u8 Egypt
to the despatch of a joint naval squadron for the protection
of foreigners with a view to subsequent Turkish military
action. But this did not suit the Sultan, who could not
act as policeman for the Christian Powers against what
had become a Pan-Islamic movement. He was more-
over, through an agent, Essad Pasha, already in treaty
with Arabi. The British and French warships duly arrived
(May 20), but such naval demonstrations, however
effective against weak Governments, merely inflame
popular movements. Arabi called out the redifs (reserv-
ists) and began raising batteries at Alexandria (June 3).
Thereupon an attempt was made to impose terms on the
Nationalists under threat of the warships. An ultimatum
was sent to the President of the Council (May 25) de-
manding the demission of the Ministry and the deporta-
tion of the three Colonels, The Ministry resigned, but
in doing so denounced Tewfik for subservience to foreign
Powers and of the Sultan's firman. Tewfik, who had
wanted to take refuge in Alexandria under the guns of
the fleet, but had failed to get away, was then forced
to reinstate Arabi and the Ministry, in response to
petitions from the Ulema, Notables, and leading
Christians, and under menace of a rising in Cairo. None
the less, his deposition was now openly discussed.
The result of our ' * ultimatum '' had thus been to make
Arabi ruler of Egypt and Tewfik his hostage. It also
gave the Nationalist movement an even more Moslem and
militarist tendency. Business was at a standstill. There
was an exodus of foreigners and Christians. Malet re-
ported (May 31): " A collision might at any moment
occur between Moslem and Christian/1 The Powers
had, in fact, themselves created the militarism that they
now felt themselves compelled to crush.
The obvious and, diplomatically speaking, least