The British Occupation	123
distinction that relieved the minds of Egypt's creditors
and removed any risk of international complications.
But had he, as Premier, resigned and gone into Opposi-
tion, there would have been no further "operations of
war/' For the bombardment had allayed the superficial
irritation against Egypt excited by the Press and had
aroused sounder instincts. The English people had begun
to realise that in the interests of moneylenders they were
forcing a petty people of peaceable peasants to fight for
very reasonable rights. Which feeling could, however,
find no expression with Gladstone preaching a crusade
against anti-Christian anarchy. So when he called for
^2,500,000—"to convert the state of Egypt from
anarchy and conflict to peace and order"—and
announced that—"failing the co-operation of Europe,
this great work will be undertaken by the single power of
England^}'—Parliament supported such a comforting com-
bination of Palmerston and Pecksniff by a majority of two
hundred and seventy-five to nineteen. So fifteen thousand
men sailed from England and five thousand from India
under command of Sir Garnet Wolseley, whose instruc-
tions were " to suppress a military revolt in Egypt.^19
The policy of de Freycinet, that France should associate
herself in armed action with England in a secondary role,
satisfied nobody in France. Bismarck, with Austria in
tow, anxious to divide Great Britain and France over
Egypt, on the one hand encouraged us in independent
intervention ; arid on the other hand took such diplomatic
action in Paris as to cause a panic there that he was
trying to involve French military resources in an African
adventure. Clemenceau denounced this danger, and, on
the proposal that France should occupy the northern
bank of the Canal and Great Britain the southern (where,
of course, all the fighting would be), the French Govern-