The War	225
formally allotted by that local despot the Omdeh. The
total collected, some ££600,000, was insignificant in
terms of war finance, and disproportionately injurious to
our position in Egypt. Such moneys raised by the hated
Omdehs for the hated Christian symbol were very dearly
come by. Again, the Egyptian Government ungrudg-
ingly gave to the British and to their friends at Court all
the rope that they wanted.
The commandeering of corn need have produced no
hardship, but did in effect do so. The same quota that
was easily supplied from his surplus by the large pro-
ducer of the Delta, forced the " Saidi^>J of Upper Egypt
to buy at war prices from his more prosperous neighbours.
Moreover, payment, though ample, was not prompt, and
at first only a percentage of such payment reached the
producers themselves. Another grievance was the control
of cotton. Cotton was both the main source of Egyptian
wealth and one of the raw materials of most importance,
both as a possible aid and comfort to the enemy and as
an  indispensable  supply  to   our  munition  and  army-
clothing factories. Cotton control was first established to
check enemy trading through Switzerland ; but the Swiss
Commercial Trust proved more commercial than trust-
worthy, and the black list of Swiss firms grew ever longer
and blacker. By 11917 it was decided, for this and other
reasons, to purchase the whole Egyptian crop at a price
slightly above the ruling rate. The Egyptian Government
contended for a price of $60 a kantar as against that
of $42 fixed by proclamation (June 18, 1918).   This,
combined with the rise in price during the winter of
1919-20 to $200, created the impression that Egypt had
been bested over a deal in futures. Whereas the cotton
control, so far from deserving condemnation, seems to
have done well by the Egyptian grower by checking
15