England and Egypt 291
has also been an increasing tendency on the part of
Egyptians to look at the relationship between the
two peoples rather in the light of the reservations of
British control than in that of their formal renunciation
of it.
What, in fact, do these reserved points amount to ?
(a) The security of the communications of the British
Empire in Egypt—is verbiage for the Canal.
(b) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggres-
sion, direct or indirect—is camouflage for the garrison.
(c) The protection of foreign interests and the pro-
tection of minorities—covers the High Commissionership
with the Financial and Judicial Advisers and the Director
of Security.
(d) The Sudan—is a complex of divergent interests
respecting cotton and water.
None of these, even the last, would offer any great
difficulties to professional negotiators seeking a practical
compromise, and not primarily concerned with the prin-
ciples either of British supremacy or of Egyptian
sovereignty. But so long as negotiation is considered by
politicians on either side as an opportunity for pressing
these principles, there is no common ground for agree-
ment. The position of Nationalist politicians has so far
been that the British garrison, the Financial and Judicial
Advisers, control over foreign affairs, and the claim to
protect foreigners and minorities should all be uncon-
ditionally withdrawn, while Egyptian sovereignty over
the Sudan should be unconditionally recognised. Such
a surrender on the part of the British is claimed on
grounds of abstract right. This implies a refusal to
negotiate as to the reservations in the Declaration of
1922, which the Nationalists, though operating de facto,
do not recognise de jure. For, according to strict