294 Egypt
encounter considerable opposition from self-governing
Dominions susceptible as they are to any loss of con-
trol over commercial communications.
Nevertheless, the British Empire is not based on con-
stitutional principle or even on conformity with prece-
dents ; but has been built up out of practical solutions
for the settlement of each particular case. If it is found
that recourse to the League promises a more prompt and
practical agreement on the issues involved in the reserved
points than can otherwise be got, it would be contrary
to the sensible practice of British policy to let considera-
tions of principle or precedent prevent its adoption.
Assuming, then, that the League can be used, and
taking the reserved points in turn, we find that there
seems to be no real reason for keeping British troops
in Egypt to secure either (a) imperial communications,
or (b) the defence of Egypt, or (c) the protection of
foreigners and minorities. For the military advantage of
guarding the Canal by a garrison has already been
shown to have no real existence. British sea and air
supremacy combined with League guarantees and pos-
sibly some form of British mandate for the Canal zone
would remove any risk of the national independence of
Egypt in any way prejudicing the international indepen-
dence of the Canal. As for the defence of Egypt against
foreign aggression, that also can be better secured by
international guarantees and by an Anglo-Egyptian
defensive alliance than by a garrison of a few thousand
British infantry. Since, if actual foreign invasion is to
be guarded against, though it is difficult to see where it
could come from, then any British troops in Egypt will
be lost if we lose control of sea and air; and if we retain
that control they will be superfluous for its defence.
The whole conception of garrisoning Egypt for its