254 Egypt
immediate abolition of the Protectorate and an abandon-
ment of the proposal to substitute a British mandate for
the international Capitulations. As the first was implied
in the bargain, and the second, the abolition of the
Capitulations, was only indirectly involved, it might have
been wise to have accepted these conditions and to have
postponed substituting the British mandate for the inter-
national Capitulations until some confidence in us had
been restored. Had this been done at once and Zaglul
definitely pledged to the draft treaty a satisfactory settle-
ment might at this stage have been secured.
But such a surrender to their worst enemy was more
than the Foreign Office could face, or possibly more than
they could force on a Conservative Government. There
was a long delay before the Milner report was officially
submitted, and then Lord Curzon opened negotiations,
not as Lord Milner had done with Zaglul and the Wafd,
but with Adli Yeghen Pasha and the new Government.
For one result of the detente caused by the Milner con-
cessions had been the restoration of an Egyptian Govern-
ment which represented the moderating and mediating
elements of nationalism. Unhappily, this factioiHwhich
was inclined to co-operation was not in contX'res( ^the
movement. And when Zaglul returned Ltnc1, Paris*
(April 5, 1921) he was given an ovation that proclaimed
him the leading political personality of the day. He at
once disassociated himself from co-operation, refused to
call on Sultan Fuad, and claimed the right to head the
delegation to London. When he was rejected in favour
of Adli he denounced the Premier as a traitor. And
though we had thereby undoubtedly split the nationalist
movement, yet the fraction we had broken off was of
little use to us. "We want Saad, not Adli/' became
the slogan of the day.