except among those who
are discontented ; and as soon as you have disclosed
your intention to a malcontent, you give him the
means of satisfying himself, for by revealing it he
can hope to secure everything he wants ; to such an
extent that seeing a certain gain by doing this, and
seeing on the other hand only a doubtful one and
full of danger, he must either be a rare friend to
you or else a very bitter enemy to the prince if he
74 NICCOL6 MACHIAVELLI
Keeps faith with you. And to reduce the matter
to narrow limits, I say, that on the side of the
conspirator there is nothing hut fear, jealousy,
suspicion, and dread of punishment which frightens
him ; and on the side of the prince there is the
majesty of government, the laws, the protection of
friends and of the state which guard him. When
to these things are added the goodwill of the
people, it is impossible that any one should have
the temerity to conspire. For whereas generally a
conspirator has to fear before the execution of his
plot, in this case he must also fear afterwards,
having the people for an enemy, when his crime is
accomplished, and thus not being able to hope for
any refuge. * Numberless instances might be given
of this, but I will content myself with one which took
place within the memory of our fathers. Messer
Annibale Bentivogli, Prince of Bologna, ancestor
of the present Messer Annibale, was killed by the
Canneschi, who conspired against him. He left no
relations but Messer Giovanni, who was then an
infant, but after the murder the people rose up
and killed all the Canneschi. This arose from the
popular goodwill that the house of Bentivogli en-
joyed at that time in Bologna, which was so great
that, as there was nobody left after the death of
Annibale who could govern the state, the Bolognese
hearing that there was one of the Bentivogli family
in Florence, who had till then been thought the
son of a blacksmith, came to fetch him and gave
him the government of the city, and it was governed
by him until Messer Giovanni was old enough to
assume the government.
I conclude, therefore, that a prince need trouble
little about conspiracies when the people are well
disposed, but when they are hostile and hold him in
hatred, then he must fear everything and every-
body. Well-ordered states and" wise princes have
studied diligently not to drive the nobles to
THE PRINCE 75
desperation, and to satisfy the populace and keep
it contented, for this is one of the most important
matters that a prince has to deal with. Among the
kingdoms that are well ordered and governed in
our time is France, and there we find numberless
good institutions on which depend the liberty and
security of the king ; of these the chief is the
parliament and its authority, because he who
established that kingdom, knowing the ambition
and insolence of the great nobles, and deeming it
necessary to have a bit in their mouths to check
them ; and knowing on the other hand the hatred of
the mass of the people to the great, based on fear,
and wishing to secure them, did not wish to make
this the special care of the king, to relieve him of the
dissatisfaction that he might incur among the nobles
by favouring the people, and among the people by
favouring the nobles. He therefore established a
third judge that, without direct charge of the king,
kept in check the great and favoured the lesser
people. Nor could any better or more prudent
measure have been adopted, nor better precaution for
the safety of the king and the kingdom. From
which another notable rule can be drawn, that
princes should let the carrying out of unpopular
duties devolve on others, and bestow favours them-
selves. I conclude again by saying that a prince
must esteem his nobles, but not make himself hated
by the populace. It may perhaps seem to some,
that considering the life and death of many Roman
emperors that they are instances contrary to my
opinion, finding that some who lived always nobly
and showed great strength of character, neverthe-
less lost the empire, or were killed by their subjects
who conspired against them. Wishing to answer
these objections, 1 will discuss the qualities of some
emperors, showing the cause of their ruin not to
be at variance with what I have stated, and I will
also partly consider the things to be noted by
76 NICCOL6 MACHIAVELLI
whoever reads the deeds of these times. I will
content myself with taking all those emperors who
succeeded to the empire from Marcus the philosopher
to Maximinus ; these were Marcus, Commodus his
son, Pertinax, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maxi-
minus. And the first thing to note is, that whereas
other princes have only to contend against the am-
bition of the great and the insolence of the people,
the Roman emperors had a third difficulty, that of
having to support the cruelty and avarice of the
soldiers, which was such a difficulty that it was the
cause of the ruin of many, it being difficult to satisfy
both the soldiers and the people. For the people
love tranquillity, and therefore like princes who are
pacific, but the soldiers prefer a prince of military
spirit, who is insolent, cruel, and rapacious. They
wish him to exercise these qualities on the people
so that they may get double pay and give vent to
their avarice and cruelty. Thus it came about that
those emperors who, by nature or art, had not such
a reputation as could keep both parties in check,
invariably were ruined, and the greater number
of them who were raised to the empire being new
men, knowing the difficulties of these two opposite
dispositions, confined themselves to satisfying the
soldiers, and thought little of injuring the people.
This choice was necessary, princes not being able to
avoid being hated by some one. They must first
try not to be hated by the mass of the people ; if
they cannot accomplish this they must use every
means to escape the hatred of the most powerful
parties. And therefore these emperors, who being
new men had need of extraordinary favours, adhered
to the soldiers more willingly than to the people ;
whether this, however, was of use to them or not,
depended on whether the prince knew how to
maintain his reputation with them.
From these causes it resulted that Marcus,
Pertinax, and Alexander, being all of modest life,
THE PRINCE 77
lovers of justice, enemies of cruelty, humane and
benign, had all a sad ending except Marcus.
