260	Egypt
"Pending the conclusion of such agreements, the
status quo in all these matters shall remain intact."
This declaration has been condemned as a surrender
of the whole basis of our position and of the whole of our
bargaining power. To it has been attributed the un-
fortunate fact that five years later we are still without a
final settlement of our relations with Egypt. While it is
even more unfortunate that this generosity should have
been succeeded by some of the worst crimes committed
in the name of Egyptian Nationalism. Yet, honest and
generous as the gift to Egypt was, we must, in fairness,
admit that we gave less than we got. We gave up the Pro-
tectorate and martial law; but then it was already quite
clear that we could no longer avoid doing so. We could
only stay in Egypt on the basis of a bargain, and we
could not bargain until we had someone to bargain with.
That, we now got, for Sarwat was at once able to form
a Government; not, indeed, for the specific purpose of
co-operation, but for the purpose of constructing the new
State and the new Constitution. We also gave up most
of our intervention in the internal affairs of Egypt through
British officials. But our command of Egypt was based
on our military occupation, while our civil control was
based on our financial and judicial agency for European
interests there. Both these were amply covered by the
two first reserved points. There was, indeed, some
ground for the criticisms of the extreme nationalists that
the British garrison, with the British financial and judicial
advisers at Cairo, put it in our power to exercise influences
over, and even interventions in, Egyptian affairs. This,
however, could give no justification for the method that
was now adopted of getting rid of any remaining repre-
sentatives of British supremacy by a campaign of
assassination against British officials and officers. In the