Nationalist Renascence 193
to circumvent the right of the Sultan to appoint all general
officers. Egyptian territory and troops were formally at
the disposal of the Sultan in time of war, and Egypt was
the only possible base for Turkish operations against the
Italian invasion of the Empire in Tripoli, A declaration
of Egyptian neutrality would mean an abrupt repudiation
of the Ottoman Empire's rights over Egypt—a refusal to
allow Egyptian Moslem to join a djehad for the defence
of their fellow Moslem—and quite possibly a recrudes-
cence of fanatical opposition to our occupation. But the
difficulty was disposed of in detail without disturbing
diplomacy by practical decisions of the military problems
as they arose. When Egyptian officers applied for leave
to volunteer with the Turkish forces they were told that
it would be impossible to keep their places unfilled. When
Bedawin tribes asked leave to join the djehad they were
told that such fire-eaters could obviously no longer claim
exemption as nomads from conscription. When the
Syrian Bedawin tried to march into Tripoli across Egypt
they were stopped at the Canal on police grounds. When
Turkish officers tried to travel through in disguise they
disappeared until they disembarked weeks later at some
remote port. When the Alexandria mob celebrated an
imaginary Turkish victory by hustling Italian workmen
the fire hoses quenched their enthusiasm. That Egypt,
though de jure an integral part of the Ottoman Empire,
was de facto part of the British Empire became very plain
to all.
Such difficulties as arose in the internal situation were
dealt with on the same lines. Both from policy and from
preference Kitchener reversed Gorst's plan of self-efface-
ment and self-government and presented himself as the
sort of personal ruler that Egypt has always been ready
to accept. But it would be a mistake to see in the auto-