Marcus alone lived and died in honour, because he
succeeded to the empire by hereditary right and did
not owe it either to the soldiers or to the people ;
besides which, possessing many virtues which made
him revered, he kept both parties in their place as
long as he lived and was never either hated or
despised. But Pertinax was created emperor against
the will of the soldiers, who being accustomed to
live licentiously under Commodus, could not put up
with the honest life to which Pertinax wished to
limit them, so that having made himself hated, and
to this contempt being added because he was old, he
was ruined at the very beginning of his administra-
tion. Whence it may be seen that hatred is gained
as much by good works as by evil, and therefore, as
I said before, a prince who wishes to maintain the
state is often forced to do evil, for when that party,
whether populace, soldiery, or nobles, whichever
it be that you consider necessary to you for keep-
ing your position, is corrupt, you must follow its
humour and satisfy it, and in that case good works
will be inimical to you. But let us come to Alex-
ander, who was of such goodness, that among other
things for which he is praised, it is said that in the
fourteen years that he reigned no one was put to
death by him without a fair trial. Nevertheless,
being considered effeminate, and a man who allowed
himself to be ruled by his mother, and having thus
fallen into contempt, the army conspired against
him and killed him. Looking, on the other hand,
at the qualities of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus,
Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them
extremely cruel and rapacious ; to satisfy the
soldiers there was no injury which they would not
inflict on the people, and all except Severus ended
badly. Severus, however, had such abilities that by
maintaining the soldiers friendly to him, he was
78 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
able to reign happily, although he oppressed the
people, for his virtues made him so admirable in the
sight both of the soldiers and the people that the
latter were, as it were, astonished and stupefied, while
the former were respectful and contented. As the
deeds of this ruler were great for a new prince,, I
will briefly show how well he could use the qualities
of the fox and the lion, whose natures, as I said
before, it is necessary for a prince to imitate.
Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, Severus,
who was leader of the army in Slavonia, persuaded
the troops that it would be well to go to Rome to
avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been slain
by the Imperial guard, and under this pretext,
without revealing his aspirations to the throne,
marched with his army to Rome and was in Italy
before his design was known. On his arrival in
Rome the senate elected him emperor through
fear, and Julian died. There remained after this
beginning two difficulties to be faced by Severus
before he could obtain the whole control of the
empire : one in Asia, where Nigrinus, head of the
Asiatic armies, had declared himself emperor ; the
other in the west from Albinus, who also aspired to
the empire. And as he judged it dangerous to show
himself hostile to both, he decided to attack Nigrinus
and deceive Albinus, to whom he wrote that having
been elected emperor by the senate he wished to
share that dignity with him ; he sent him the title
of Caesar and, by deliberation of the senate, he was
declared his colleague ; all of which was accepted
as true by Albinus. But when Severus had defeated
and killed Nigrinus, and pacified things in the East,
he returned to Rome and charged Albinus in the
senate with having, unmindful of the benefits re-
ceived from him, traitorously sought to assassinate
him, and stated that he was therefore obliged to go
and punish his ingratitude. He then went to
France to meet him, and there deprived him of both
THE PRINCE 79
his position and his life. Whoever examines in
detail the actions of Severus, will find him to have
been a very ferocious lion and an extremely astute
fox, and will see him to have been feared and
respected by all and not hated by the army ; and
will not be surprised that he, a new man, should
have been able to hold the empire so well, since his
great reputation defended him always from that
hatred that his rapacity might have produced in
the people. But Antoninus his son was also a man
of great ability, and possessed qualities that rendered
him admirable in the sight of the people and also
made him popular with the soldiers, for he was a
military man, capable of enduring the most extreme
hardships, disdainful of delicate food, and every
other luxury, which made him loved by all the
armies. However, his ferocity and cruelty were so
great and unheard of, through his having, after
executing many private individuals, caused a large
part of the population of Rome and all that of
Alexandria to be killed, that he became hated by all
the world and began to be feared by those about
him to such an extent that he was finally killed by
a centurion in the midst of his army. Whence it is
to be noted that this kind of death, which proceeds
from the deliberate action of a determined man,
cannot be avoided by princes, since any one who
does not fear death himself can inflict it, but a
prince need not fear much on this account, as such
actions are extremely rare. He must only guard
against committing any grave injury to any one he
makes use of, or has about him for his service, like
Antoninus had done, having caused the death with
contumely of the brother of that centurion, and
also threatened him every day, although he still
retained him in his bodyguard, which was a foolish
and dangerous thing to do, as the fact proved.
But let us come to Commodus, who might easily
have kept the empire, having succeeded to it by
80 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
heredity, being the son of Marcus, and it would have
sufficed for him to follow in the steps of his father
to have satisfied both the people and the soldiers.
But being of a cruel and bestial disposition, in order
to be able to exercise his rapacity on the people, he
sought to amuse the soldiers and render them
licentious ; on the other hand, by not maintaining
his dignity, by often descending into the theatre to
fight with gladiators and committing other con-
temptible actions, little worthy of the imperial
dignity, he became despicable in the eyes of the
soldiers, and being hated on the one hand and
despised on the other, he was conspired against
and killed. There remains to be described the
character of Maximinus. He was an extremely
warlike man, and as the armies were annoyed
with the effeminacy of Alexander, which we have
already spoken of, he was after the death of the
latter elected emperor. He did not enjoy it for
long, as two things made him hated and despised :
the one his base origin, as he had been a shepherd in
Thrace, which was generally known and caused
great disdain on all sides ; the other, because he had
at the commencement of his rule deferred going to
Rome to take possession of the Imperial seat, and
had obtained a reputation for great cruelty, having
through his prefects in Rome and other parts of
the empire committed many acts of cruelty. The
whole world being thus moved by indignation for
the baseness of his blood, and also by the hatred
caused by fear of his ferocity, he was conspired
against first by Africa and afterwards by the senate
and all the people of Rome and Italy. His own
army also joined them, for besieging Aquileia and
finding it difficult to take, they became enraged
at his cruelty, and seeing that he had so many
enemies, they feared him less and put him to death.
