2i 8 Egypt
result of a want of precaution on the part of the British
authorities that was excusable in the emergency, as well
as of more preparation on the part of the Egyptians than
they have as yet been given credit for. It was, for
example, a mistake on our part, though a very natural
one, to make the war an excuse for shutting down such
constitutional safety-valves as there were for expressing
political opinions. Thus, the new Legislative Assembly
was suspended and every political activity was sup-
pressed. So heavy was the hand of the military authori-
ties, and so long the arm of their secret service, that
prisons were soon full of hundreds of political suspects.
No more than five persons could meet anywhere with-
out incurring arrest. The Nationalist newspapers were
suppressed, and the remainder were not allowed to
publish political news. The Times condemned the
Egyptian censorship as "the most incompetent, the
most inept, and the most savagely ruthless in any
country under British control/' Yet, at the same time,
these same authorities spoon-fed the local papers with
war propaganda as to the liberties of lesser nations and
crusades for self-determination that were in the circum-
stances about as dangerous as anything could be. The
effect of this was to drive nationalism into the only
region where it defied all regulation—to say nothing of
repression. The nationalist movement among the
students and schoolboys soon became formidable. Each
school or college became a centre of violent anti-British
agitation. In the East adolescents are more reckless in
action than adults, and in Egypt such youthful reckless-
ness inflamed the native hue of resolution. The Sultan
was twice attacked (April 9 and July 9, 1915), his first
assailant being executed, his second escaping. The
Prime Minister narrowly escaped (August 10), Yet,