The British Occupation in
and the foreign Controllers failed to work with the Con-
stitutional Nationalists. Colvin and Malet, if left to them-
selves, could have done so. For Colvin, Anglo-Indian
autocrat as he was, had by now learnt what the move-
ment meant. In a memorandum written at this time, he
says : *' The Liberal movement should be in no wise
discouraged. Though, in its origin anti-Turk, it is in
itself an Egyptian national movement/' He had also
been won by Arabi's simplicity and sincerity. He re-
ports of an interview: "Arabi, who spoke with great
moderation, calmness, and conciliation, is sincere and
resolute, but not a practical man.'3 But the general
foreign attitude towards the Constitutionalists is ex-
pressed by Cromer, then absent from Egypt. "There
were two parties in opposition to the Khedive — a
mutinous army half mad with fear of punishment, and
a party the offspring of Ismail's dalliance with constitu-
tionalism, with vague national aspirations. . . . The
main thing was to prevent amalgamation" (Modern
Egypt, p. 188). And not long after (July 27, 1882)
Mr. Gladstone, defending military intervention, could go
so far as to assert: " It has been charitably believed,
even in this country, that the military party was the
popular party, and was struggling for the liberties of
Egypt. There is not the smallest rag or shred of
evidence to support that contention." Thus between
the devil of Khedivial intrigue and the deep sea of Glad-
stonian ignorance, the Constitutionalists had little chance
of escaping shipwreck.
Tewfik, anxious to rid himself as quickly of Sherif
and the Egyptian reformers as he had got rid of Riaz
and the " Turkish" reactionaries, had telegraphed to
the Sultan forl twenty battalions of Turkish troops.
Arabi, learning this also, petitioned for Ottoman interven-