I will not speak of Heliogabalus, of Macrinus, or
Julian, who being entirely contemptible were
THE PRINCE 81
immediately suppressed, but I will come to the
conclusion of this discourse by saying that the
princes of our time have less difficulty than these
of being obliged to satisfy in an extraordinary
degree their soldiers in their states ; for although
they must have a certain consideration for them,
yet it is soon settled, for none of these princes have
armies that are inextricably bound rp with the
administration of the government and the rule of
their provinces as were the armies of the Roman
empire ; and therefore if it was then necessary to
satisfy the soldiers rather than the people, it was
because the soldiers could do more than the people ;
now, it is more necessary to all princes, except
the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy the people than
the soldiers, for the people can do more than the
soldiers. I except the Turk, because he always
keeps about him twelve thousand infantry and
fifteen thousand cavalry, on which depend the
security and strength of his kingdom ; and it is
necessary for him to postpone every other considera-
tion of the people to keep them friendly. It is the
same with the kingdom of the Soldan, which being
entirely in the hands of the soldiers, he is bound to
keep their friendship regardless of the people. And
it is to be noted that this state of the Soldan is
different from that of all other princes, being
similar to the Christian pontificate, which cannot be
called either a hereditary kingdom or a new one,
for the sons of the dead prince are not his heirs, but
he who is elected to that position by those who have
authority. And as this order is ancient it cannot be
called a new kingdom, there being none of these
difficulties which exist in new ones ; as although the
prince is new, the rules of that state are old and
arranged to receive him as if he were their hereditary
lord. But returning to our matter, I say that
whoever studies the preceding argument will see
that either hatred or contempt were the causes of
82 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
the ruin of the emperors named, and will also
observe how it came about that, some of them acting
in one way and some in another, in both ways there
were some who had a fortunate and others an un-
fortunate ending. As Pertinax and Alexander were
both new rulers, it was useless and injurious for
them to try and imitate Marcus, who was a hereditary
prince ; and similarly with Caracalla, Commodus,
and Maximinus it was pernicious for them to
imitate Severus, as they had not sufficient ability to
follow in his footsteps. Thus a new prince cannot
imitate the actions of Marcus, in his dominions, nor
is it necessary for him to imitate those of Severus ;
but he must take from Severus those portions that
are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus
thosie that are useful and glorious for conserving a
state that is already established and secure.
CHAPTER XX
WHETHER FORTRESSES AND OTHER THINGS WHICH
PRINCES OFTEN MAKE ARE USEFUL OR INJURIOUS
SOME princes, in order to securely hold their posses-
sions, have disarmed their subjects, some others
have kept their subject lands divided, into parts,
others have fomented enmities against themselves,
others have endeavoured to win over those whom
they suspected at the commencement of their rule :
some have constructed fortresses, others have
ruined and destroyed them. And although one
cannot pronounce a definite judgment as to these
things without going into the particulars of the
state to which such a deliberation is to be applied,
still I will speak in such a broad way as the matter
will permit of.
A new prince has never been known to disarm
his subjects, on the contrary, when he has found!
them disarmed he has always armed them, for by
arming them these arms become your own, those
that you suspected become faithful and those that
were faithful remain so, and from being merely
subjects become your partisans. And since all the
subjects cannot be armed, when you benefit those
that you arm, you can deal more safely with the
others ; and this different treatment that they
notice renders your men more obliged to you, the
others will excuse you, judging that those have
84 N1CCOLO MACHIAVELLI
necessarily greater merit who have greater danger
and heavier duties. But when you disarm them,
you commence to offend them and show that you
distrust them either through cowardice or lack of
confidence, and hoth of these opinions generate
hatred against you. And as you cannot remain
unarmed, you are obliged to resort to a mercenary
militia, of which we have already stated the value ;
and even if it were good it cannot be sufficient in
number to defend you against powerful enemies
and suspected subjects. But, as I have said, a new
prince in a new dominion always has his subjects
armed. History is full of such examples. But
when a prince acquires a new state as an addition
to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm that
state, except those who in acquiring it have sided
with you ; and even these one must, when time
and opportunity serve, render weak and effeminate,
and arrange things so that all the arms of the new
state are in the hands of your own soldiers who in
your old state live near you.
Our forefathers and those who were esteemed
wise used to say that it was necessary to hold
Pistoia by means of factious and Pisa with fortresses,
and for this purpose they fomented differences
Among their subjects in some town in order to
possess it more easily. This, in those days when
Jtaly was fairly divided, was doubtless well done,
l>ut does not seem to me to be a good precept
for the present time, for I do not believe that the
divisions thus created ever do any good ; on the
contrary it is certain that when the enemy
approaches the cities thus divided will be at once
lost, for the weaker faction will always side with
the enemy and the other will not be able to stand.
The Venetians, actuated, I believe, by the aforesaid
motives, cherished the Guelf and Ghibelline factions
in the cities subject to them, and although they
never allowed them to come to bloodshed, they yet
THE PRINCE 85
encouraged these differences among them, so that
the citizens, heing occupied in their own quarrels,
might not act against them. This, however, did
not avail them anything, as was seen when, after the
defeat of Vaila, a part of those subjects immediately
took courage and took from them the whole state.
Such methods, besides, argue weakness in a prince,
for in a strong government such dissensions will
never be permitted. They are profitable only in
time of peace, as by means of them it is easy to
manage one's subjects, but when it comes to war,
the fallacy of such a policy is at once shown.
Without doubt princes become great when they
overcome difficulties and opposition, and therefore
fortune, especially when it wants to render a new
prince great, who has greater need of gaining a
great reputation than a hereditary prince, raises
up enemies and compels him to undertake wars
against them, so that he may have cause to over-
come them, and thus raise himself higher by means
of that ladder which his enemies have brought him.
There are many who think therefore that a wise
prince ought, when he has the chance, to foment
astutely some enmity, so that by suppressing it he
will augment his greatness. Princes, and especially
new ones, have found more faith and more useful-
ness in those men, whom at the beginning of their
power they regarded with suspicion, than in those
they at first confided in. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince
of Siena, governed his state more by those whom he
suspected than by others. But of this we cannot
speak at large, as it varies according to the subject ;
I will merely say that these men who at the begin-
ning of a new government were enemies, if they
are of a kind to need support to maintain their
position, can be very easily gained by the prince,
and they are the more compelled to serve him faith-
fully as they know they must by their deeds cancel
the bad opinion previously held of them, and thus
86 NICCOLC) MACHIAVELLI
the prince will always derive greater help from
them than from those who, serving him with greater
security, neglect his interests And as the matter
requires it, I will not omit to remind a prince who
has newly taken a state with the secret help of
its inhabitants, that he must consider well the
motives that have induced those who have favoured
him to do so, and if it is not natural affection for
him, but only because they were not contented with
the state as it was, he will have great trouble and
difficulty in maintaining their friendship, because it
will be impossible for him to content them. And
on well examining the cause of this in the examples
drawn from ancient and modern times it will be
seen that it is much easier to gain the friendship of
those men who were contented with the previous
condition and were therefore at first enemies, than
that of those who not being contented, became his
friends and helped him to occupy it It has been
the custom of princes in order to be able to hold
securely their state, to erect fortresses, as a bridle
and bit to those who have designs against them,
and in order to have a secure refuge against a
sudden assault. I approve this method, because it
was anciently used. Nevertheless, Messer Niccolo
Vitelli has been seen in our own time to destroy
two fortresses in Citta di Castello in order to keep
that state. Guid' Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on
returning to his dominions from which he had been
driven by Cesare Borgia, razed to their foundations
all the fortresses of that province, and considered
that without them it would be more difficult for
him to lose again the state. The Bentivogli, in
returning to Bologna, used similar measures.
