Bankrupts and Brokers	93
in arranging '' invisible ^J' occupations would have easily
evolved a working compromise. But the problem was
complicated by the competition between British and
French %nd by the conviction of both their representa-
tives that there was nothing to be made of the Assembly
and nothing to be done with the Khedive. It was, indeed,
too readily assumed that Ismail, as a constitutional
ruler, was a wolf in sheep's clothing. He was much
more like a fox taking refuge among sheep from the
hounds.
Moreover, Ismail's financial proposals were more
favourable to foreign creditors than those of the Com-
mission of Inquiry, as Ismail knew when he excluded the
Commission's Report from the mail bags so that his own
proposals might reach Europe first. The financial
criticisms of Ismail's project, even as argued by Lord
Cromer, are quite unconvincing. The real issue was not
the measure of financial repudiation, but the measure of
political reform. Political reform required time ; and so
reluctant were both British and French at this time
to assume direct responsibility for the Government
of Egypt that time might have been allowed but for
the intervention of a third party that forced their
hand.
Bismarck had more than once boasted that he would
make Great Britain and France quarrel over Egypt,
and he had no intention of letting the Egyptian question
settle itself. Here now was an opportunity for putting
the British and French at loggerheads, for letting
Germany play the lead in high politics, and for placing
high finance under an obligation. Mr. Wilfrid Blunt
(Secret History of the Occupation, p. 65) tells a well
authenticated story of how Wilson resented his dismissal
by "that little scoundrel" Ismail, and his desertion by