Financial Reconstruction 155 tion was to see that Egypt paid its debts. Its European mandate, to use a modern term, was that of a receivership for the European creditors of Egypt. Reforms could only be effected in so far as they contributed—or at least were in no way contrary to the fullest liquidation of Egypt's extravagant liabilities. But any real financial recon- struction obviously required as a first step a thorough revision of these liabilities and a reduction of them within reasonable limits. As Egyptian solvency had now practi- cally a British guarantee, European creditors ought to have allowed in return a squeezing out of water and a scaling down of the more extortionate claims. For, if Egypt was to become a paying proposition, it was essential that all real profits should be applied to remunerative replace- ments of the plant and to promoting production. But none of these essential powers were in possession of the British receivers owing to the international mortgages placed upon Egypt, and to the deliberate use of them made by the French for putting every possible difficulty in the way of a British reconstruction. - The French still held two-thirds of the debt. They had, under protest, acquiesced in the abolition of the French controller at the beginning of the British occupation (January 4, 1883). But soon after they adopted the policy they thereafter maintained until 1904, of using the International Debt Commission and its powers under the Law of Liquidation, in conjunction with the inter- national Mixed Tribunals, for thwarting whenever possible, by legal proceedings, the British efforts to avoid another bankruptcy with its further development of financial bondage. It has been shown that the burden of the debt, even as provisionally reduced under the condominium, was more than the country could bear without loss of recuperative power. To this had been