Therefore fortresses may or may not be useful
according to the times ; if they do good in one way,
they do harm in another.
The question may be discussed thus : a prince
who fears his own people more than foreigners ought
THE PRINCE 87
to build fortresses, but he who has greater fear of
foreigners than of his own people ought to do with-
out them. The castle of Milan built by Francesco
Sforza has given and will give more trouble to the
house of Sforza than any other disorder in that
state. Therefore the best fortress is to be found
in the love of the people, for although you
may have fortresses they will not save you if you
are hated by the people. When once the people
have taken arms against you, there will never be
lacking foreigners to assist them. In our times we
do not see that they have profited any ruler, except
the Countess of Forli on the death of her consort
Count Girolamo, for she was thus enabled to escape
the popular rising and await help from Milan and
recover the state ; the circumstances being then
such that no foreigner could assist the people. But
afterwards they were of little use to her when
Cesare Borgia attacked her and the people being
hostile to her allied themselves with the foreigner.
So that then and before it would have been safer
for her not to be hated by the people than to have
the fortresses. Having considered these things I
would therefore praise the one who erects fortresses
and the one who does not, and would blame any one
who, trusting in them, thinks little of being hated
by his people.
CHAPTER XXI
HOW A PRINCE MUST ACT IN ORDER TO GAIN
REPUTATION
NOTHING causes a prince to be so much esteemed
as great enterprises and setting a rare example.
We have in our own day Ferdinand, King of
Aragon, at present King of Spain. He may almost
be termed a new prince, because from a weak king
he has become for fame and glory the first king in
Christendom, and if you regard his actions you will
find them all very great and some of them extra-
ordinary. At the beginning of his reign he assailed
Granada, and that enterprise was the foundation
of his state. At first he did it leisurely and with-
out fear of being interfered with ; lie kept the
minds of the barons of Castile occupied in this
enterprise, so that thinking only of that war they
did not think of making innovations, and he thus
acquired reputation and power over them without
their being aware of it. He was able with the
money of the Church and the people to maintain
his armies, and by that long war lay the founda-
tions of his military power, which afterwards has
made him famous. Besides this, to be able to
undertake greater enterprises, and always under
the pretext of religion, he had recourse to a pious
cruelty, driving out the Moors from his kingdom
and despoiling them. No more admirable or rare
88
THE PRINCE 89
example can be found. He also attacked under
the same pretext Africa, undertook his Italian enter-
prise, and has lately attacked France ; so that he
has continually contrived great things, which have
kept his subjects' minds uncertain and astonished,
and occupied in watching their result.
And these actions have arisen one out of the
other, so that they have left no time for men to
settle down and act against him. It is also very
profitable for a prince to give some rare examples
of himself in the internal administration, like
those related of Messer Bernabo of Milan, when
it happens that some one does something extra-
ordinary, either good or evil, in civil life, and to
take a means of rewarding or punishing him which
will be much talked about. And above all a prince
must endeavour in every action to obtain fame for
being great and excellent. A prince is further
esteemed when he is a true friend or a true enemy,
when, that is, he declares himself without reserve
in favour of some one against another.
This policy is always more useful than remaining
neutral. For if two neighbouring powers come to
blows, they are either such that if one wins, you
will have to fear the victor, or else not. In either
of these two cases it will be better for you to
declare yourself openly and make war, because in
the first case if you do not declare yourself, you
will fall a prey to the victor, to the pleasure and
satisfaction of the one who has been defeated, and
you will have no reason nor anything to defend
you and nobody to receive you. For, whoever
wins will not desire friends whom he suspects and
who do not help him when in trouble, and whoever
loses will not receive you as you did not take up
arms to assist his cause. Antiochus went to Greece,
being sent by the ^Etoli to expel the Romans. He
sent orators to the Achaei who were friends of the
Romans to encourage them to remain neutral, on
90 NICCOLO MACHIAVELL1
the other hand the Romans persuaded them to take
up arms on their side. The matter was brought
before the council of the Achaei for deliberation,
where the ambassador of Antiochus sought to per-
suade them to remain neutral, to which the Roman
ambassador replied : (( As to what is said that it is
best and most useful for your state not to meddle
in our war, nothing is further from the truth ; for
if you do not meddle in it you will become, without
any favour or any reputation, the prize of the
victor." And it will always happen that the one
who is not your friend will want you to remain
neutral, and the one who is your friend will require
you to declare yourself by taking arms. Irresolute
princes, to avoid present dangers, usually follow
the way of neutrality and are mostly ruined by it.
But when the prince declares himself frankly in
favour of one side, if the one to whom you adhere
conquers, even if he is powerful and you remain at
his discretion, he is under an obligation to you and
friendship has been established, and men are never
so dishonest as to oppress you with such ingratitude.
Moreover, victories are never so prosperous that
the victor does not need to have some scruples,
especially as to justice. But if he to whom you
adhere loses, you are sheltered by him, and so long
as he can, he will assist you ; you become the com-
panion of a fortune which may rise again. In the
second case, when those who fight are such that you
have nothing to fear from the victor, it is still
more prudent on your part to adhere to one ; for
you go to the ruin of one with the help of him
who ought to save him if he were wise, and if he
conquers he rests at your discretion, and it is im-
possible that he should not conquer with your help.
