Financial Reconstruction	167
barely functioning. But there remained the possibility
of education in administration, and, as Nubar Pasha re-
marked,—" The Government of Egypt is an administra-
tion/^3 Association of suitable individuals in administrative
responsibility would have provided a future nation with
leaders of some experience in public affairs. And it had
been intended that this should be done. But instead of
a larger and larger contingent of native officials their
numbers became less and less. An Englishman could
do the work of several natives more efficiently and
economically, even though paid five or six times more.
There was a steady pressure to employ an Englishman
both for political and personal reasons. Vacancies came
to be almost invariably filled by Englishmen—at first as
experts, but finally just because they were English.
Efforts were at times made to check this process. But in
the end the contingent of " advisers^11 and "experts"
was transformed into a pretty complete Civil Service, in
which Egyptians either held sinecures or second division
posts* This Anglo-Egyptian Civil Service was there-
after regularly recruited in England, and came to be
entitled to permanent employment and pension. The
direct results were good. But the whole rats on d'etre of
the British officials had become administrative and not
advisory. The fiction was maintained that Egypt was
being educated by experts ; but, in fact, it was employ-
ing more members of the British ruling class than was
compatible with its own political education.
The introduction of advisers and of experts was a
necessary development of the responsibility thrown upon
the British Agent and Consul-GeneraL His position, with
which British prestige was involved, had to be protected
by associating responsible officials with the various de-
partments. The first of these was necessarily an adviser