Rebellion and Independence	235
that was no doubt intended to put Zaghil and the Wafd
in their place, and to exalt the co-operators at their
expense, would be taken by Egypt as an insult to the
nation as a whole. It consequently produced just the
opposite result to what was intended. For it enabled
Zaglul to do what he had been unsuccessfully designing
throughout the war, and effect a lining up of all political
sections and public opinion behind the extreme Watan
faction and the Wafd delegation. Thus we find that, on
receipt of the first rebuff from the Foreign Office, Rushdi
had tried to resign, and that the position of the Egyptian
Government and of all other moderate and mediating
factors thereafter rapidly became impossible. Sultan
Fuad, the notables of the old landed gentry, the Syrian,
Greek, and Armenian plutocrats, the Coptic clerks, the
Bedawin chieftains, probably all had their doubts as to
the effect that national independence would have upon
their interests. But they had no doubts as to what the
effect would be if they opposed it. The foreign colonies,
as usual, clamoured for coercion, and did not conceal
their contempt for British blundering. The great war
machines of the Secret Service and of the Press Censor-
ship still busily whirled their wheels within wheels, but
had not properly adapted themselves to the new front.
Such British officials as the war had left were ignored
and discouraged. The British officers were without per-
sonal authority or political ability. The man who could
have saved the situation, the High Commissioner, Sir R.
Wingate, had no support from either the Foreign Office
or War Office. On pressing his remonstrances against
the policy that was being pursued, he was recalled "to
report/' But when he reached Paris he was not
received, and he did not return to Egypt.
Then it was a bad ^st diplomatic ^J* mistake to refuse