And here it should be noted that a prince ought
never to make common cause with one more power-
ful than himself to injure another, unless necessity
forces him to it, as before said ; for if he wins you
THE PRINCE 91
rest at his discretion, and princes must avoid as
much as possible being at the discretion of others.
The Venetians united with France against the Duke
of Milan, although they could have avoided that
union, and from it resulted their own ruin. But
when one cannot avoid it, as happened to the
Florentines when the pope and Spain went with
their armies to attack Lombardy, then the prince
ought to join for the above reasons. Let no state
believe that it can follow a secure policy, rather let
it think that all are doubtful. This is found in
the nature of things, that one never tries to avoid
one difficulty without running into another, but
prudence consists in being able to know the nature
of the difficulties, and talking the least harmful as
good. A prince must also show himself a lover of
merit, and honour those who excel in every art.
Moreover he must encourage his citizens to follow
their callings quietly, whether in commerce, or
agriculture, or any other trade that men follow, so
that this one shall not refrain from improving his
possessions through fear that they may be taken
from him, and that one from starting a trade for
fear of taxes ; but he should offer rewards to who-
ever does these things, and to whoever seeks in any
way to improve his city or state. Besides th'is, he
ought, at convenient seasons of the year, to keep
the people occupied with festivals and spectacles ;
and as every city is divided either into trades or
into classes, he ought to pay attention to all these
things, mingle with them from time to time, and
give them an example of his humanity and magni-
ficence, always holding firm, however", the majesty
of his dignity, which must never be allowed to fad
in anything whatever.
CHAPTER XXII
OP THE SECRETARIES OP PRINCES
THE choice of a prince's ministers is a matter of no
little importance ; they are either good or not ac-
cording to the prudence of the prince. The first
impression that one gets of a ruler and of his brains
is from seeing the men that he has about him.
When they are competent and faithful one can
always consider him wise, as he has been able to
recognise their ability and keep them faithful. But
when they are the reverse, one can always form an
unfavourable opinion of him, because the first mis-
take that he makes is in making this choice. There
was nobody who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro
as the minister of Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of
Siena, who did not consider Pandolfo to be a very
prudent man, having him for his minister. There
are three different kinds of brains, the one under-
stands things unassisted, the other understands
things when shown by others, the third understands
neither alone nor with the explanations of others.
The first kind is most excellent, the second also
excellent, but the third useless. It is therefore
evident that if Pandolfo was not of the first kind,
he was at any rate of the second. For every time
that one has the judgment to know the good and
evil that any one does or says, even if he has no
invention, yet he recognises the bad and good works
92
THE PRINCE 93
or his minister and corrects the one and supports
the other ; and the minister cannot hope to deceive
him and therefore remains good. For a prince to
be able to know a minister there is this method
which never fails. When you see the minister
think more of himself than of you, and in all his
actions seek his own profit, such a man will never
be a good minister, and you can never rely on him ;
for whoever has in hand the state of another must
never think of himself but of the prince, and not
call to mind anything but what relates to him.
And, on the other hand, the prince, in order to
retain his fidelity ought to think of his minister,
honouring and enriching him, doing him kindnesses,
and conferring on him honours and giving him
responsible tasks, so that the great honours and
riches bestowed on him cause him not to desire
other honours and riches, and the tasks he has to
fulfil make him fearful of changes, knowing that
he could not execute them without the prince.
When princes and their ministers stand in this
relation to each other, they can rely the one upon
the other ; when it is otherwise, the end is always
injurious either for one or the other of them.
CHAPTER XXili
HOW FLATTERERS MUST BE SHUNNED
I MUST not omit an important subject, and a mistake
which princes can with difficulty avoid, if they are
not very prudent, or if they do not make a good
choice. And this is with regard to flatterers, of
which courts are full, because men take such
pleasure in their own things and deceive themselves
about them that they can with difficulty guard
against this plague ; and by wishing to guard
against it they run the risk of becoming contempt-
ible. Because there is no other way of guarding
one's self against flattery than by letting men
understand that they will not offend you by speak-
ing the truth ; but when every one can tell you the
truth, you lose their respect. A prudent prince
must therefore take a third course, by choosing in
his state wise men, and giving these alone full
liberty to speak the truth to him, but only of those
things that he asks and of nothing else ; but he
must ask them about everything and hear their
opinion, and afterwards deliberate by himself in
his own way, and in these councils and with each
of these men comport himself so that every one may
see that the more freely he speaks, the more he
will be acceptable. Outside these he should listen
to no one, go about the matter deliberately, and be
determined in his decisions. Whoever acts other-
94
THE PRINCE 95
wise either acts precipitately through flattery or
else changes often through the variety of opinions,
from which it happens that he is little esteemed. I
will give a modern instance of this. Pre' Luca, a
follower of Maximilian, the present emperor, speak-
ing of his majesty said that he never took counsel
with anybody, and yet that he never did anything
as he wished ; this arose from his following the
contrary method to the aforesaid. As the emperor
is a secret mail he does not communicate his designs
to any one or take aiiy one's advice, but as on putting
them into effect they begin to be known and dis-
covered, they begin to be opposed by those he lias
about him, and he is easily diverted from his pur-
pose. Hence it comes to pass that what he does
one day he undoes the next, no one ever under-
stands what he wishes or intends to do, and no
reliance is to be placed on his deliberations. A
prince, therefore, ought always to take- counsel,
but only when he wishes, riot when others wish ;
on the contrary he ought to discourage absolutely
attempts to advise him unless he asks it, but he
ought to be a great asker, and a patient hearer of
the truth about those things which he has inquired
of; indeed, if he finds that any one has scruples
in telling him the truth he should be angry. And
since some think that a prince who gains the re-
putation of being prudent is so considered, not by
his nature but by the good councillors he has about
him, they are undoubtedly deceived. It is an in-
fallible rule that a prince who is not wise himself
cannot be well advised, unless by chance he left
himself entirely in the hands of one man who ruled
him in everything, and happened to be a very
prudent man. In this case he may doubtless be
well governed, but it would not last long, for that
governor would in a short time deprive him of the
state ; but by taking counsel with many, a prince
who is not wise will never have united councils and
96 NICCOLO MACHI A VELLI
will not be able to unite them for himself. The
councillors will all think of their own interests, and
he will be unable either to correct or to understand
them. And it cannot be otherwise, for men will
always be false to you unless they are compelled by
necessity to be true.
