3IQ Egypt
eventually twelve per cent, of the total force were in*
capacitated and certain units lost a quarter of their
strength.
Supporting and supplying this enormous garrison
meant wealth for Egypt, but it also meant work. As
usual, the wealth went mostly to the few, and they not
the best, while the work fell heavily on the many, and
heaviest on the best. An elaborate system of pipe-
lines, railways, and roads had to be built to connect
Egypt with the Canal, and, later on, with Syria. The
work required was soon beyond the strength of the de-
pleted Civil Administration, on whose powers the military
authorities more and more encroached. The British
Government had formally undertaken not to call on
Egyptians for war service, but this had now to be ignored.
The Egyptian Government agreed to call up army
reservists for railway construction (January 20, 1916),
and the Egyptian Labour Corps, originally organised for
Gallipoli (August, 1915), was enormously expanded and
employed for foreign service. By the winter of 1915-16
eight thousand five hundred Egyptians were being re-
cruited for the Mesopotamian Labour Corps and ten
thousand for Labour Corps Service in France. Service
was voluntary at high pay and for a three months*
contract. The Egyptian fellah, though he enlisted with-
out enthusiasm, proved a most energetic navvy. A
*' SW7'' digging was a revelation to the much more
powerful English soldier. Later, Egyptians were re-
cruited for the camel transport of the Syrian campaign.
This service of considerable hardship, often under fire,
was work for which Egyptians alone were competent.
All ofs^hich war employments, valuable as they were, did
little to enlist Egyptian national sentiment in support of
the English.