Bankrupts and Brokers 73
pensating Egypt for its loss of traffic with a share in the
profits. As it was, Egypt was made to pay heavily both
for the concession of the site and for the construction of
the greater part of the Canal, and was left with no share
in the concern. The sufferings of the Egyptian fellaheen,
both in the years of forced labour and in the subsequent
fiscal exactions to meet interest on the Canal debt, put
Europe heavily in their debt, a debt of honour of Europe
to Egypt as to which we have not heard so much as we
have of the less worthy liabilities of Egypt to Europe.
The pride of Frenchmen in the flotation, feat of de
Lesseps, or of the English in the financial coup of Dis-
raeli, should not make them forget that Egypt deserved
well of Europe in this matter, and was in return most
ruthlessly defrauded. Moreover, the construction of the
Canal changed for the worse the relations between the
British Empire and Egypt by shifting the main objective
of British sea-power, and the main interest of British
Imperialism in the Near East from Constantinople to
Cairo. Thereafter it would have been difficult for Egypt,
even with the most diplomatic of princes and with the
most democratic of governments, to prevent the British
Empire from guarding so vital and vulnerable a line of
communication by garrisoning at least the isthmus. As
it was, Ismail hurried his country into bankruptcy and a
foreign receivership even faster than did any of his
princely colleagues in the border lands between East and
West from Fez to Stamboul. Such bankruptcy followed
by foreign occupation is a phenomenon to be observed in
Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Egypt, and Turkey at this
phase of their development from the Islamic state into
Western nations. But in Cairo the financial crisis would,
owing to international rivalries, have been solved, as it
was in Constantinople, by some form of financial control,