Therefore it must be concluded that wise counsels,
from whoever they come, must necessarily be due
to the prudence of the prince, and not the prudence
of the prince to the good counsels received.
CHAPTER XXIV
WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR
STATES
THE before-mentioned things, if prudently observed,
make a new prince seem ancient, and render him
at once more secure and firmer in the state than if
he had been established there of old. For a new
prince is much more observed in his actions than
a hereditary one, and when these are recognised
as virtuous, he gains men more and they are
more bound to him than if he were of the ancient
blood. For men are much more taken by present
than by past things, and when they find them-
selves well off in the present, they enjoy it and
seek nothing more ; on the contrary, they will do
all they can to defend him, so long as the prince is
not in other things wanting to himself. And thus
he will have the double glory of having founded
a new realm and adorned it and fortified it with
good laws, good arms, good friends and good
examples ; as he will have double shame who is
born a prince and through want of prudence has
lost it.
And if one considers those rulers who have lost
their position in Italy in our days, such as the King
of Naples, the Duke of Milan and others, one will
find in them first a common defect as to their
arms, for the reasons discussed at length, then we
98 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
observe that some of them either had the people
hostile to them, or that if the people were friendly
they were not able to make sure of the nobility, for
without these defects, states are not lost that have
enough strength to be able to keep an army in the
field. Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander
the Great, but the one who was conquered by Titus
Quinteus, did not possess a great state compared to
the greatness of Rome and Greece which assailed
him, but being a military man and one who knew
how to divert the people and make sure of the great,
he was able to sustain the war against them for
many years ; and if at length he lost his power over
several cities, he was still able to keep his kingdom.
Therefore, those of our princes who had held their
possessions for many years must not accuse fortune
for having lost them, but rather their own negli-
gence ; for having never in quiet times considered
that things might change (as it is a common fault
of men not to reckon on storms, in fair weather)
when adverse times came, they only thought of
fleeing from them, instead of defending themselves ;
and hoped that the people, enraged by the insolence
of the conquerors, would recall them. This measure,
when others are wanting, is good ; but it is very
bad to have neglected the other remedies for that
one, for nobody would desire to fall because he
believed that he would then find some one to pick
him up. This may or may not take place, and if it
does, it is not with safety to you, as that defence is
known to be cowardly and" not to be depended on ;
and only those defences are good, certain and
durable, which depend only on yourself and your
own ability
CHAPTER XXV
HOW MUCH FORTUNE CAN DO IN HUMAN AFFAIRS /
AND HOW IT MAY BE OPPOSED
IT is not unknown to me how many have been and
are of opinion that worldly events are so governed
by fortune and by God, that men cannot by their
prudence change them, and that on the contrary
there is no remedy whatever, and for this they may
judge it to be useless to toil much about them, but
let things be ruled by chance. This opinion has
been more believed in in our day, from the great
changes that have been seen, and are daily seen,
beyond every human conjecture.
When I think about them at times, I am partly
inclined to share this opinion. Nevertheless, that
our freewill may not be altogether extinguished, I
think it may be true .that fortune^ is the ruler^of
half our actions, but that she allows'TEe otEer half
or a little less to be governed by us. 1 would com-
pare her to an impetuous river that, when turbulent,
inundates the plains, ruins trees and buildings,
removes earth from this side and places it on the
other ; every one flies before it, and everything
yields to its fury without being able to oppose
it ; and yet though it is of such a kind, still
when it is quiet, men can make provision against
it by dams and banks, so that when it rises it will
either go into a canal or its rush will not be so wild
99
100
and dan ownnW^ l almiJfljJ^if Vi fortune,
which shows her powej^ffT6fe-no measures have
been taken to resist her, and turns her fury where
she knows that no dams or barriers have been made
to hold her. And if you regard Italy, which has
been the seat of these changes, and who has given
the impulse to them, you will see her to be a
country without dams or barriers of any kind. If
she had been protected by proper measures, like
Germany, Spain, and France, this inundation would
not have caused the great changes that it has,
or would not have happened at all. This must
suffice as regards opposition to fortune in general.
But limiting myself more to particular cases, I
would point out how one sees a certain prince
to-day fortunate and to-morrow ruined, without
seeing that he has changed in character or other-
wise. I believe this arises in the first place from
the causes that we have already discussed at
length ; that is to say, because the prince who bases
himself entirely on fortune is ruined when fortune
varies. I also believe that he is happy whose mode
of proceeding accords with the needs of the times,
and similarly he is unfortunate whose mode of pro-
ceeding is opposed to the times. For one sees that
men in those things which lead them to the aim
that each one has in view, namely, glory and riches,
proceed in various ways ; one with circumspection,
another with impetuosity, one by violence, another
by cunning, one with patience, another with the
reverse ; and each by these diverse ways may arrive
at his aim. One sees also two cautious men, one of
whom succeeds in his designs, and the other not,
and in the same way two men succeed equally by
different methods, one being cautious, the other
impetuous, which arises only from the nature of the
times, which does or does not conform to their
method of proceeding. From this results, as I have
said, that two men, acting differently, attain the
THE PRINCE 101
same effect, and of two others acting in the same
way, one arrives at his good and not the other.
From this depend also the changes in fortune, for if
it happens that time and circumstances are favour-
able to one who acts with caution and prudence he
will be successful, but if time and circumstances
change he will be ruined, because he does not
change his mode of proceeding. No man is found
able to adapt himself to this, either because he
cannot deviate from that to which his nature dis-
poses him, or else because having always prospered
by walking in one path, he cannot persuade himself
that it is well to leave it ; and therefore the cautious
man, when it is time to act suddenly, does not know
how to do so and is consequently ruined ; for if one
could change one's nature with time and circum-
stances, fortune would never change. Pope Julius
II. acted impetuously in everything he did and
found the times and conditions so in conformity
with that mode of proceeding, that he always ob-
tained a good result. Consider the first war that
he made against Bologna while Messer Giovanni
Bentivogli was still living. The Venetians were
not pleased with it, the King of Spain and like-
wise France had objections to this enterprise, not-
withstanding which with his fierce and impetuous
disposition he engaged personally in the expedition.
