154 Egypt
these lines was signed with the Sultan (October 24, 1885).
The short Liberal interregnum (1886) made no differ-
ence, and it was eighteen months before the tortuous and
interminable negotiations at Constantinople and Cairo
were completed in a final Convention and Protocol (May
22, 1887). But by that time we had no longer any use
for Turkish sovereignty or soldiery either in Egypt or
in the Sudan. For the Sudan was no longer a danger and
Egypt was politically and financially in course of re-
construction. Moreover, the Triple Alliance had been
renewed and rallied to our support. So the new Con-
vention was found to stipulate that the British garrison
would evacuate in three years and the British officers in
Egyptian service two years later, leaving Egypt a
neutralised territory. But that (Art. 5) we would refuse
to evacuate '' if there was any appearance of danger in
the interior or without/' and (Art. 6) that we should
resume occupation <fif order and security in the interior
were disturbed." As this seemed to be rather a regular-
isation of our occupation than a regulation of our
evacuation, France and Russia not only rejected the
Convention, but prevented the Sultan from ratifying it.
The immediate result of the negotiation was the perman-
ent addition of a Turkish " Commissioner" as a factor
in the international intrigues at Cairo. The indirect result
was the establishment of a de facto British occupation
based on the Balance of Power in Europe. Unfortunately,
in Egypt there was a balance of impotence. For whenever
we put our shoulder to a wheel the French put a spoke
in it, and whenever we got together with the French the
Germans set us by the ears again.
The other main difficulty of the British, besides the
insecurity of their footing, was the way in which their
hands were tied. The main motive of the British occupa-