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objectionable weapon with which the Powers could crush
the Egyptian Nationalist forces was an Ottoman army.
The British wanted such Ottoman intervention for the
suppression of Arabi and the restoration of foreign
authority. But Arabi wanted it also for the deposition of
Tewfik and for resistance to foreign control. Gladstone
very properly would only allow a Turkish force if it were
clearly under foreign control. While the Sultan would
only intervene as Khalif and Commander of the Faithful,
and could not do so as a gendarme of the ghiaours.
Abdul Hamid accordingly arrived at a characteristic
compromise by sending a mission composed of Dervish
Pasha, who was notorious for his cruelty to rebellious
rayahs, and of Sheikh Ahmed Essad, a Pan-Islamic
propagandist. Dervish was accredited to Tewfik and the
Turkish ruling class. The Sheikh had been already closely
associated with the Colonels and Egyptians. Both had
independent cipher communication with the Sultan.
Dervish was instructed to support Tewfik, arrest Arabi,
abolish the Chamber, and call for troops if necessary.
Essad was to act with Arabi and assure the Chamber that
the Sultan would respect Egyptian autonomy and refuse
armed intervention. For which duplicity " Abdul the
Damned" has been very generally condemned. Authors
like Lord Cromer argue that he thereby lost the last
chance of recovering Egypt for the Empire that a strong
and straightforward intervention would have secured.
But Abdul was between the devil of a Pan-Islamic
.djehad and the deep sea of British sea-power. It
would have been fatal for him to commit himself to the
deep sea, but the devil was not unfamiliar.
This Egyptian crisis offers us a very interesting
example of how an imperialist impulse can change
abruptly the whole tone and tendency of the foreign