Egypt and the Sudan 321
was a tactical blunder that the British Government
included the Sudan in its ultimatum of November,
1924. It should have made a separate declaration of
its policy in regard to the Sudan instead of leaving this
matter as one of the reserved points. For negotiation
on the other reserved points concerns the future status
of Egypt. Whereas negotiation as to the future Status
of the Sudan can best be settled as between two friendly
and fully independent States after the other reserved
points have been cleared out of the way. It may be
hoped that the Egyptian Government will now see the
advantage of such a procedure and not again press their
full claim^ to the Sudan to the prevention of a negotiation
on the other points. It may be hoped that the British
Government will make such concessions on those points
as will allow of a settlement satisfactory to the interests
of the Sudan.
Such claims to contiguous territory are especially
difficult to deal with in the case of new nations on their
first emergence, and in their first ebullience. We have
seen for example how the somewhat similar Mossul dis-
pute brought us to the verge of war with a new Turkish
nation. And we have had another territorial question in
the same region as the Sudan, that was perhaps fortu-
nately settled by us out of hand over the head of Egyptian
objections. The Jarabub oasis in the Sahara was within
that section of the desert ascribed to Egypt, but it had
long been coveted by Italy as being the main base of
their enemy, the Senussi. Under the Treaty of London
(1915) Italy was promised a rectification of frontier in
this region. In 1919 we agreed that Jarabub should be
Italian, and negotiations for the transfer began with the
Egyptian Protectorate. The end of the Protectorate
(1922) terminated these negotiations. But hostilities
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