3o6 Egypt
lenders, but have also their princes of commerce. As the
local retailer and usurer they perform the rather un-
popular function filled further north by the Jews. They
are on the border-line between a foreign colony and a
native community, and are clever at exploiting the
advantages of both characters.
Nowhere in this short category can we find any
community that, owing to its being regionally segregated
or suspected by the ruling race and religion, could be
classed as a national minority requiring special protec-
tion. If any such were to be so classed, protection could
clearly be better afforded, as elsewhere, through League
guarantees and not through a British garrison. Of
course, if it be assumed that the protection of foreigners
requires the retention of a High Commissioner with some
undefined extra-diplomatic authority, of Judicial and
Financial Advisers and of a Director of Security with
even less defined rights of intervention—then there may
be grounds for keeping a garrison to assert their authority.
But, even so, it would be worth considering whether such
support could not be better given by diplomatic repre-
sentation and by political pressure.
For it is obvious that the presence of a garrison must
undoubtedly deter and defer the establishment of friendly
relations with Egypt and a settlement of the reserved
points. A fair and free reconciliation and resettlement
are both almost impossible while one of the negotiating
parties is in military occupation of the other. That the
British Empire, in dealing with Egypt, should have to
fortify its diplomacy by remaining in occupation of Cairo,
is itself almost an admission that its case is weak, and
certainly it is an unfair advantage that is likely to be met
by intransigence.
The main justification for retaining the garrison so long