This move caused both Spain and the Venetians to
halt and hesitate, the latter through fear, the
former through the desire to regain the entire
kingdom of Naples. On the other hand, he engaged
with him the King of France, because seeing him
make this move and desiring his friendship in order
to put down the Venetians, that king judged that he
could not refuse him his troops without manifest
injury. Thus Julius by his impetuous move
achieved what no other pontiff with the utmost
human prudence would have succeeded in doing,
because, if he had waited till all arrangements had
102 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
been made and everything settled before leaving
Rome, as any other pontiff would have done, it
would never have taken place. For the king of
France would have found a thousand excuses, and
the others would have inspired him with a thousand
fears. I will omit his other actions, which were all
of this kind and which all succeeded well, and the
shortness of his life did not suffer him to experience
the contrary, for had times succeeded in which it
was necessary to act with caution, his ruin would
have resulted, for he would never have deviated
from these methods to which his nature disposed
him. I conclude then that fortune varying and
men remaining fixed in their ways, they are success-
ful so long as these ways conform to each other, but
when they are opposed to each other then they are
unsuccessful. I certainly think that it is better to
be impetuous than cautious, for fortune is a woman,
and it is necessary, if you wish to master her, to
conquer her by force ; and it can be seen that she
lets herself be overcome by these rather than by
those who proceed coldly. And therefore, like a
woman, she is a friend to the young, because they
are less cautious, fiercer, and master her with greater
audacity.
CHAPTER XXVI
EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE
BARBARIANS
HAVING now considered all the things we have
spoken of, and thought within myself whether at
present the time was not propitious in Italy for a
new prince, and if there was not a state of things
which offered an opportunity to a prudent and
capable man to introduce a new system that would
do honour to himself and good to the mass of the
people, it seems to me that so many things concur
to favour a new ruler that I do not know of any
time more fitting for such an enterprise. And if,
as I said, it was necessary in order that the power
of Moses should be displayed that the people of
Israel should be slaves in Egypt, and to give scope
for the greatness and courage of Cyrus that the
Persians should be oppressed by the Medes, and to
illustrate the pre-eminence of Theseus that the
Athenians should be dispersed, so at the present
time, in order that the might of an Italian genius
might be recognised, it was necessary that Italy
should be reduced to her present condition, and
that she should be more enslaved than the Hebrews,
more oppressed than the Persians, and more scattered
than the Athenians ; without a head, without order,
beaten, despoiled, lacerated, and overrun, and that
she should have suffered ruin of every kind. And
103
104 N1CCOLO MACHIAVELLI
although before now a spirit has been shown by some
which gave hope that he might be appointed by God
for her redemption, yet at the highest summit of his
career he was thrown aside by fortune, so that now,
almost lifeless, she awaits one who may heal her
wounds and put a stop to the rapine and pillaging
of Lombardy, to the rapacity and extortion in the
kingdom and in Tuscany, and cure her of those
sores which have long been festering. Behold how
she prays God to send some one to redeem her from
this barbarous cruelty and insolence. Behold her
ready and willing to follow any standard if only
there be some one to raise it. There is nothing now
she can hope for but that your illustrious house may
place itself at the head of this redemption, being by
its power and fortune so exalted, and being favoured
by God and the Church, whose leadership it now
occupies. Nor will this be very difficult to you, if
you call to mind the actions and lives of the men
I have named. And although those men were rare
and marvellous, they were none the less men, and
had each of them less occasion than the present, for
their enterprise was not juster than this, nor easier,
nor was God more their friend than He is yours.
Here is a just cause ; for that war is just which is
necessary ; and those arms are merciful where no
hope exists save in them. Here is the greatest
willingness, nor can there be great difficulty where
there is great willingness, provided that the measures
are adopted of those whom I have set before you as
examples. Besides this, unexampled wonders have
been seen here performed by God, the sea has been
opened, a cloud has shown you the road, the rock
has given forth water, manna has rained, and
everything has contributed to your greatness, the
remainder must be done by you. God will not do
everything, in order not to deprive us of freewill
and the portion of the glory that falls to our lot.
It is no marvel that none of the before-mentioned
THE PRINCE 105
Italians have done that which it is to be hoped your
illustrious house may do ; and if in so many revolu-
tions in Italy and so many warlike operations, it
always seems as if the military capacity were extinct,
this is because the ancient methods were not good,
and no one has arisen who knew how to discover
new ones. Nothing does so much honour to a
newly-risen man than the new laws and measures
which he introduces. These things, when they are
well based and have greatness in them, render him
revered and admired, and there is not lacking scope
in Italy for the introduction of every kind. Here
there is great virtue in the members, if it were
not wanting in the heads. Look how in duels and
in councils of a few the Italians are superior in
strength, dexterity, and intelligence. But when it
comes to armies they make a poor show ; which
proceeds entirely from the weakness of the leaders,
for those that know are not obedient, and every one
thinks that he knows, there being hitherto nobody
who has raised himself so high both by valour and
fortune as to make the others yield. Hence it comes
about that in all this time, in all the wars waged
during the last twenty years, whenever there has
been an army entirely Italian it has always been
a failure, as witness first Taro, then Alexandria,
Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, and Mestri. If your
illustrious house, therefore, wishes to follow those
great men who redeemed their countries, it is before
all things necessary, as the true foundation of every
undertaking, to provide yourself with your own
forces, for you cannot have more faithful, or truer
and better soldiers. And although each one of
them may be good, they will together become better
when they see themselves commanded by their
prince, and honoured and supported by him. It is
therefore necessary to prepare such forces in order
to be able with Italian prowess to defend the country
from foreigners. And although both the Swiss and
106 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
Spanish infantry are deemed terrible, none the less
they each have their defects, so that a third order
might not only oppose them, but be confident of
overcoming them. For the Spaniards cannot sustain
the attack of cavalry, and the Swiss have to fear
infantry which meets them with resolution equal
to their own. From which it has resulted, as will
be seen by experience, that the Spaniards cannot
sustain the attack of French cavalry, and the Swiss
are overthrown by Spanish infantry. And although
a complete example of the latter has not been seen,
yet an instance was furnished in the battle of
Ravenna, where the Spanish infantry attacked the
German battalions, which observe the same order
as the Swiss. The Spaniards, through their bodily
agility and aided by their bucklers, had entered
between and under their pikes and were in a position
to attack them safely without the Germans being
able to defend themselves ; and if the cavalry had
not charged them they would have utterly destroyed
them. Knowing therefore the defects of both these
kinds of infantry, a third kind can be created which
can resist cavalry and need not fear infantry, and
this will be done not by the creation of armies but
by a change of system. And these are the things
which, when newly introduced, give reputation and
grandeur to a new prince. This opportunity must
not, therefore, be allowed to pass, for letting Italy at
length see her liberator. I cannot express the love
with which he would be received in all those
provinces which have suffered under these foreign
invasions, with what thirst for vengeance, with
what steadfast faith, with what love, with what
grateful tears. What doors would be closed against
him? What people would refuse him obedience?
