Egypt
concerns any ground within the purview of our profes-
sional diplomacy. It was quite in the picture and very
much too all of a piece with our diplomacy both before,
after, and during the war.
This defence of our protectorate in principle cannot,
however, be extended to the method of its proclamation;
seeing that this was so unnecessarily provocative of
offence to Egyptian nationalism that it can best be ex-
plained by assuming that our diplomacy was unaware
that the Egyptian Nationalist sentiment was extending
or even that it still existed. It was, perhaps, excusable
that we should not have known that the Arabic word for
protectorate (himaya) is especially offensive to Moslem^,
as having been in common use for the ' * protection'' of
foreign subjects, which is one of the worst abuses of
extra-territoriality, and a term of opprobrium as between
Moslems and Christians. One might also excuse such
ignorance of the true position of the Khalif in the Islamic
State as was shown in the Note accompanying the pro-
clamation when it attributed to the Khalif ate ''spiritual
authority'' in Egypt and alleged that the country was
already politically independent. For this is a common
mistake, and one that might easily be made by minds
more familiar with the position of the Papacy than with
that of the Prophet; though one much resented by
Moslems. But ignorance of Arabic or of Islamic institu-
tions does not explain the general political atmosphere
and attitude adopted in the vapid and verbose Note
which notified the protectorate to the Egyptian Govern-
ment. The only advantage to Egypt that it ascribed to
the protectorate was a revision of the Capitulations after
the war. There was no promise even of an extension of
self-government. His Majesty's Government might be
*' convinced that the clearer definition of Great Britain's