204 Egypt
with such adventurous action as would have been the
naval occupation of the Straits on the outbreak of war,
As it was, we departed from a sound and secular foreign
policy, and let the most formidable enemy we have ever
encountered in the most fearful war in which we have ever
engaged snatch an advantage that probably doubled the
duration and damage of the war.
This snap victory of German over British sea-power
changed the character of the war in the East from an
investment of the Central Powers at the Straits to a
defence of our own communications at the Canal. The
inclusion of Turkey within the German lines made Egypt
a sector of the Eastern Front. Our declaration of Martial
Law in Egypt (November 2, 1914) had promised that we
would bear the whole burden of war in Egypt without
calling on Egypt for help. But within three days the
military emergency repealed this self-denying ordinance,
and the Egyptian artillery were sent to defend the
Canal.
The war, so far as Egypt is concerned, is best con-
sidered as three campaigns. These are well expressed
under the designations of their military organisations as
the campaign of the Canal Defence Force (1914-15);
that of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force at the
Levant Base (1915-16); and that of the Egyptian Ex-
peditionary Force (1916-17). They represent respec-
tively, in character, a defensive, an offensive, and a
defensive ending in an offensive.
The first campaign, that of Canal Defence, though a
modest and makeshift affair compared with the later war
machines operating in Egypt, was perhaps the most im-
portant contribution of Egypt to the Allied cause. For
the secret Turco-German alliance had stolen a long
inarch, not only on our diplomacy in the Near East, but