What envy could oppose him ? What Italian would
rebel against himr This barbarous domination
stinks in the nostrils of every one. May your
illustrious house therefore assume this task with
THE PRINCE 107
that courage and those hopes which are inspired by
a just cause, so that under its banner our fatherland
may be raised up, and under its auspices be verified
that saying of Petrarch :
Valour against fell wrath
Will take up arms ; and be the combat quickly sped 1
For, sure, the ancient worth,
That in Italians stirs the heart, is not yet dead.
THE END
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Prof. HUGH WALKER. (193)
Second Series. (228)
English Songs and Ballads. Compiled by T. W. H. CROSLAND. (13)
English Speeches, from Burke to Gladstone. Selected by EDGAR
R.JONES, M.P. (191).
Fielding. Journal of a Voyage to Lisbon, &c. Intro. A. DOBSON. (142)
Gait (John). The Entail. Introduction by JOHN AyscouGH. (177)
Gaskell (Mrs.). Introductions by CLEMENT SHORTER.
Cousin Pliillis, and other Tales, &c. (168)
Cranford, The Cage at Cranford, and the Moorland Cottage, (no)
Lizzie Leigh, The Grey Woman, and other Tales, &c. (175)
Mary Barton. (86)
North and South. (154)
Right at Last, and other Tales, &c. (203)
Round the Sofa. (190)
Ruth. (88)
Sylvia's Lovers. (156)
Wives and Daughters. (157)
Life of Charlotte Bronte. (214)
Gibhon. Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. With Maps. 7 vols.
(35, 44, 5*i 64, 69, 74)
Autobiography. Introduction by J. B. BURY. (139)
Goethe. Faust, Part I (with Marlowe's Dr. Faustus). Translated by
JOHN ANSTER. Introduction by Sir A W. WARD. (135)
Goldsmith. Poems. Introduction and Notes by AUSTIN DOBSON. (123)
The Vicar of Wakefield. (4)
Grant (James). The Captain of the Guard. (159)
Hawthorne. The Scarlet Letter. (26)
Hazlitt. Characters of Shakespeare's Plays. Introduction by Sir A.
QUILLER-COUCH. (205)
Lectures on the English Comic Writers. Introduction by R. BRIMLEY
JOHNSON. (124)
Sketches and Essays, (i*)
Spirit of the Age. (57) *
Table-Talk. (5)
Winterslow. (25)
579QIF,
WORLD'S CLASSICS
List of the Series — continued
Shakespearean Criticism. A Selection. Edited with Intro., b
D. NICHOL SMITH. (212)
Shelley. Poems. A Selection. (187)
Sheridan. Plays. Introduction by JOSEPH KNIGHT. (79)
Smith (Adam). The Wealth of Nations, 2 vols. (54, 59)
Smith (Alexander). Dreamthorp, with Selections from Last Leaves
Introduction by Prof. HUGH WALKER. (200)
Smollett. Travels through France and Italy. Introduction by THOMAI
SECCOMBE. (90)
Sophocles. Th'e Seven Plays. Trans. LEWIS CAMPBELL. (116)
Southey (Robert). Letters. Selected, with an Introduction and Notes
by MAURICE H. FITZGERALD. (169)
Sterne. Tristram Shandy. (40)
Swift. Gulliver's Travels. (20)
Taylor (Meadows). Confessions of a Thug. (207)
Tennyson (Lord). Poems. (3)
Thackeray. Book of Snobs, Sketches and Travels in London, &c. (50
Henry Esmond. (28)
Pendennis. Introduction by EDMUND GOSSE. 2 vols. (91, 92)
Thoreau. Walden. Introduction by THEODORE WATTS-DUNTON. (68)
Tolstoy. Essays and Letters. Translated by AYLMER MAUDE. (46)
Twenty-three Tales. Translated by L. and A. MAUDE. (72)
The Cossacks. Translated by L. and A. MAUUE. (208)
Resurrection. Trans. L. MAUDE. Intro. A. MAUDE. (209)
Anna Karenina. Trans. AYLMER MAUDE. 2 vols. (210, 211)
A Confession, and What I believe. Trans. AYLMER MAUDE. (229)
Trollope. The Three Clerks. Intro, by W. TEIGNMOUTH SHORE. (i4<
The Warden. (217)
Virgil. Translated by DRYDEN. (37)
Virgil. The Aeneid and the Georgics. Trans. J. RHOADES. (227)
Watts-Dunton (Theodore). Aylwin. (52)
Wells (Charles). Joseph and his Brethren. With an Introduction by
ALGERNON CHARLES SWINBURNE, and a Note on Rossetti and
Charles Wells by THEODORE WATTS-DuNTON. (143)
White (Gilbert). The Natural History of Selborne. (22)
Whitman. Poems. Introduction by E. DE SELINCOURT. (218)
Whittier. Poems. A Selection. (188)
Wordsworth. Poems : A Selection. (189)
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