England and Egypt	313
ably as it relieved our relations with Turkish nationalism.
Moreover, French militarism in Syria has relegated us
to the role of a Second Murderer "of milder mood."
Finally, the despised Constitution, and even the detested
High Commissionership, have acquired a value as safe-
guards against the autocratic ambitions of the King.
In peaceably accepting co-operation, and in allowing
it to proceed for a comparatively long period undisturbed,
Egyptian Nationalism has made as large a contribution
to a change in atmosphere as can fairly be expected. It
is now up to us to respond by a generous gesture. And
in view of the absence of any recent pressure, we need
not fear that it will be misinterpreted as weakness. Such
a gesture would be the admission of Egypt to the League
and a reference to the League of all the reserved points,
If the arguments above advanced and the view of events
above adopted are correct, we should stand to lose
nothing serious except in the case of the Sudan, which
is dealt with in the following chapter. On the other
hand, we should thereby get the acceptance by Egypt
of terms that, however equitable, we could never impose
on them either arbitrarily,or by agreement.
With the reserved points thus cleared out of the way,
either by direct concessions on our part or by reference
to the League, a new possibility presents itself in future
relations. Egyptian Nationalists, or a sufficiently large
majority of them, might thereafter be able to realise the
disadvantages of finally seceding from the Empire. For
the advantages that Egypt would obtain by becoming a
self-governing Dominion within the Empire are apparently
already acknowledged by the Liberal-Constitutionalists
and Nationalist-Co-operators now in office. These ad-
vantages, very briefly summarised, are; Security from the
Italian imperialism that so impresses at present all Near